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INTRODUCTION
On June 12, 1991, the Municipal Art Society ("Society")' held its annual
meeting in the sanctuary of St. Bartholomew's Episcopal Church. Framed by a
terrace and gardens, the landmark seventy- one year old church and its adjoining
community house occupy a strip of the most expensive real-estate in Manhattan:
set among Park Avenue's modem high-rise office towers and older skyscrapers,
St. Bartholomew's is directly across 50th Street from the Waldorf Astoria Hotel
& Towers. The choice of this meeting site was symbolic. Just three months
before, the Society, together with the New York City Landmarks Commission,
had successfully concluded a decade-long effort to block St. Bartholomew's plan
to erect a fifty-nine story office tower next to the graceful Byzantine structure in
order to fund its religious and social programs.
2
The church had been a formidable opponent. With an endowment of over
$12 million, it could afford to hire top legal counsel and to take its case to the
public with a full-page ad in the New York Times.3 If the Society's members
were somewhat subdued in light of their victory, it was both an expression of
courtesy - the Reverend Thomas Bowers, Rector of St. Bartholomew's and
"architect" of the office-tower project would address them that afternoon - and
an acknowledgment of their many past defeats and pending struggles.
The Church of St. Paul & St. Andrew, like St. Bartholomew's, is a
landmarked church that sought permission to develop its site commercially.
However, St. Paul & St. Andrew's, a Methodist church on Manhattan's upper
west side, has an endowment of only $35,000, and its congregation struggles to
pay salaries and maintain the 1,400 seat sanctuary.4 A decade ago, St. Paul &
1. The Municipal Art Society is a nonprofit organization that has been extremely active as a
proponent of strong landmark and land-use controls in New York City.
2. Final victory was assured in March 1991 when the Supreme Court denied the church's peti-
tion for review of a federal appeals court ruling in favor of the Commission. St. Bartholomew's
Church v. City of New York, 914 F.2d 58 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1103 (1991). For a
discussion of St. Bartholomew's attempts to demolish its community house and raise an office build-
ing, see infra notes 166, 213-18 and accompanying text.
3. Interview with the Rev. Thomas Bowers, Rector, St. Bartholomew's Church, in New York,
N.Y. (June 11, 1991). See generally BRENT C. BROLIN, THE BATrLE OF ST. BART'S (1988).
4. Church of St. Paul & St. Andrew v. Barwick, 496 N.E.2d 183, 194-95 (N.Y.) (Meyer, J.,
dissenting), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 985 (1986). The required maintenance was quite beyond the con-
gregation's fiscal means: the balcony had deteriorated to the point where it was unsafe; the plumbing,
[Vol. 65
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St. Andrew's devised a plan to alleviate its financial difficulties: it would demol-
ish the decaying interior and roof of the existing church, while retaining the
building's facade, and construct a smaller sanctuary at the front of the site and a
high-rise apartment complex in the rear.
Rather than submit these plans to the Landmarks Commission for ap-
proval, the church challenged New York City's landmark preservation law on
constitutional grounds.5  When this challenge failed,6 the church sought, and
was denied, Commission approval for its development plan under a hardship
provision in the ordinance.
7
As these two cases illustrate, there can be significant conflicts when
landmark preservation ordinances are applied to religious institutions. In fact,
the opponents of landmark designation for religious institutions argue that con-
flict is unavoidable because secular designation fundamentally burdens religious
institutions.8 By definition, landmark designation prevents a church from realiz-
ing the funds that attend the commercial development of a given site.9 More-
over, the financial burdens associated with landmark designation - such as
affirmative maintenance requirements, regulation of renovation and expansion,
and the prohibition on demolition and redevelopment - divert existing church
funds from the needs of religious ministry to building maintenance. In addition,
a landmark ordinance's regulations and restrictions compromise a church's reli-
gious autonomy t0 by intruding upon a church's management of its affairs "sub-
roof, and exterior masonry required extensive repair; and the church could not afford to install an
elevator for the elderly and handicapped. Id.
5. Id. at 185.
6. Id. at 192-93. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed a lower court ruling dismissing the
church's action on ripeness grounds. Id.
7. The Commission acknowledged that the building was deteriorating and that the church
could not afford to maintain it; nonetheless, it declined to find a hardship on the ground that the
church's application was incomplete. The church, which claims that it has already spent $75,000 in
attempting to complete its application to the Commission's satisfaction, has no choice but to return
to the Commission, since it is impossible for the congregation to raise the $6 million to $8 million it
would need to restore the building. See Rob Boston, Historic Battle, CHURCH & STATE, Mar. 1990,
at 8-10.
8. Angela C. Carmella, Houses of Worship and Religious Liberty: Constitutional Limits to
Landmark Preservation and Architechical Review, 36 VILL. L. REV. 401 (1991) [hereinafter Houses
of Worship]. See Committee of Religious Leaders of the City of New York, Final Report of the
Interfaith Commission to Study the Landmarking of Religious Property, in THE HISTORIC PRESER-
VATION YEARBOOK 258-67 (Russell V. Keune ed., 1985) [hereinafter Interfaith Commission Report]
(requiring diversion of resources for religious purposes to nonreligious cause of architectural preser-
vation tantamount to constitutional violation); see also Angela C. Carmella, Landmark Preservation
of Church Property, 34 CATH. LAW. 41, 50-52 (1991) [hereinafter Landmark Preservation] (general
overview of fiscal burdens on churches subjected to landmark preservation laws).
9. Robert L. Crewdson, Ministry and Mortar: Historic Preservation and the First Amendment
After Barwick, 33 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 137, 160 (1988) (describing financial issue as
"the core of the preservation battle in Manhattan").
10. See Carmella, Landmark Preservation, supra note 8, at 52-53 (because church's form is
integral part of its function, governmental restriction on landmark use, interior or exterior, may risk
governmental intrusion into religious affairs); see generally Crewdson, supra note 9, at 161-63.
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ject solely to its own discretion in accord with its own polity."'"
Finally, and most fundamentally, opponents of landmark designation con-
tend that such "governmental design control of houses of worship violates both
the free exercise and establishment clauses of the first amendment ... [because]
the physical form of the house of worship constitutes religious expression."
1 2
Opponents of landmark designation of religious institutions have pressed
these claims both in the courts and before legislative bodies. The results have
been mixed. In 1990, churches in Seattle and Boston challenged their cities'
landmark preservation ordinances on First Amendment grounds and won, while
St. Bartholomew's was unable to dislodge New York City's ordinance on either
First Amendment or takings grounds. 13 Legislative attempts over the past few
years to protect religious institutions from landmark designation have also met
with checkered success at both the state and local levels.14
A number of these lawsuits and legislative proposals have received exten-
sive media coverage,15 and the impression of inevitable conflict between religious
institutions and landmark commissions has gained popular currency. This im-
pression may be more contrived than real. Despite the heroic proportions of
some documented conflicts, like St. Bartholomew's, there are relatively few re-
ported cases in which a religious institution has challenged its landmark status.
On the contrary, many religious leaders support landmark designation of reli-
gious institutions. Some church leaders cite the theological importance of main-
taining a linkage with the past and the recognition that the physical environment
affects the "spiritual realities of our community" as reasons for their support.'
6
11. Interfaith Commission Report, supra note 8, at 258. This claim for church autonomy does
recognize, however, "that all such decisions should be undertaken in compliance with appropriate
regulations affecting public safety and health." Id. But cf. City of Sumner v. First Baptist Church,
639 P.2d 1358 (Wash. 1982) (trial court failed to properly baance interests of parties by enjoining
use of church basement for educational purposes, where full compliance with uniform building code
requirements for fire safety as applied to a religious school posed financial burden for church).
12. Carmella, Houses of Worship, supra note 8, at 402.
13. See infra notes 144-265 and accompanying text for a discussion of these and other constitu-
tional challenges to landmark preservation ordinances.
14. See infra notes 127-40 and accompanying text for a discussion of the legislative attempts to
protect religious institutions from preservation laws and landmark designation.
15. See, e.g., David W. Dunlap, St. Bart's is Getting an Adversary Under Its Dome, N.Y. TIMES,
May 4, 1991, at A10, and David W. Dunlap, Court Backs St Bart's in Tower Legal Battle, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 29, 1987, at B3 [hereinafter Court Backs St. Bart's] (both discussing St. Bartholomew's
Church controversy in New York City); see also Church Cannot Be Regulated As Landmark Court
Rules, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 1, 1991, at A9 (discussing dispute over landmarking Boston church's
interior).
16. Letter from Rev. Thomas F. Pike, Rector of Calvary Holy Communion & St. George's
Episcopal Church, New York, N.Y., to Stephen Halpern, Buffalo, N.Y. (Jan. 17, 1986) [hereinafter
Pike Letter] (copy on file at Partners for Sacred Places, Philadelphia, Pa.); see also Historic Preserva-
tion of Religious Sites: Oversight Hearing Before the Subcomm. on General Oversight and Investiga-
tions of the House Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1990) [hereinafter
Oversight Hearing] (preservation of religious institutions vital because religious structures, with mul-
titude of uses, may serve as primary cultural and social centers of communities) (statement of Rev.
Pike); Statement of Rev. Thomas Phelan, Dean, School of Humanities and Social Sciences, Rensse-
laer Polytechnic Institute, Troy, N.Y., NEWSLETTER (Preservation League of New York State),
[Vol. 65
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Others recognize that the burden of landmark designation in historic districts is
offset by the benefit of protection from incompatible neighboring development. 17
Still others see landmark designation as part of a church's responsibility to the
wider community.' 8 Arguing from a less sectarian perspective, lay supporters of
landmark preservation contend that the burdens placed on churches and syna-
gogues are no greater than those imposed on other nonprofit institutions.1 9
Thus, the argument goes, exempting religious institutions from valid landmark
ordinances would itself violate the First Amendment's Establishment Clause.20
This Article proposes to examine the conflict between religious institutions
and landmark preservation groups at both its empirical and normative levels.
Part I of the Article provides an overview of historic preservation. It traces the
development of the historic preservation movement, describes the standards and
procedures commonly found in preservation ordinances, and discusses briefly
the seminal cases in this field.2 1 Part II then attempts to answer three questions:
(1) how extensive is the conflict between religious institutions and landmark
commissions; (2) what has been the response of state and local legislatures to
the conflict; and (3) what legal doctrines have the courts used in addressing this
conflict? To answer these questions the Article presents empirical data regard-
ing the extent and types of conflict between religious institutions and landmark
commissions, and discusses the various legislative and judicial attempts to recon-
cile the seemingly incommensurate goals of the parties involved. 22 Part III then
considers the relevant caselaw23 and commentary24 in the context of the larger
scholarly debate on First Amendment issues.
My findings suggest that, while the conflict is real, it is not so threatening as
to warrant extraordinary remedial measures. As an empirical matter, it appears
Mar.-Apr. 1984, Vol. 10, No. 2, at 2 (historical religious structures remind us of shared past, suggest
permanance, and offer sense of identity).
17. See, e.g., Statement of Rev. Mark D. Ridley, Associate Pastor, United Methodist Church,
Owego, N.Y., NEWSLETTER (Preservation League of New York State), Mar.-Apr. 1984, Vol. 10,
No. 2, at 2 (churches benefit when neighbors covered by landmark laws). In fact, landmark designa-
tion is often coveted because of the perceived status it imparts to religious buildings. Interview with
Robert Yeager, Director, Partners for Sacred Places, Inc., Philadelphia, Pa. (June 5, 1991) [hereinaf-
ter Yeager Interview]. There have also been instances where individuals seek designation of a vacant
building that formerly housed a religious institution in order to safeguard the building, and its his-
torical import, from demolition. See, e.g., Letter from David Schechner, Historian of Congregation
Oheb Shalom, South Orange, N.J., to Samuel Gruber, Jewish Heritage Council, New York, N.Y.
(Jan. 18, 1990) (seeking council's assistance in obtaining landmark designation for congregation's
former sanctuary in Newark, N.J.) (copy on file with Partners for Sacred Places, Philadelphia, Pa.).
18. Statement of the Rev. William D. Persell, Rector, St. Ann and the Holy Trinity Episcopal
Church, Brooklyn Heights, N.Y., NEWSLETrER (Preservation League of New York State) Mar.-
Apr. 1984, Vol. 10, No. 2, at 3 (churches have responsibility to maintain properties).
19. Yeager Interview, supra note 17.
20. See infra notes 397-407 and accompanying text for a discussion of the tension between the
First Amendment's Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses when religious institutions are ex-
empted from otherwise applicable preservation laws.
21. See infra notes 25-95 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 96-265 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 266-99 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 300-96 and accompanying text.
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that cooperation, not conflict, characterizes the relationships between religious
institutions and landmark commissions. Churches may legitimately invoke con-
stitutional protection, but only where landmark regulations effectively compro-
mise core religious activities; structural interior restrictions are an obvious
example, since a church's physical interior is intimately bound to its congrega-
tion's religious expression. However, the claims of landmark opponents for
more sweeping protection from regulation do not withstand analysis and should
not be granted by either the courts or the legislature. The Article concludes
with suggestions as to how both courts and legislatures can uphold landmark
regulation of religious institutions while guaranteeing that such regulations do
not intrude too deeply into core religious values.
I. AN OVERVIEW OF HISTORIC DISTRICT AND LANDMARK
PRESERVATION ORDINANCES
A. The Historic Preservation Movement
Before the 1960s, federal, state, and local governments made little effort to
protect or conserve the nation's historic buildings.
25 The early preservation
movement, which began in the mid-nineteenth century, was solely the responsi-
bility of interested individuals or private groups whose primary function was
that of purchasing historically significant buildings threatened with demoli-
tion. 26 A primary motivation for preserving such buildings was the hope that
they might be a source of patriotic inspiration for the public.
27 Despite this
theme of patriotism, state and local governments were little moved to support
preservation efforts, 28 while the federal government limited its role to the acqui-
sition of Civil War battlefield sites.
29
25. See Carol M. Rose, Preservation and Community: New Directions in the Law of Historic
Preservation, 33 STAN. L. REV. 473, 474-75 (1981) (government at all levels slow to recognize need
for preservation laws, especially in light of nation's preoccupation with growth and expansion); see
also JACOB M. MORRISON, HISTORIC PRESERVATION LAW 4-19 (2d ed. 1965) (describing the lim-
ited preservation efforts undertaken before 1960s).
While we may think of historic preservation as a modern phenomenon, preservation efforts can
be traced as far back as the end of the Roman Empire, when the Emperor Majorian attempted to
halt the common practice of using monumental public buildings as a ready source of building mater-
ials. Id. at 1. However, Professor Sax has noted that while societies occasionally have protected or
preserved their past, "for most things, and for most of history, neglect or iconoclasm were far more
common than protection." Joseph L. Sax, Heritage Preservation as a Public Duty: The Abbd Grd-
goire and the Origins of an Idea, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1142, 1143 (1990).
26. David B. Fein, Note, Historic Districts: Preserving City Neighborhoods for the Privileged, 60
N.Y.U. L. REV. 64, 71-72 (1985); see also MORRISON, supra note 25, at 2-3 (until recently, private or
semi-private historical societies, art associations, and cultural organizations responsible for preserva-
tion of United States historical relics and landmarks). By this time, many historically significant
structures had been lost to fire or demolished to accommodate growth or changing tastes. CHARLES
B. HOSMER, JR., THE PRESENCE OF THE PAST 22 (1965).
27. See Rose, supra note 25, at 481-84 (discussion of how nineteenth century preservation was
motivated by such "inspiration").
28. See HOSMER, supra note 26, at 29-62 (describing limited state and local preservation
efforts).
29. See Christopher J. Duerksen & David Bonderman, Preservation Law: Where It's Been,
[Vol. 65
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The historic preservation movement evolved into its next phase around the
turn of the century, when the focus of preservation efforts broadened to include
buildings that were of architectural or cultural merit. 30 As this phase
progressed, the first local preservation ordinances appeared. Cities such as
Charleston, New Orleans, and San Antonio, each of which had notable historic
districts, enacted preservation ordinances in the 1930s. 3 1 Over the next two de-
cades similar ordinances could be found in a number of other cities as well. 32
These early ordinances protected historic areas rather than individual landmarks
and were usually enacted to preserve quaint districts, such as the Vieux Carre in
New Orleans, as tourist attractions. 33 During this same period both the federal
and state governments began passing legislation supportive of the preservation
effort.34
Where It's Going, in A HANDBOOK ON HISTORIC PRESERVATION LAW 2 (Christopher J. Duerksen
ed., 1983) (hereinafter HANDBOOK]. Even this limited federal effort was not without opposition. See
Rose, supra note 25, at 482-83 (unsuccessful challenge to proposed condemnation of the Gettysburg
battlefield) (citing United States v. Gettysburg Elec. Ry. Co., 160 U.S. 668 (1896)).
30. For a discussion of the reasons behind this broadening of focus, compare Rose, supra note
25, at 480 (shift in focus due solely to entry of professional artists and architects into historic preser-
vation) with Fein, supra note 26, at 73 (extension of local land use controls beyond abatement of
nuisances played role in changing focus). Surprisingly, neither author mentions the influence of the
"City Beautiful" movement, which motivated many civic efforts to improve the aesthetics of their
communities. See generally MEL SCOTT, AMERICAN CITY PLANNING SINCE 1890 44-109 (1969);
Jon A. Peterson, The City Beautiful Movement, in INTRODUCTION TO PLANNING HISTORY IN THE
UNITED STATES 40-57 (Donald A. Krueckeberg ed., 1983).
31. See MORRISON, supra note 25, at 129-86 (lists and describes all local ordinances enacted
before 1965). The Charleston ordinance was enacted in 1931, followed by New Orleans in 1937, and
San Antonio in 1939. Id. at 17. Morrison notes that New Orleans passed an ordinance in 1924 to
protect the Old French Quarter, the Vieux Carre, but it was not put into effect at that time. Id. at 17
n.ll.
32. See Rose, supra note 25, at 506 (citing Washington, D.C. (1950), Lexington, Kentucky
(1958); Annapolis, Maryland (1952); Nantucket Island and Boston, Massachusetts (1955); Santa Fe,
New Mexico (1957); Winston-Salem, North Carolina (1948); and Alexandria, Virginia (1946)).
33. Rose, supra note 25, at 506-07.
34. The first historic preservation legislation the federal government enacted was the Antiqui-
ties Act of 1906, ch. 3060, 34 Stat. 225 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 431-433 (1988)), which
authorized the President to designate national monuments on lands the federal government owned
or controlled. 16 U.S.C. § 431. This was followed in 1935 by the Historic Sites Act, ch. 593, 49 Stat.
666 (1935) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 461-467 (1988)), which declared a national policy
"to preserve for public use historic sites, buildings, and objects of national significance for the inspi-
ration and benefit of the people of the United States." 16 U.S.C. § 461. The Act empowered the
Secretary of the Interior to survey and secure data about historic buildings and sites; to acquire such
buildings and sites, provided Congress appropriated money for that purpose; and to enter into coop-
erative agreements with state and local governments, associations, and individuals to preserve or
maintain historic buildings and sites. Id. § 462. Interestingly, the Act contained a provision that
barred acquisition of "property that is owned by any religious or educational institution" without the
consent of the owner. Id. Finally, in 1949, Congress created the National Trust for Historic Preser-
vation, a nonprofit corporation organized to facilitate the preservation of historic sites and buildings.
Act of Oct. 26, 1949, ch. 755, 63 Stat. 927 (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 468 (1988)). To effectuate this
purpose, the National Trust was authorized to accept and administer donated properties and funds;
to make cooperative agreements with government, associations, or individuals; and, generally, to
undertake any lawful activities necessary to achieve its goals. 16 U.S.C. § 468(e)-(h).
States assisted the historic preservation movement in this period in one of three ways: they
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It was not until after the mid-1950s, however, that government assumed an
active and dominant role in the preservation movement.
35 By 1965, every state
had enacted some form of historic preservation legislation.
36 At the local level,
New York City became the first large city to enact a comprehensive preservation
ordinance authorizing the designation of both historic districts and individual
landmarks. 37 And in 1966 Congress enacted the National Historic Preservation
Act, 38 which was followed ten years later by federal tax incentives for historic
preservation. 39 By 1978, when the United States Supreme Court upheld the
New York City ordinance against a constitutional challenge,
4° 500 local govern-
either (1) enacted enabling legislation, authorizing certain local governments to enact local preserva-
tion ordinances; (2) authorized local government to enact such ordinances; or (3) authorized local
governments to regulate private property under the police power in order to assure its preservation.
MORRISON, supra note 25, at 12.
35. See MORRISON, supra note 25, at 1 ("The most interesting thing about preservation laws is
their phenomenal growth in recent years in every category: importance, significance, influence and
sheer numerical output."). One important factor leading to this development was the Supreme
Court decision in Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954), which provided a strong statement in
support of land use controls as a device to achieve aesthetic goals. Duerksen & Bonderman, supra
note 29, at 7.
36. See MORRISON, supra note 25, at 61-126 (describing each statute); see generally Paul E.
Wilson & H. James Winkler, II, The Response of State Legislation to Historic Preservation, 36 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 329 (1971) (analysis of state response to historic preservation movement).
37. The New York City Landmarks Preservation Law, ADMIN. CODE ch. 8A, §§ 25-301 to 25-
321 (1986). However, New York City was not the first large city to enact an ordinance protecting
individual landmarks. That distinction belongs to Philadelphia, which enacted its ordinance in 1955.
PHILADELPHIA, PA., CODE OF GENERAL ORDINANCES ch. 14-2000 (1955). That ordinance author-
ized the Philadelphia Historical Commission to list and classify every historic building in the city,
and empowered the Commission to prevent these landmarks from demolition or alteration through a
permitting process. See generally Margaret B. Tinkcom, The Philadelphia Historical Commission:
Organization and Procedures, 36 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 386 (1971).
38. Pub. L. No. 89-665, 80 Stat. 915 (1966) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 470 to 470w-6
(1988)). For a description of the Act, see Louis R. Ruzzi, Comment, Preserving Historic Structures:
An Analysis of Regulatory Legislation and Tax Incentives in Federal, Maryland, and Municipal Law,
14 U. BALT. L. REV. 557, 558-62 (1985). For an overview of federal efforts regarding historic pres-
ervation, see Oscar S. Gray, The Response of Federal Legislation to Historic Preservation, 36 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBs. 314 (1971) (federal preservation efforts as they stood five years after passage of
Act); Kate M. Perry, The National Historic Preservation Forum Evaluates The Nation's Preservation
Program, 6 PRESERVATION L. REP. 2047-59 (1988) (recent overview and evaluation of federal pres-
ervation efforts).
39. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 2124, 90 Stat. 1525, 1919 (repealed 1981).
Because this Article focuses on tax-exempt institutions, the tax aspects of historic preservation law
are not relevant to the inquiry. For a brief description and analysis of federal tax incentives for
historic preservation, see Fein, supra note 26, at 77-79. For a more detailed description of federal tax
incentives for historic preservation, see Lars A. Hanslin, Tax-Sheltered Investments in Historic
Building Rehabilitation: The 20 Percent Tax Credit Explained, in 1988 ZONING AND PLANNING
LAW HANDBOOK 407-20 (Noah J. Gordon ed., 1988); cf Margaret Davis, State Tax Incentives For
Historic Preservation, in NATIONAL TRUST FOR HISTORIC PRESERVATION, PRESERVATION POLICY
RESEARCH SERIES No. SLP-003 (1985) (tax incentives under state law); David Listokin,
LANDMARKS PRESERVATION AND THE PROPERTY TAX (1982) (tax incentives under local law).
40. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978) (New York City ordi-
nance upheld against takings challenge).
[Vol. 65
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ments had preservation ordinances: that number had doubled by 1985.41 Cur-
rent estimates place the number of local ordinances between 1,500 and 2,000.42
B. Local Ordinances
Federal and state contributions notwithstanding, 43 local government has
played the major regulatory role in historic landmark preservation." Local gov-
ernments generally preserve historic buildings by enacting either, or both
(1) historic district ordinances, which are designed to protect all buildings
within a given area (most often characterized by a large number of historic
buildings); or (2) landmarks ordinances, which are designed to protect individ-
ual buildings.45 The following paragraphs outline the basic structures, stan-
dards, and procedures of local historic preservation ordinances, as found in a
recent survey of thirty-three such ordinances.
4 6
41. Christoper J. Duerksen, Drafting and Administering Historic District Ordinances, in 1985
ZONING AND PLANNING LAW HANDBOOK 295 (J. Benjamin Gailey ed., 1985).
42. Carmella, Landmark Preservation, supra note 8, at 43.
43. State governments' most important function has been to enact enabling legislation that au-
thorizes local regulatory programs and to provide technical assistance. Some states also provide tax
incentives and limited amounts of funding. See Richard J. Roddewig, Preservation Law and Eco-
nomics: Government Incentives to Encourage For-Profit Preservation, in HANDBOOK, supra note 29,
at 427, 449-56 (various state tax incentives analyzed).
The federal government has been active in two areas, technical assistance and financial and tax
incentives. Technical assistance is provided through the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation
and the listing activities of the National Register of Historic Places, that were both created by the
National Historic Preservation Act of 1966, and the National Trust for Historic Preservation, an
independent nonprofit corporation established in 1949. Fein, supra note 26, at 76. The 1966 Act
also provides for matching grants to states and to the National Trust. For a discussion of federal tax
incentives see supra note 39.
44. DONALD G. HAGMAN & JULIAN C. JUERGENSMEYER, URBAN PLANNING AND LAND DE-
VELOPMENT CONTROL LAW § 14.9, at 469 (2d ed. 1986) ("The most important [historic] preserva-
tion work occurs at the local level .... "); see also Carmella, Landmark Preservation, supra note 8, at
43 ("For the most part ... preservation is most effectively and aggressively administered at the
municipal level ....").
45. See PATRICK J. ROHAN, ZONING AND LAND USE CONTROLS, § 7.01[2], at 7-6 to 7-7
(1987) (landmark commissions conduct architectural surveys and suggest buildings or areas that
deserve landmark desingation); John S. Pyke, Jr., Architectural Controls and the Individual
Landmark, 36 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 398, 398-99 (1971) (since 1950s, both historic districts and
individual landmarks have been regulated by ordinances).
46. MOBILE, ALA., CODE §§ 44-71 to 44-116 (1965); PHOENIX, ARIZ., ZONING ORDINANCE
ch. 8, §§ 801-816 (1985); Los ANGELES, CAL., ADMINISTRATIVE CODE §§ 22.120 to 22.136 (1985)
(amended 1987); SAN DIEGO, CAL., MUNICIPAL CODE ch. II, art. 6, § 26.02 (1965); SAN FRAN-
CISCO, CAL., PLANNING CODE art. 10 (1967), Id. art. 11 (1985); SAN JOSE, CAL., MUNICIPAL CODE
ch. 13.48 (1986); DADE COUNTY, FLA., CODE ch. 16A (1981) (Miami); ATLANTA, GA., CITY CODE
§§ 16-20.001 to 16-20.012 (1989); CHICAGO, ILL., MUNICIPAL CODE ch. 21, §§ 21-62 (1987); IND.
CODE §§ 36-7-11. 1-1 to 36-7-11.1-14 (1982) (Indianapolis); New Orleans, La., Ordinance No. 5992
M.C.S. (Feb. 19, 1976) (rev. Aug. 21, 1980); BALTIMORE, MD., CITY CODE art. 1, § 40 (1964); 1975
Mass. Acts. ch. 772, §§ 1-12 (1974) (Boston); DETROrr, MICH., CITY CODE ch. 25, art. 2 (1984);
MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CODE ch. 34 (1960); ST. PAUL, MINN., LEGISLATIVE CODE ch. 73 (1976)
(amended 1978, 1981, 1984, 1990); KANSAS CITY, Mo. ADMINISTRATIVE CODE §§ A6.120 to
A6.129 (1986); ST. Louis, Mo., COUNTY CODE § 1003.191 (1988); ALBUQUERQUE, N.M.,
LANDMARKS AND URBAN CONSERVATION ORDINANCE Art. 7-5, R.O. 1974, §§ 1-14 (1978)
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1. The Landmark Commission
Both historic district and landmark preservation rely on similar regulatory
provisions. Local preservation ordinances are administered by a commission or
board, whose members are typically appointed by the mayor. The size of these
bodies ranges from five to fifteen members, and they generally are comprised of
professionals from the various fields associated with historic preservation.
47
Most ordinances require that applications for landmark or historic district
designation be submitted directly to the commission.
48 There are variations,
such as requiring that the application be submitted to the city council, which
then transmits it to the appropriate commission. 4
9 Landmark preservation com-
missions must comply with due process hearing requirements either by mandat-
ing a public hearing on the proposal or allowing a public hearing at the owner's
or any interested party's request. Following the hearing, the commission gener-
ally transmits a report or recommendation to the city council for approval.
50
(amended 1991); ALBANY, N.Y., HISTORIC RESOURCES COMMISSION ORDINANCE §§ 1-1.26 to 1-
1.36.2 (1988); BUFFALO, N.Y., CODE ch. 337, §§ 337-1 to 337-32 (1974); NEW YORK CITY, N.Y.,
ADMINISTRATIVE CODE §§ 25-301 to 25-321 (1986); ROCHESTER, N.Y., CODE §§ 115-17 to 115-18,
115-35 to 115.37 (1975) (amended 1978, 1980, 1981, 1985, 1987, 1988); CINCINNATTI, OHIO, AD-
MINISTRATIVE CODE § 14 (1980); CINCINNATrI, OHIO, MUNICIPAL CODE ch. 741, §§ 741-1 to 741-
23 (1980); CINCINNATTI, OHIO, ZONING CODE, ch. 35, §§ 3500.1 to 3501.7 (1980); COLUMBUS,
OHIO, CITY CODE ch. 3116 (1989); PORTLAND, OR., CODE §§ 33.845.010 to 33.845.100, 33.710.060
to 33.710.110, 33.825.010 to 33.825.100 (1991); PHILADELPHIA, PA., CODE § 14-2007 (1985);
PITTSBURGH, PA., CODE tit. 10, ch. 1007, §§ 513.0-513.8 (1979); CHARLESTON, S.C., CITY CODE
art. 3, §§ 54-24 to 54-35 (1966) (amended 1973); DALLAS, TEX., DEVELOPMENT CODE §§ 51A-
3,103 to 51A-3,105, 51A-4,501 (1973); EL PASO, TEX., CITY CODE ch. 20.67 (1978); SEATTLE,
WASH., CODE ch. 25.12 (1977); MILWAUKEE, WIS., CITY DEVELOPMENT CODE §§ 308-381 (1981).
47. See, e.g., PHILADELPHIA, PA., CODE § 14-2007(3) (1985) (providing that Historical Com-
mission be comprised of 14 members, including at least one architect, one historian, one architec-
tural historian, one representative of a Community Development Corporation, one real estate
developer, and one representative of a community organization).
48. See, e.g., ATLANTA, GA., CITY CODE § 16-20.005 (1989) (applications to be filed with Ex-
ecutive Director of Urban Design Commission); KANSAS CITY, Mo., ADMINISTRATIVE CODE
§ A6.125 (1986) (applications to be filed as designated by Landmarks Commission); ALBUQUERQUE,
N.M., LANDMARKS AND URBAN CONSERVATION ORDINANCE § 7-5-7.2 (1978) (amended 1991)
(commission shall hold public hearing on any duly filed application); BUFFALO, N.Y., CODE § 337-6
(1974) (applications submitted to Secretary of Preservation Board); PITTSBURGH, PA., CODE tit. 10,
ch. 1007, § 513.3 (1979) (nominating form filed with commission). Seventeen of the 33 ordinances
surveyed state or imply that the application should be submitted to the preservation commission.
49. See, eg., DETROIT, MICH., CODE ch. 25, art. 2, § 4 (1984) (any person may request City
Council to designate: if reasonable, the City Council will direct the Historic Designation Advisory
Board to investigate proposal).
50. See, e.g., SAN JOSE, CAL., MUNICIPAL CODE §§ 13.48.110 to 13.48.120 (1986) (City Coun-
cil may approve, disapprove or give modified approval to proposed designation); CHICAGO, ILL.,
MUNICIPAL CODE § 21-73 (1987) (City Council may designate landmark by ordinance); BALTI-
MORE, MD., CITY CODE art. I, § 40 (J) (1964) (City Council passes ordinance); DETROIT, MICH.,
CITY CODE § 25-2-4 (1984) (City Council establishes historic district by ordinance); MINNEAPOLIS,
MINN., CODE § 34.60 (1960) (City Council designates by ordinance or resolution); KANSAS CITY,
Mo., ADMINISTRATIVE CODE § A6.125 (1986) (City Council designates historic landmark or dis-
trict); ALBUQUERQUE, N.M., LANDMARK AND URBAN CONSERVATION ORDINANCE § 7-5-7 (1978)
(amended 1991) (City Council approves or denies ordinance designating property as landmark);
ALBANY, N.Y., HISTORIC RESOURCES COMMISSION ORDINANCE § 1-1.29 (1988) (City Council may
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There are exceptions to this procedural scheme. An ordinance may mandate
that the commission present the report to the mayor,5 ' or a planning commis-
sion,5 2 or may vary the procedure depending on the size of the area to be
designated.
5 3
2. Designation as a Landmark
To determine whether a structure merits landmark designation, some pres-
ervation ordinances follow the Secretary of the Interior's standards for landmark
evaluation,5 4 while others adopt various different criteria.5 5 Very few ordi-
nances include a minimum-age requirement for landmark designation.5 6 Those
that do, generally permit designation of a property that doesn't meet the age
requirement if it is of exceptional importance.
57
The process for landmark designation begins with either an application by
the property owner or nomination by someone other than the property owner.
58
approve or disapprove recommendation); BUFFALO, N.Y., CODE § 337-12 (1974) (common council
may approve or disapprove designation of proposed landmark); EL PAso, TEX., CITY CODE
§§ 20.67.080 -20.67.090 (1978) (City Council passes historic landmark designation ordinance); MIL-
WAUKEE, WIS., CITY DEVELOPMENT CODE § 308-81-8 (1981) (City Council makes final designa-
tion decision). Twenty-one of the ordinances give the city council the final authority to approve,
deny, or modify the recommendation.
51. See, e.g., 1975 Mass. Acts ch. 772, § 4 (requiring Boston Landmarks Commission to submit
report to Mayor for approval; City Council may override Mayor's action by two-thirds vote).
52. See, e.g., EL PASO, TEX., CODE §§ 20.67.070 to .080 (1986) (providing that Landmark
Commission present recommendation for designation to City Plan Commission, which then passes
its recommendation, along with Landmark Commission's, to City Council).
53. See, e.g., New Orleans, La., Ordinance No. 5992 M.C.S., § IX.A(l)-(2) (1976) (revised
1980) (Historic District/Landmarks Commission empowered to make final designation decision if
property does not exceed five acres; anything over five acres requires ratification by City Council).
54. See 36 C.F.R. § 60.4 (1991) (eligible sites "possess integrity of location, design, setting,
materials, workmanship, feeling, and association," and are associated with significant historical
events or historical figures; embody distinctive construction characteristics, the work of a master, or
high artistic value; or have yielded information important to history or prehistory).
55. See, e.g., SAN FRANCISCO, CAL., PLANNING CODE art. 10, § 1004 (1967) (eligible struc-
tures or sites are those having "a special character or special historical, architectural or aesthetic
interest or value").
56. Only 4 of the surveyed ordinances have a minimum age requirement for designation. See
PHOENIX, ARIZ., ZONING ORDINANCE ch. 8, § 807 (1985) (50 years); SAN JOSE, CAL., MUNICIPAL
CODE § 13.48.020 (1986) (30 years); DADE COUNTY, FLA., CODE § 16A.10 (1981) (50 years); SEAT-
TLE, WASH., CODE ch. 25.12, § 350 (1977) (25 years). Charleston requires permit approval for the
demolition, removal or relocation of a structure that is more than 75 years old or is listed on historic
inventory map within certain districts and for any change in the exterior architectural appearance of
a structure that is 100 years old or listed on the historic inventory map within certain districts.
CHARLESTON, S.C., CrrY CODE art. 3, § 54-25 (1966) (amended 1973).
57. See, e.g., PHOENIX, ARIZ., ZONING ORDINANCE ch. 8, § 807 (1985) (property achieving
significance within past 50 years eligible for designation if of exceptional importance or unique
within city); DADE COUNTY, FLA., CODE § 16A.10 (1981) (property achieving significance within
past 50 years considered for designation if of exceptional importance); CINCINNATI, OHIO, MUNICI-
PAL CODE ch. 741, § 1-41 (1980) (same). But see SEATTLE, WASH., CODE ch. 25.12, § 350 (1977)
(imposing mandatory minimum age requirement of 25 years).
58. See, e.g., ATLANTA, GA., CITY CODE § 16-200.005 (1989) (owner may nominate building
or site; owners of at least 10 properties or 10% of total properties within proposed district may
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In the case of owner initiation for historic district nomination, the ordinances
typically require that a specific number or percentage of the owners in the pro-
posed area apply.
5 9
If the designation process is initiated by someone other than the owner, due
process requires that the owner of the property receive notice of the proposal.
Very few ordinances, however, require that the owner consent to the
designation. 6°
3. Restrictions Imposed by Designation
The majority of ordinances provide for designation of only the exteriors of
buildings. 6 1 Exterior designation generally prohibits the designated property's
owner from demolishing the property, undertaking any alterations, renovations,
nominate district); DETROIT, MICH., CITY CODE § 25-2-4 (1984) (anyone owning property in city
may request designation); ALBUQUERQUE, N.M., LANDMARKS AND URBAN CONSERVATION ORDI-
NANCE Art. 7-5, R.O. 1974, §§ 1-14 (1978) (amended 1991) (application may be filed by any person
with direct financial, contractual, or proprietary interest in affected property); ROCHESTER, N.Y.,
CODE § 115-36 (1975) (amended 1978, 1980, 1981, 1985, 1987, 1989) (designation proceedings may
be initiated by City Council, Planning Commission, Preservation Board, Director of Zoning, or any
resident of City); DALLAS, TEX., DEVELOPMENT CODE § 51A-4.501(a)(2) (1973) (owner may initi-
ate procedure).
While most ordinances allow the owner to initiate the designation process, some apparently do
not; some contain express provisions listing those able to petition which do not include the owner.
Compare ATLANTA, GA., CODE ch. 20, § 16-20.005 (1989) ("The following persons are empowered
to file an application with the director for the nomination of a building site or district ...the
owner(s) of the building or site to be nominated.") with 1975 Mass. Acts, ch. 772, § 4 (the Mayor,
any Commission member, or any 10 voters of city may petition Boston Landmarks Commission to
designate landmark).
59. See, e.g., SAN JOSE, CAL., CODE ch. 13.48.120 (1986) (provides for nomination of historic
district by City Council, Historic Landmarks Commission, Planning Commission, or by application
of persons who own 60% of land in proposed district); ATLANTA, GA., CODE, ch. 20, § 16-20.005
(1989) ("owners of at least 10 properties, or the owners of 10 percent of the total number of proper-
ties within the proposed district, whichever is less," can nominate an area).
60. Only 4 ordinances contain provisions relating to owner consent. See DADE COUNTY, FLA.,
CODE § 16A-10(c) (1981) (board "encouraged to obtain the permission" of property owners within
designated area); CHICAGO, ILL., MUNICIPAL CODE ch. 21, § 69 (1987) (commission shall request
owner consent, and if not given shall hold public hearing on proposed designation); ROCHESTER,
N.Y., CODE § 115-36 (5)(a) (1988) (if owner does not consent to landmark designation, Preservation
Board must approve designation by three-fourths majority vote); SEATTLE, WASH., CODE chs.
25.12.520, 25.12.570, 25.12.620 (1980) (if Landmarks Preservation Board staff cannot agree with
owner on control of site and economic incentives, owner may demand hearing before hearing exam-
iner, whose findings are appealable to City Council).
Two ordinances provide additional restrictions on designation of places of religious worship.
See DADE COUNTY, FLA., CODE ch. 16A, § 10 (1981) (property of religious institutions or used for
religious purposes "will not normally be considered" for historical designation unless they are inte-
gral parts of historic districts); CHICAGO, ILL., MUNICIPAL CODE ch. 21, § 69.1 (1977) (no building
owned by religious organization and used primarily for religious ceremonies shall be designated
historical landmark without owner consent).
61. See, e.g., ALBANY, N.Y., HISTORIC RESOURCES COMMISSION ORDINANCE § 1-1.31(a)
(1988) (no exterior alterations without first obtaining certificate of appropriateness and building per-
mit); PHILADELPHIA, PA., CODE § 14-2007 (8)(c) (1985) (exterior of every historic building and
interior portions, neglect of which may cause deterioration of exterior, are to be "kept in good re-
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or construction on the property, or removing anything from the property with-
out the prior approval of the preservation commission. 62 Typically, the prop-
erty's owner applies to the building department for a building permit
authorizing the proposed work. The department then forwards the application
to the preservation commission. 63 At this juncture, the commission might hold
a public hearing on the work proposal, but if the proposal is for minor altera-
tions or complies with the commission's standards, a hearing is normally not
required. 64 Commission approval commonly takes the form of a certificate of
appropriateness, which authorizes the building department to issue a permit for
the proposed work.
4. Hardship and Appeals Procedures
Most ordinances contain some sort of hardship provision that enables an
applicant for a building permit or certificate of appropriateness to receive an
exception from the commission's criteria. 65 To be eligible for relief under a
pair"); MILWAUKEE, WIs., CITY DEVELOPMENT § 308-81-9 (1989) (no alteration of exterior of
historic site or property in historic district without certificate of appropriateness).
Only 10 ordinances expressly allow for designation of interior space. See, e.g., MINNEAPOLIS,
MIN., CODE § 34.40 (1985) (commission shall recommend to City Council buildings, including
interiors, to be designated for historic preservation); NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMINISTRATIVE CODE
§ 207-2.0 (1985) (recodified at §§ 25-301 to 25-321 (1986)) (commission has power to designate a list
of interior landmarks). However, church interiors are excluded from designation in New York. See
NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMINISTRATIVE CODE § 207-2.0(2) (1985) (commissioner cannot designate
"interiors utilized as places of religious worship").
62. Thirty-two ordinances provide for the issuance of a certificate of appropriateness; however,
some ordinances do not use the term "certificate of appropriateness." See, e.g., MOBILE, ALA.,
CODE § 44-73 (1965) (Architectural Review Board must transmit "written order" to Building In-
spector, who may then issue appropriate permit to applicant).
63. The following 20 ordinances provide for that procedure: MOBILE, ALA., CODE § 44-73
(1965); Los ANGELES, CAL., ADMINISTRATIVE CODE § 22.132 (1987); SAN DIEGO, CAL., MUNICI-
PAL CODE § 26.02 (E) (1) (1989); SAN FRANCISCO, CAL., CODE §§ 1005-1006 (1985); SAN JOSE,
CAL. MUNICIPAL CODE § 13.48.210(d) (1986); CHICAGO, ILL., MUNICIPAL CODE § 21-77 (1987);
BALTIMORE, MD., CODE § 4 0 (p)( 2 ) (1964); DETROIT, MICH., CODE ch. 25, art. 2-19 (1984); MIN-
NEAPOLIS, MINN., CODE ch. 34.60(4)(b) (1985); ST. PAUL, MINN. LEGISLATIVE CODE ch. 73,
§ 6(d) (1990); KANSAS CITY, Mo., ADMINISTRATIVE CODE § A6.126.B (1986); BUFFALO, N.Y.,
CODE § 337-18 (1974); ROCHESTER, N.Y., CODE § 115-37(c) (1988); CINCINNATI, OHIO, MUNICI-
PAL CODE ch. 741-13 (1981); PORTLAND, OR., CODE §§ 33.222.020, 33.825.020(1991); PHILADEL-
PHIA, PA., CODE § 14-2007 (7)(b) (1985); PITTSBURGH, PA., CODE ch. 1007, § 513.4(b) (1979); EL
PASO, TEX., CODE ch. 20.67.100 (1988); SEATTLE, WASH., CODE § 25.12.690 (1980); MILWAUKEE,
WIs., CITY DEVELOPMENT ch. 308-81-9(a) (1989).
64. See, e.g., ALBANY, N.Y., HISTORIC RESOURCES COMMISSION ORDINANCE § 1-1.31 (1988)
(Building Department refers proposal for alterations to Director of Planning, who may issue certifi-
cate of appropriateness for proposals for minor alterations); SEATTLE, WASH., CODE ch. 25.12,
§ 720 (1980) (no hearing required if Landmarks Preservation Board, owner, and applicant approve
the requested work).
65. Twenty-three ordinances have some type of hardship provision. PHOENIX, ARIZ., ZONING
ORDINANCE § .813 (1985); SAN JOSE, CAL., MUNICIPAL CODE § 13.48.260 (1986); DADE COUNTY,
FLA., CODE § 16A-12 (1981); ATLANTA, GA., CODE § 16.20.008(5) (1989); CHICAGO, ILL., MUNIC-
IPAL CODE § 21-86 (1987); IND. CODE § 36-7-1 1.1-9(e) (1991); New Orleans, La., Ordinance No.
5992 M.C.S. § VII (I) (Feb. 19, 1976) (revised Aug. 21. 1980); BALTIMORE, MD., CODE art. 1,
§ 40(a)(5)(ii) (1964); 1975 Mass. Acts ch. 772, § 8; DETROIT, MICH., CODE ch. 25-2-22(3) (1984);
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hardship provision, the applicant must show that denying his application will
result in his inability to earn a reasonable rate of return on the designated
property.
66
Most ordinances allow an aggrieved party to appeal the commission's deter-
mination, although some limit that right of appeal. 6 7 With few exceptions, the
party may appeal either to the city council (or an equivalent local government
council) or directly to a municipal court.
6 8
5. Specific Relief Provisions for Religious and Charitable Institutions
Although few in number, several municipal ordinances contain relief provi-
sions directed specifically at religious and charitable institutions. 69 In addition
to New York City - whose ordinance provides the most significant protection
MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CODE ch. 34.70(e) (1985); KANSAS CITY, Mo., ADMINISTRATIVE CODE
§ A6. 126.E.(4) (1986); ALBUQUERQUE, N.M., LANDMARKS AND URBAN CONSERVATION ORDI-
NANCE § 7-5-8 (1978) (amended 1991); ALBANY, N.Y., HISTORIC RESOURCES COMMISSION ORDI-
NANCE § 1-135 (1988); BUFFALO, N.Y., CODE § 337-23(A) (1974); NEW YORK, N.Y.,
ADMINISTRATIVE CODE § 25-309 (1986); CINCINNATI, OHIO, MUNICIPAL CODE § 741-13(h)
(1981); COLUMBUS, OHIO, CODE ch. 3116.15 (1989); PHILADELPHIA, PA., CODE § 14-2007
(7)(h)(.7) (1985); DALLAS, TEX., DEVELOPMENT CODE § 51A-4.501 (3) (1973); EL PASO, TEX.,
CODE § 20.67.100(6)(D) (1988); SEATTLE, WASH., CODE § 25.12.580 (1980); MILWAUKEE, WIS.,
CITY DEVELOPMENT § 308-81-9(0 (1989).
66. See, e.g., CHICAGO, ILL., MUNICIPAL CODE ch. 21, § 86 (1987) (applicant may apply to
Commission on Chicago Landmarks for economic hardship exception on basis that denial of permit
will result in loss of all reasonable and beneficial use of, or return from, property); BUFFALO, N.Y.,
CODE ch. 337, § 23 (1974) (Buffalo Preservation Board may issue certificates of exception where
strict enforcement of code would cause undue hardship for applicant; one factor in meeting undue
hardship standard is proof that property cannot yield reasonable rate-of-return without requested
alteration or demolition).
67. See, e.g., ST. Louis, Mo., COUNTY CODE § 1003.191-4 (1988) (limiting right of appeal to
petitioner and "specified nearby property owners"); COLUMBUS, OHIO, CODE ch. 3116.21 (1989)
(limiting right of appeal to applicant).
68. Seventeen ordinances provide for appeal to the city council while six provide for the appeal
to be made in a municipal court. See, e.g., CHICAGO, ILL., MUNICIPAL CODE § 21-89 (1987) (appeal
to circuit court of Cook County); ALBUQUERQUE, N.M., LANDMARKS AND URBAN CONSERVA-
TION ORDINANCE § 7-5-10 (1978) (amended 1991) (appeal to City Council); CINCINNATI, OHIO,
MUNICIPAL CODE § 741-17 (1981) (appeal to City Council); CHARLESTON, S.C., CODE art. 3, § 54-
35 (1973) (appeal to "court of record"); EL PASO, TEX. CODE § 20.67.100(6)(D) (1988) (appeal to
City Council). But see PHILADELPHIA, PA., CODE, § 14-2007(10) (1985) (Board of License and
Inspection hears appeals).
69. See DADE COUNTY, FLA., CODE § 16A-10.(II) (1981) ("properties owned by religious in-
stitutions or used for religious purposes... will not normally be considered for designation"); CHI-
CAGO, ILL., MUNICIPAL CODE § 21-69.1 (1987) (no building owned by religious organization and
used primarily for religious ceremonies shall be designated as historic landmark without owner's
consent); BUFFALO, N.Y., CODE § 337-23(B)(3) (1974) (to prove undue hardship, applicant must
show land cannot be used without preventing or seriously interfering with carrying out of charitable
purpose on property held for charitable, religious, or nonprofit purposes); NEW YORK, N.Y., AD-
MINISTRATIVE CODE § 25-309(a)(2)(c) (1986) (nonprofit applicant shall be granted certificate of
appropriateness if it shows property is no longer adequate to carry out purposes of owner and pur-
poses to which it was devoted when acquired); COLUMBUS, OHIO, CODE § 3116.16(3) (1989) (to
show unusual and compelling circumstances, nonprofit applicant must show it is infeasible to
achieve its charitable purposes "while conforming to the architectural standards and guidelines").
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for such institutions 70 - Columbus, Ohio provides relief to nonprofit organiza-
tions that prove that "it is infeasible to financially or physically achieve its chari-
table purposes while conforming to the pertinent architectural standards and
guidelines" in the ordinance. 71 In Buffalo, New York, the Preservation Board
may issue a certificate of exception where strict enforcement of the code would
result in undue hardship to charitable, religious, or nonprofit institutions.
7 2
And although the Seattle ordinance authorizing landmark designation does not
itself provide any hardship relief for religious institutions, Seattle has included a




1. Upholding Historic District Designation
Because local preservation laws initially took the form of historic district
ordinances, these were the first to be challenged in the courts.74 In upholding
these early historic preservation efforts, courts relied on two basic arguments.
The first analogized historic districting to traditional zoning. 75 In both cases,
the argument ran, areas of the city were designated as districts within which
uniform restrictions applied; thus, property owners were benefitted and bur-
dened identically.76 The second argument stressed the economic benefits to be
gained from preserving historic districts as tourist attractions.
77
70. See supra note 147 for a description of the New York City ordinance's protection of charita-
ble institutions.
71. COLUMBUS, OHIO, CODE § 3116.16(3) (1989).
72. BUFFALO, N.Y., CODE § 337-23(B)(3) (1974). The applicant must prove inter aia that the
property "may not be used without physically or financially preventing or seriously interfering with
the carrying out of the charitable purpose in the case of properties held for charitable, religious or
nonprofit purposes." Id.
73. See SEATTLE, WASH., CODE § 25.12.350 (1980) (providing no hardship relief for designa-
tion of religious institutions). Under the Seattle landmark ordinance, a second ordinance is required
to designate a specific building as a landmark. Id. § 25.12.360.
74. See, e.g., City of New Orleans v. Pergament, 5 So. 2d 129 (La. 1941) (upholding ordinance
establishing Vieux Carre historic district in New Orleans); Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, 128
N.E.2d 563 (Mass. 1955) (upholding the validity of state laws creating Beacon Hill historic district);
Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, 128 N.E.2d 557 (Mass. 1955) (upholding validity of state laws
creating Nantucket historic district). For a description of these cases and associated litigation, see
MORRISON, supra note 25, at 37-42. Although the Charleston, South Carolina historic district ordi-
nance was the first to be enacted, see supra note 31, its validity was never litigated due to the "wide
public support" for preserving the city's graceful historic atmosphere. Thomas J. Reed, Note, Land
Use Controls in Historic Areas, 44 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 379, 391-92 (1969).
75. See Pyke, supra note 45, at 399 (zoning laws serve as principal precedent for historic district
regulation).
76. See DANIEL R. MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW § 11.22, at 434 (2d ed. 1988) (historic dis-
tricts, like any zoning district, confer mutually offsetting benefits and burdens). Mandelker points
out, however, that historic preservation serves different purposes than zoning. While zoning regu-
lates use, density, and location, historic districts preserve the exteriors of buildings by prohibiting
their demolition, requiring that they be maintained, and regulating their renovation. Id. at 433.
77. See Pyke, supra note 45, at 349 (both Massachusetts and Louisiana Supreme Courts empha-
sized value of districts as tourist attractions in upholding historic district preservation ordinances).
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In more recent years, courts have recognized and endorsed a third ration-
ale: historic districts serve a valid public purpose in preserving aesthetic and
cultural values. The Fifth Circuit in Maher v. City of New Orleans,78 used this
rationale to uphold the validity of New Orleans' Vieux Carre historic district
ordinance against a takings challenge.
79
In Maher, the owner of a cottage in the historic district was denied permis-
sion to tear-down the structure and replace it with a seven-unit apartment build-
ing. The Fifth Circuit upheld the ordinance as a proper exercise of the police
power, explicitly recognizing that apart from economic considerations, aesthetic
and spiritual values justified the creation of historic districts.8 0 The court re-
jected Maher's claims that the ordinance had the effect of taking his property
either because it denied him the most profitable use of that property or because it
imposed an affirmative maintenance requirement without acquiring the property
through eminent domain."' Maher's clear statement that aesthetic values may
legitimate such an exercise of police power exemplifies the modem trend holding
that aesthetics, standing alone, is a proper rationale upon which to uphold his-
toric district regulations.8 2 This decision remains the leading case for courts
determining the constitutionality of historic districts ordinances as the Supreme
Court has not addressed this issue to date.
8 3
78. 516 F.2d 1051 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 905 (1976).
79. Id. The Takings Clause - "nor shall private property be taken for public use without just
compensation." U.S. CoNST. amend. V. - serves as a check on governmental intrusion on rights of
private property. See Maher, 516 F.2d at 1065 (regulatory ordinance may constitute taking "if it is
unduly onerous so as to be confiscatory").
80. Maher, 516 F.2d at 1060-61.
81. Id. at 1065-67.
82. See MORRISON, supra note 25, at 35-43 (discussing evolution of aesthetics as rationale for
sustaining historic district ordinances). By 1980 a majority of states had adopted the rule that aes-
thetics alone could be a valid basis for an exercise of the police power; 31 states followed the majority
rule by 1990. James P. Karp, The Evolving Meaning of Aesthetics in Land-Use Regulation, 15
COLUM. J. ENv. L. 307, 313 n.35 (1990). For an overview of the judicial treatment of aesthetics as
the basis for land-use regulation, see John J. Costonis, Law and Aesthetics: A Critique and A Refor-
mation of the Dilemmas, 80 MICH. L. REv. 355, 371-77 (1982); Karp, supra, at 310-20.
Some commentators have argued that aesthetic-based regulations promote pluralistic communi-
ties and values. Compare Costonis, supra, at 359-61, 386-91 (aesthetics-based regulations allow
community to retain cultural stability while accommodating new members; historic district ordi-
nances are example of regulations based on desire for associational harmony, an idea that focuses on
shared human values and need for cultural stability) with Rose, supra note 25, at 488-91, 533-34
(fostering of community cohesion and encouragement of pluralism are major public purposes under-
lying historic district ordinances).
83. Although Maher was the first federal Circuit Court of Appeals case to address the constitu-
tionality of an historic district ordinance, there had previously been a number of unsuccessful state
court challenges to the New Orleans ordinance. See, e.g., City of New Orleans v. Levy, 64 So. 2d
798 (La. 1953) (restrictions on signs and building addition valid exercise of police power); City of
New Orleans v. Pergament, 5 So. 2d 129 (La. 1941) (prohibiting display of large sign not discrimina-
tory); City of New Orleans v. Impastato, 3 So. 2d 559 (La. 1941) (permit requirement for exterior
alteration is constitutional). Those cases, however, involved challenges to the ordinance's restric-
tions on signs and exterior alterations and thus did not pose as serious a constitutional issue as did
the denial of a demolition permit in Maher. The Fifth Circuit cited a number of sources to support
this decision, but relied in particular on two U.S. Supreme Court decisions, Berman v. Parker, 348
[Vol. 65
HeinOnline  -- 65 Temple L. Rev. 106 1992
1992] LANDMARK DESIGNATIONS OF RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS 107
2. Upholding Designation of Individual Landmarks
In Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York,8 4 the United States
Supreme Court held that the New York City Landmarks Law, which placed
restrictions on individual buildings and historic districts alike,85 did not amount
to a taking of the property occupied by the Grand Central Terminal.8 6 The crux
of Penn Central's claim was that the Landmarks Commission, by rejecting a
proposal to construct a high-rise office building above the existing terminal, had
taken its property without just compensation. 87 Penn Central attacked the gen-
U.S. 26 (1954) and Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974). Maher, 516 F.2d at 1058-61.
Although Berman involved a congressional use of the power of condemnation, rather than a state's
use of the police power, 348 U.S. at 28, 36, it has been universally cited as supporting the use of the
police power to achieve aesthetic and spiritual goals, including the goals of historic preservation. See
MANDELKER, supra note 76, § 2.37, at 57 (Berman "contains a much-quoted dictum that defines
'public welfare' to include spiritual and aesthetic as well as physical values"). Belle Terre upheld an
ordinance in an exclusive Long Island suburb that barred "group-living" arrangements because they
would interfere with "family values." 416 U.S. at 2-3, 9-10. The potential exclusionary effect of the
Belle Terre decision is noteworthy in light of the claims that historic preservation may have exclu-
sionary effects. See Fein, supra note 26, at 79-103 (arguing that historic preservation, particularly in
the form of historic districting, can have undesirable consequences of displacing and excluding mi-
norities and poor from urban neighborhoods); see also Rose, supra note 25, at 478, 512-17 (catalogu-
ing concerns about displacement); but see Dennis E. Gale, The Impacts of Historic District
Designation, 57 J. AM. PLAN. ASS'N 325, 329-36 (1991) (although existing research provides only a
few insights into displacement issue, analysis of residential historic district legislation in Washington,
D.C., finds little support for displacement threat).
84. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
85. Unlike historic district ordinances, which could be sustained by reference to traditional
zoning, see supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text, landmark ordinances were distinguishable
from zoning because they did not impose uniform restrictions on all similar uses within a district.
This distinction led some scholars to question the validity of landmark schemes on grounds other
than an alleged violation of the Takings Clause. One author writes:
The misconception that zoning and the regulation of individual landmarks are indistin-
guishable manifestations of the police power probably results from the fact that early pres-
ervation ordinances focused almost exclusively on the regulation of historic districts.
Historic districting may properly be viewed as a special case of zoning because of its area-
wide focus. But a "zoning" measure that singles out an individual landmark property for
severe bulk, use, and area restrictions not applicable to its neighbors generally would risk
invalidation on spot zoning and equal protection grounds.
John J. Costonis, The Chicago Plan: Incentive Zoning and the Preservation of Urban Landmarks, 85
HARV. L. REv. 574, 602 n.93 (1972). But cf. Pyke, supra note 45, at 399 (rationale validating
historic districts because of their value as tourist attraction may also justify designation of individual
landmarks which qualify as tourist attractions).
86. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 131, 138. The Terminal building, with eight stories above-ground
and many below-ground levels, is used primarily as a railroad station but also generates significant
income from commercial rentals. Id. at 115. The building was designated a landmark in 1967. Id.
at 115-16. In 1968, Penn Central sought approval from the Landmarks Commission for either of
two separate plans to construct a high-rise office building above the Terminal. Id. at 116. After the
Commission rejected both plans, Penn Central chose not to appeal the decision or to submit other
development plans. It filed suit in the New York courts claiming that the Landmarks Law had
unconstitutionally taken its property. Id. at 117. The New York Court of Appeals ultimately re-
jected the takings claim. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 366 N.E.2d 1271, 1278-79
(N.Y. 1977), aff'd, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
87. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 122. The Court announced that while takings cases were "essen-
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eral validity of the Landmarks Law on similar grounds, arguing "that any sub-
stantial restriction imposed pursuant to a landmark law must be accompanied
by just compensation if it is to be constitutional."8 8 The Court disagreed and
made short shrift of the arguments Penn Central marshalled to support its
challenge.89
The Court next analyzed whether the particular application of the law to
tially ad hoc, factual inquiries," several factors were of particular significance: (1) the economic
impact of the regulation on the claimant, particularly with regard to "distinct investment-backed
expectations"; (2) whether the government action is more readily characterized as a physical inva-
sion or acquisition of resources or property for public purposes, rather than a regulatory program;
and (3) whether the regulation is prohibiting otherwise lawful uses of "property" in order to effect a
substantial public purpose. Id. at 124-28. See generally LAND USE AND THE CONSTITUTION: PRIN-
CIPLES FOR PLANNING PRACTICE 70-103 (Brian W. Blaesser & Alan C. Weinstein eds., 1989) [here-
inafter PLANNING PRACTICE] (land use regulation will be found unconstitutional, regardless of effect
on reasonable use of property, if it is unrelated to legitimate governmental interest, fails to substan-
tially advance legitimate state interest, or allows physical invasion or occupation of the property).
88. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 128-29. Before considering this broad challenge to the ordinance,
the Court emphasized what was not in dispute, stating that: (1) "New York City's objective of
preserving structures and areas with special historic, architectural, or cultural significance is an en-
tirely permissible governmental goal"; (2) "the restrictions imposed on its parcel are appropriate
means of securing [those] purposes"; and (3) there was no question that Penn Central was earning a
reasonable rate of return on its property in its current use and that the transferable development
rights provided to Penn Central as a result of the Terminal's designation as a landmark are valuable.
Id. at 129. For a description of the transferable development rights provision in the Landmarks
Law, see Norman Marcus, Air Rights Transfers in New York City, 36 LAW & CONTEMP. PROas. 372
(1971); Note, Development Rights Transfers in New York City, 82 YALE L.J. 338 (1972). For a
critical commentary on this provision, see Costonis, supra note 85, at 586-89.
89. Penn Central's challenge delineated into three claims. It argued that the ordinance:
(1) "took" the "air rights" above the terminal without just compensation; (2) differed from historic
district ordinances in that it singled-out certain property owners for unfair regulatory treatment,
thereby significantly diminishing the value of individual properties without providing any compensa-
tory benefits; and (3) amounted to a governmental appropriation of part of their property for a
public use. The Court rejected the first argument on the ground that " '[taking' jurisprudence does
not divide a single parcel into discrete segments and attempt to determine whether rights in a partic-
ular segment have been entirely abrogated." Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 130. It is the effect of the
ordinance on the parcel as a whole, not on any separate strand in the owner's bundle of property
rights, that determines whether a taking has occurred. Id. Although not cited in the Court's opin-
ion, this argument was strongly advanced by Justice Brandeis's dissent in Pennsylvania Coal v.
Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 419 (1922) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). See Frank Michelman, Comments on the
Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REv. 1165, 1192 (1967) (discussing
how to define property interest where value has been diminished). The second claim attempted to
distinguish the designation of individual landmarks from both historic district legislation and tradi-
tional zoning on the ground that the Landmarks Law "arbitrarily singles out a particular parcel for
different, less favorable treatment than the neighboring ones." Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 132. The
Court rejected this argument:
In contrast to discriminatory zoning, which is the antithesis of land-use control as part of
some comprehensive plan, the New York City law embodies a comprehensive plan to pre-
serve structures of historic or aesthetic interest wherever they may be found in the city,
and, as noted, over 400 landmarks and 31 historic districts have been designated pursuant
to this plan.
Id. The Court also noted that it is common for zoning regulations to have a greater financial effect
on some properties than others, which does not by itself invalidate such schemes. Id. at 133-34. The
owners of the Terminal may have been burdened by its designation as a landmark, but because the
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Grand Central Terminal so diminished Penn Central's property interests as to
amount to a taking. 90 The Court found little merit in this claim. The law did
not interfere with the property's current use from which Penn Central obtained
a reasonable return on its investment, and the availability of transferable devel-
opment rights meant that some value remained in the air rights above the
Terminal. 9
Penn Central made clear that historic preservation ordinances designating
individual landmarks advance a legitimate public interest and are constitutional,
provided that the ordinance satisfy certain criteria. First, the ordinance must be
based on a comprehensive plan for designation, with reasonable standards to
guide the exercise of discretion involved in selecting properties for designation.
92
Second, it must provide some benefit to the designated property, even if that
benefit is no different from that accruing to all property owners regardless of
designation.9 3 And third, the ordinance must leave owners with a "reasonable
use" for their designated properties.
94
D. Conclusions
By the late 1970s, the historic preservation movement had become a re-
sounding success. Federal, state, and local governments had created substantial
tax incentives for the preservation of historic and architecturally significant
buildings. And historic district and landmark preservation ordinances had be-
come common features in America's cities and towns. After Penn Central and
Maher, the general constitutionality of these ordinances was no longer seriously
in doubt.95 However, new constitutional claims would arise when preservation
ordinances were applied to religious institutions.
preservation of landmarks improves the quality of life for the city as a whole, they too had benefitted
from the ordinance. Id. at 134-35.
To support its third claim, Penn Central cited United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1964),
because in that case overflights by military aircraft could be viewed as a governmental appropriation
of the claimants' airspace. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 135. The Court rejected this contention, noting
the difference between governmental use of airspace for its own purposes and the Landmarks Law's
prohibition on use. Id. See infra notes 152-56 and accompanying text for a discussion of designation
as governmental appropriation of property in its 'enterprise" capacity.
90. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 136-38.
91. Id. at 136-37. The Court did leave open, however, the question of whether these transfera-
ble development rights would have provided just compensation had the application of the
Landmarks Law to the terminal been found to be a taking. Id. at 137.
92. Id. at 132-34.
93. Id. at 134-35.
94. Id. at 135-37.
95. But see United Artists Theater Circuit, Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, 595 A.2d 6, 13-14 (Pa.)
(landmark ordinance violated takings provision of state constitution when ordinance was applied to
designate interior of movie theater), reargument granted, (Pa. Aug. 30, 1991).
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II. THE CONFLICT BETWEEN RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS AND LANDMARK
PRESERVATION
A. The Sources of the Conflict
Churches are frequently designated as landmarks because so many prove to
be excellent examples of various architectural styles. Indeed, ecclesiastical ar-
chitecture is itself a style. Though perhaps lacking architectural distinction, nu-
merous other churches merit landmark designation because they have great
cultural or historic significance.
96
Designation often has a more profound effect on churches than on other
properties. Because historic district or landmark ordinances normally designate
only the exterior of buildings and do not regulate their use,97 commercial prop-
erty owners are free to "adaptively reuse" their landmarked properties.9" Thus,
commercial property owners may temper any negative financial consequences
flowing from designation - such as affirmative maintenance requirements - by
putting their property to uses that will maximize the return on their investment.
Churches obviously are far less able to "adapt" to landmark designation. As a
result, they may find designation to be more onerous. Moreover, while any
property owner may have financial, or even philosophical or political objections
to preservation-based restrictions on his building, clergy and concerned layper-
sons often view any governmental efforts to regulate churches as an intrusion on
church autonomy in religious matters. 99 Church designation, then, raises First
Amendment issues under both the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses that
are absent when commercial properties are landmarked. 0 0
B. The Extent of the Conflict
1. Studies and Surveys
One of the questions posed in this Article is, how extensive is the conflict
96. See Carmella, Landmark Preservation, supra note 8, at 44 (church buildings often eligible
for landmark designation because of central role in development of neighborhoods and
communities).
97. See supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text for a discussion of exterior designation. For a
brief discussion of the leading cases involving challenges to the landmark designation of the interiors
of commercial buildings, see Thomas W. Logue, Avoiding Takings Challenges While Protecting His-
toric Properties From Demolition, 19 STETSON L. REV. 739, 745-47 (1990). Since Logue's article was
published, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has found that the Philadelphia Historical Commission
violated the takings clause of the Pennsylvania state constitution by designating the exterior and
interior of a movie theater. United Artists, 595 A.2d at 13-14.
98. See generally RICHARD L, AUSTIN, ADAPTIVE REUSE (David G. Woodcock et al. eds.,
1988). The new use may be one permitted "as of right" under the zoning code or available under
some form of discretionary permitting process. It may also be possible for a property owner to
convince the local government that the zoning code should be amended to permit certain uses for all
eligible property owners in a given district. See generally MANDELKER, supra note 76, §§ 6.23 to
.30, 6.49 to .57 (discussion of zoning regulations and property use).
99. See supra notes 8-12 and accompanying text for a discussion of common objections raised
by religious institutions against landmarks ordinances.
100. See, e.g., Carmella, Houses of Worship, supra note 8, at 513-15 (concluding that landmark
designation of religious institutions violates both clauses).
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between churches and landmark commissions? There is no comprehensive
study of the extent of this conflict. The bulk of the available data comes either
from the small number of reported cases' 0 ' or from anecdotal information,
much of which is provided by opponents of landmark designation.1
0 2
The only other published data comes from studies analyzing the disposition
of applications filed by religious institutions for certificates of appropriateness.
The studies were conducted in Philadelphia and New York, both cities with
large numbers of landmarked churches. These studies provide an accurate sta-
tistical portrait of the administration of the cities' respective landmark ordi-
nances with regard to churches. To the extent that they provide information
about application denials in particular cases, the studies indicate the nature and
extent of conflict outside of reported cases.
The Philadelphia study, completed in late 1989, documents the outcomes
for all permit applications by landmarked religious institutions. 10 3 Out of ap-
proximately 12,000 landmarked properties in Philadelphia, 139 are religious
properties. t ° 4 Sixty-one of these religious properties applied for building per-
mits under standards governed by the city's landmarks ordinance.
10 5 Only one
out of 127 total permit applications was denied, and that request was subse-
quently withdrawn by the religious institution.1t 6 Of the 126 permits that were
approved, 66% were approved within one week of application (48% within one
day) and only 12% took longer than thirteen calendar days.to
7
An examination of the detailed information on permit applications reveals
that approvals were given to convert the interiors of landmarked churches to
residential' 0 8 and office space.'t 9 Several other churches were permitted to
make significant exterior changes. 110 There is also considerable evidence of
compromise between the applicants and the Commission. On several occasions
the Commission offered to assist the applicant in obtaining private funds."'
Further, staff members confirm that the Commission attempts to accommodate,
rather than confront, religious institutions that apply for a permit under the
ordinance. 12
101. See infra notes 149-265 for a discussion of the reported cases in which religious institu-
tions opposed designation.
102. See generally Interfaith Commission Report, supra note 8.
103. PHILADELPHIA HISTORICAL COMMISSION, RELIGIOUS PROPERTIES BUILDING PERMIT
STUDY (1989) [hereinafter PHILADELPHIA STUDY] (copy on file with the Commission, Philadelphia,
Pa.).
104. Id. at ii.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 2 (St. Augustine's Church, 260 N. 4th Street).
107. Id.
108. Id. (Third Baptist Church, 771 S. 2d Street).
109. Id. at 16 (Church of the New Jerusalem, 2129 Chestnut Street).
110. These have included the removal of spires and turrets, partial or total demolition of adja-
cent buildings, construction of building additions, and construction of a parking garage. Id. at 1-28.
111. Id. at 19, 23, 25.
112. Interview with Richard Tyler, Historic Preservation Officer, Philadelphia Historical Com-
mission, in Philadelphia, Pa. (June 5, 1991).
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The New York City study bears out this sense of accommodation. There
are 211 designated religious institutions in New York City,'1 3 constituting ap-
proximately 1.2% of that city's more than 18,000 landmark buildings. Through
May 1991, a total of 423 applications were received for work on designated
churches. Of these 423 applications, only nine were denied: in two cases, a cer-
tificate of appropriateness was partially denied, while in two other cases - those
involving St. Bartholomew's Church and the Church of St. Paul and St. Andrew
- a certificate of appropriateness on grounds of hardship was denied. 1 14 Of the
five certificates of appropriateness that were denied, two were for St. Bartholo-
mew's. Two of the three remaining cases were resolved with the approval of
another proposal. ' 15 The study reveals that a total of five hardship applications
were approved. Four of them permitted demolition of the designated building
(the fifth allowed construction of an addition to the Marymount School), and in
no case did the approval take more than five months. 
16
There have also been two informal studies of the conflict between churches
and landmark commissions. The first was conducted in 1988 by the National
Center for Preservation Law, which mailed a "Questionnaire on Properties
Owned by Religious Institutions," to over 500 local commissions." 17 Of the
eighty responses received, sixty-eight (85%) reported that properties owned by
religious institutions were subject to the commission's jurisdiction."18 Fifty-four
(68%) of the eighty responses reported no opposition to designation from reli-
gious institutions, while 24 (30%) indicated there had been opposition.' 19 By
contrast, fifty-nine (74%) of the responses indicated that churches support the
commission's preservation efforts, while 14 (18%) reported no such support. 12
0
Finally, only seven responses (9%) indicated that a religious institution argued
that designation violated its First Amendment rights, while sixty-five (81%) re-
113. New York City Landmarks Preservation Commission, Internal Memorandum (copy on
file with the Commission, New York, N.Y.). Eighty-six are individually designated landmarks and
125 are in historic districts. One hundred and twenty of the 211 are in Manhattan, 66 in Brooklyn,
13 in the Bronx, 9 in Staten Island, and 3 in Queens. Id.
114. Id. See supra notes 1-7 and accompanying text for a discussion of the two denied hardship
applicants.
115. New York City Landmarks Preservation Commission, Internal Memorandum, Certificate
of Appropriateness Denials for Work to Designated Places of Worship (copy on file with the Commis-
sion, New York, N.Y.).
116. New York City Landmarks Preservation Commission, Internal Memorandum,
Landmarks Preservation Commission Disposition of Hardship Applications (copy on file with the
Commission, New York, N.Y.).
117. NATIONAL CENTER FOR PRESERVATION LAW, Questionnaire on Properties Owned by
Religious Institutions (Mar. 1988).
118. See NATIONAL CENTER FOR PRESERVATION LAW, Preliminary Tabulation of Question-
naire on Properties Owned by Religious Institutions (Apr. 1988) (copy on file with Partners for Sacred
Places, Philadelphia, Pa.). Since this was an informal survey, with no internal checks on validity and
no follow up, the responses often do not correspond to one another. Thus, while only 68 commis-
sions reported that churches were under their jurisdiction, 78 commissions responded to subsequent
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ported there had not been such a claim.'
2 1
The second informal study, a telephone survey of the thirty-three cities
whose landmark ordinances have been described previously, 122 was conducted
as part of the research for this Article. This survey produced findings in line
with the studies reported above. Of the thirty-three cities surveyed, twelve re-
ported that they had experienced no conflict whatsoever.' 23 Six others reported
that churches had voiced some opposition to designation, but took no formal
action. 124 Ten cities reported minor conflicts, ranging from churches undertak-
ing work without a permit to appeals of designation and permit denials.'
2 5 Only
five cities reported more than minimal conflict.'
26
In short, the data provided by both the formal and informal surveys contra-
dicts the impression of pervasive conflict between religious institutions and
landmark commissions. That erroneous impression derives from a small
number of highly-publicized court battles - most of which resulted from the
over-heated Manhattan real estate market in the 1980s and the efforts of a seg-
ment of the clergy who oppose landmark designation.
2. The Extent of the Conflict in State and Local Legislatures
There have been several recent attempts at both the state and local levels to
amend preservation laws so as to create religious exemptions or owner consent
provisions for designation of religious properties. Legislation attempting to ban
landmark designation of churches has been introduced, and defeated, in both the
New York and Pennsylvania legislatures. The initial effort came in New York
through a bill that would have required owner consent for landmark designation
of religious property. 12 7 Religious leaders were divided on the issue and the bill
was defeated.' 28 The bill defeated in Pennsylvania required owner consent for
"any property owned and used by a church, synagogue or other religious organi-
121. Id.
122. See supra note 46 for list of cities surveyed.
123. The cities that reported no conflict were Albany, Buffalo, Cincinnati, Detroit, El Paso,
Indianapolis, Kansas City, Miami, Mobile, Saint Louis, Saint Paul, and San Jose.
124. The cities that reported informal opposition were Atlanta, Baltimore, Columbus, Los An-
geles, Portland, and Rochester.
125. Cities reporting minor conflict were Albuquerque, Charleston, Dallas, Minneapolis, New
Orleans, Philadelphia, Phoenix, Pittsburgh, San Diego, and San Francisco.
126. Cities reporting more than minimal conflict were Boston, Chicago, Milwaukee, New
York, and Seattle.
127. The Flynn/Walsh Bill (S.6684-A/A.7942-A) was introduced jointly in both houses of the
New York legislature during the 1983-84 Regular Session. The bill amended § 96-a of the N.Y.
Gen. Mun. Law to bar application of any local landmark ordinance to "any real property that is
used or leased... for (a) by a corporation or association that is organized and operated for religious
purposes, or (b) by an organization operated, supervized, or controlled by or in connection with a
religious organization unless and until the owners of such property shall have filed a consent to such
applicability .. " Flynn/Walsh Bill (S.6684-A/A.7942-A).
128. See supra notes 8-10, 16-20 and accompanying text for the competing arguments of
church leaders; see generally Interfaith Commission Report, supra note 8, at 270 (Statement in Sup-
port of the Flynn/Walsh Bill by the Reverend N.J. L'Heureux, Jr., New York State Interfaith Com-
mission on Landmarking of Religious Property).
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zation in furtherance of its religious purposes," and would have applied retroac-
tively. 129 While the proposed bill received support from the Pennsylvania
Council of Churches and the Pennsylvania Catholic Conference, there was op-
position from some church leaders.
1 30
In 1987, Chicago enacted an owner consent provision for any "building
that is owned by a religious organization and is used primarily as a place for the
conduct of religious ceremonies." 13 1 The New York City ordinance provides a
more limited form of protection for churches. The ordinance specifically ex-
empts church interiors from the interior designation sections of the Landmarks
Law.1 32 It also contains a hardship provision, that is available to all tax-exempt
properties. 133
New York City was also the site of the most recent attempt to provide
additional protection to religious institutions. After rejecting a proposal that the
new city charter 134 include an owner consent requirement for landmark designa-
tion of religious institutions, the Charter Revision Commission approved a sepa-
rate ballot item, asking whether the electorate would support a law creating an
independent Hardship Appeals Panel to review tax exempt institutions' hardship
claims. In November 1989, the city's voters approved this separate ballot item
along with the new charter, 13 5 which provided that the City Council had until
July 1, 1991 to adopt a law establishing the Hardship Appeals Panel. 136 Two
competing proposed laws were introduced in the City Council: Introduction
No. 672,137 strongly supported by the preservation community; and Introduc-
129. Pa. S. B. No. 1228 §§ 1-2 (1989).
130. Compare Why the Pennsylvania Council of Churches and the Pennsylvania Catholic Con-
ference Support Senate Bill 1228 Which Exempts the Property of All Religions from Compulsory
Historic Landmarking (Oct. 1989) (memo supporting Senate Bill No. 1228 as means of eliminating
problems religious institutions experience under local land laws) (copy on file with Partners for
Sacred Places, Philadelphia, Pa.) with Letter from the Rev. Robert C. Linke, Pastor, First Lutheran
Church, Mifflinburg, Pa., to the Rev. Paul D. Gehris, Pennsylvania Council of Churches Office for
Social Ministry (Dec. 12, 1989) (expressing opposition to the Council's support of Senate Bill No.
1228) (copy on file with Partners for Sacred Places, Philadelphia, Pa.). The Rev. Linke argued that
"[w]e have a responsibility to future as well as present generations to preserve important historic and
architectural landmarks for those who come after us to appreciate, to learn, and to enjoy our roots
and heritage." Id.
131. CHICAGO, ILL., MUNICIPAL CODE § 21-69.1 (1987). This provision was the subject of a
recent court challenge; however, the suit was dismissed on standing grounds. Alger v. City of Chi-
cago, 748 F. Supp. 617, 625 (N.D. Ill. 1990).
132. NEW YORK CITY, N.Y., ADMINISTRATIVE CODE § 207-2.0(2) (1986).
133. NEW YORK CrrY, N.Y., ADMINISTRATIVE CODE § 25-309 (1986).
134. Revision of the New York City charter was required after the U.S. Supreme Court decided
in Board of Estimate v. Morris, 489 U.S. 688 (1989), that the Board, the city's governing body,
unconstitutionally violated the one-person, one-vote principle. Id. at 703.
135. COALITION FOR FAIR LANDMARKING, PRESERVING THE INTEGRITY OF NEW YORK
CITY'S LANDMARKS LAW: ESTABLISHING A FAIR AND RESPONSIBLE HARDSHIP APPEALS PANEL
1-2 (May 1991) (copy on file with the Municipal Art Society, New York, N.Y.).
136. Id. If the Council did not act before July 1, the Charter required the Mayor to establish
the panel by executive order.
137. New York City Council Introduction No. 672 (Apr. 10, 1991). Introduction No. 672
would establish a highly deferential appeals process, calling for a rational basis standard of review
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tion No. 633,138 supported by, among others, the religious leaders in the Inter-
faith Commission.' 
39
The polarization of support was hardly surprising. Introduction No. 672
would rarely, if ever, overturn the Commission's denial of a hardship claim,
while Introduction No. 633 would effectively gut the Landmarks Law as applied
to any tax-exempt institution.140 On June 30, 1991, the new City Council passed
Introduction No. 672 and Mayor Dinkins signed the measure into law on July
19.
C. The Conflict In the Courts
Of course, the most obvious conflicts between churches and historic preser-
vation groups have been realized, and resolved, in the courtroom. Penn Central
and Maher remain definitive statements on the facial validity of preservation
ordinances; together they articulate the standards that an ordinance must meet
to survive a takings challenge. However, as both cases involve commercial prop-
erty only, they leave open the question whether preservation ordinances are
equally valid when applied to religious institutions. Clearly, the answer is not
accessible through process of analogy. Because neither case involved any claims
brought under the First Amendment guarantees of religious freedom,'
4 t they
provide no guidance on that issue. Indeed, when removed from a commercial
property context, even the outcome of a takings challenge is uncertain because
the reasonable return analysis in these commercial cases does not, on its face,
appear to be applicable to religious or charitable institutions.
The following sections briefly discuss challenges to preservation ordinances
based on the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. They then present a
more extensive discussion of challenges based on the Religion Clauses of the
First Amendment. Other constitutional challenges, such as those based on the
Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses, will not
be discussed. Maher and Penn Central have provided answers to the substantive
based on the record of the proceedings before the Landmarks Commission, or any supporting memo-
randa of law, and an opportunity for the parties to present oral argument. Id. § 5.
138. New York City Council Introduction No. 633 (Apr. 10, 1991). Introduction No. 633
would establish a de novo review process, including the right to subpoena and cross-examine wit-
nesses, limited to the issue of whether there is hardship on the appellant, with hardship defined as:
[A]ny significant interference ... upon the appellant's ability freely to utilize, invest or
develop, in accordance with its own plans and priorities, any of its real or personal prop-
erty, or the full market value thereof, in order to implement, expand, or otherwise support
its charitable, religious, social, educational, human welfare or other lawful activities,
whether at the location of the affected site or elsewhere and including any inability of the
appellant to earn a fair market return on its real or personal property or on any of its other
assets.
Id. §§ 3-5.
139. See Interfaith Commission Report, supra note 8.
140. See supra notes 137-38 for a discussion of the proposals' respective provisions.
141. See U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof .... ). Both the Establishment and Free Exercise
Clauses are applicable to the states under the Fourteenth Amendment. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310
U.S. 296, 303 (1940).
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due process and equal protection questions. 14 2 Procedural due process claims
- those challenging the procedures and rules utilized in the administration of
local preservation ordinances - are of little interest in attempting to understand
the development of constitutional doctrine as it pertains to landmark regulation
of churches. Such challenges fail to raise any issues unique to churches because
procedural shortcomings are equally invalid for all property owners.14 3 More-
over, few churches have brought such challenges, relying instead on the Fifth
Amendment's Takings Clause and the First Amendment claims discussed
below.
1. Takings Challenges
Courts have analyzed takings challenges under either the "charitable pur-
pose" test, developed in the New York state courts,1 or tests adopted from
142. See supra notes 78-95 and accompanying text for a discussion of Penn Central and Maher.
Although equal protection claims have been brought by churches, they have not been successful.
See, e.g., St. Bartholomew's Church v. City of New York, 728 F. Supp. 958, 963-64 (S.D.N.Y. 1989)
(equal protection claim failed because different hardship laws for nonprofit organizations have ra-
tional basis), aff'd, 914 F.2d 348 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1103 (1991).
143. See, e.g., St. Bartholomew's, 728 F. Supp. at 964-65 (plaintiff's due process challenge re-
jected because certificate of appropriateness laws not impermissibly vague). Procedural due process
issues in the preservation context have been considered by two authors, each reaching different con-
clusions about the adequacy of current administrative processes. Compare Ross D. Netherton, The
Due Process Issue in Zoning for Historic Preservation, 19 URa. LAW. 77, 90-101 (1987) (describing
existing administrative process as adequate) with Samuel A. Turvey, Comment, Beyond The Taking
Issue: Emerging Procedural Due Process Issues In Local Landmark Preservation Programs, 10
FORDHAM URa. L.J. 441, 467 (1982) (arguing for adoption of greater procedural safeguards and
enhanced judicial enforcement of these procedural standards).
144. See infra notes 146-73 and accompanying text for a discussion of the charitable purpose
test and its application. The charitable purpose test was also adopted by the U.S. District Court for
the Southern District of New York in St Bartholomew's. See St. Bartholomew's, 728 F. Supp. at 966
(reviewing claim to determine if existing facilities prevent church from fulfilling its religious mission
and charitable purposes). New York City has been the site for all but two of the reported takings
challenges to local ordinances for two related reasons. First, New York City has designated a very
large number of individual landmarks. See Glenn S. Gerstell, Needed: A Landmark Decision: Tak-
ings; Landmark Preservation and Social Cost, 8 URB. LAW. 213, 265 (1976) (New York City has
many individual landmarks because most of city's landmarks are not in clusters suitable for historic
district designation). Second, the location of many of the landmarked churches in areas of Manhat-
tan with high real estate values makes them more likely to challenge the preservation ordinance
because the market creates extreme development pressures on landmarked properties. See id. (many
individual cases arose because potential burden very pronounced due to high real estate values in
Manhattan).
Many landmarked properties, most of which were constructed before the advent of the modern,
high-rise office building, occupy only a small percentage of the total square footage permitted for
development on their zoning lots. The 1982 revision of the New York City Zoning Resolution
permits buildings in mid-town Manhattan to have a floor area ratio ("FAR") of 15 to 18, (i.e., a
building may contain 15 to 18 times the square footage of its zoning lot). See generally DANIEL R.
MANDELKER & ROGER A. CUNNINGHAM, PLANNING AND CONTROL OF LAND DEVELOPMENT
316 (3d ed. 1990). Because church and synagogue buildings are rarely more than a few stories in
height and often occupy only a portion of the zoning lot, they face considerable pressure from devel-
opers. See David M. Stewart, Constitutional Standards for Hardship Relief Eligibility for Nonprofit
Landowners Under New York City's Historic Preservation Law, 21 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 163,
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Maher or Penn Central.145  New York's charitable purpose test was first an-
nounced in Trustees of Sailors' Snug Harbor v. Platt. 146 Its purpose was to judge
the validity of applying New York's landmarks law to tax-exempt property
owners: 1
47
The criterion for commercial property is where the continuance of the
landmark prevents the owner from obtaining an adequate return. A
comparable test for a charity would be where maintenance of the
landmark either physically or financially prevents or seriously inter-
feres with carrying out the charitable purpose. In this instance the
answer would depend on the proper resolution of subsidiary questions,
namely, whether the preservation of these buildings would seriously
interfere with the use of the property, whether the buildings are capa-
ble of conversion to a useful purpose without excessive cost, or
whether the cost of maintaining them without use would entail serious
expenditure - all in the light of the purposes and resources of the
petitioner. 14
8
166-67 (1988) (buildings smaller than zoning laws permit are economically under-utilized for profits
and are targeted by developers, who especially focus on landmark churches).
145. See infra notes 167-83 and accompanying text for a discussion of the tests developed from
Penn Central and Maher.
146. 288 N.Y.S.2d 314 (N.Y. App. Div. 1968). In Snug Harbor, the trustees of a Staten Island
charitable home for retired seamen challenged the designation of three of its buildings as historically
significant. Id. at 315. The trustees wanted to demolish the landmarked structures and erect new
dormitories on the site. Id. at 316. Ineligible for any relief under the landmarks law, the trustees
challenged the law on constitutional grounds. See id. (trustees conceded validity of designation and
raised a takings challenge).
147. See id. (court formulated test for charitable institutions comparable to test for commercial
property in order to review application of landmark laws). The New York City Landmarks Law
provides hardship relief for commercial property that cannot earn at least a 6% return on invest-
ment (§ 207-8.0, subd. a). However, the corresponding provisions for tax-exempt property are lim-
ited to situations where the owner seeks to alienate the property by sale or lease. New York City's
Administrative Code requires a tax-exempt property owner to meet the following requirements in
order to receive hardship relief: (1) the owner must have entered into an agreement to sell or to
grant a lease of at least 20 years, and that agreement must be subject to or contingent upon the
issuance of a certificate of appropriateness or a notice to proceed; (2) the property must be incapable
of earning a reasonable return if it were not exempt from property taxation; (3) the property has
ceased to be adequate, suitable, or appropriate for use to carry out both (i) the purpose to which it
has been devoted by the owner and (ii) those purposes to which it had been devoted when acquired,
unless the owner is no longer engaged in pursuing such purposes; and (4) the prospective purchaser
or tenant intends in good faith to demolish, alter, or reconstruct the building with reasonable
promptness. NEW YORK, N.Y. ADMIN. CODE § 25-309(a), (2)(a)-(d) (1985). Since in Snug Har-
bor the trustees wanted to retain title to the property, but demolish the landmarked structures, no
relief was available under the landmarks law. For a detailed examination of the hardship provisions
of the ordinance for owners of nonprofit properties, see Stewart, supra note 144, at 169-73; see also
Eric J. Gruber, Towering Above Charities" Real Estate Development By Nonprofit Organizations,
Zoning Variances and the Reasonable Return Finding, 8 CARDOZO L. REV. 397, 427-36 (1986) (dis-
cussion of landmark hardship caselaw).
148. Snug Harbor, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 316. The court was unable to apply this test in Snug Har-
bor because the trial court had not received sufficient evidence upon which to base a judgment; thus,
the court remanded the matter. Id. at 317. New York City subsequently purchased the property
and it became the Sailors' Snug Harbor, Staten Island Institute of Arts and Sciences. Stephen M.
Watson, Comment, First Amendment Challenges to Landmark Preservation Statutes, 11 FORDHAM
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In Lutheran Church in America v. City of New York, 149 the first case involv-
ing a church challenge to the New York City Landmarks Law, the New York
Court of Appeals adopted Snug Harbor's charitable purpose test.1
5 0 As in Snug
Harbor, Lutheran Church involved a claim that a landmarked building no
longer met the physical needs of its owner and would have to be demolished. 
151
The Lutheran Church opinion focused solely on the takings issue. The court
acknowledged that government interference with an owner's use of private prop-
erty is valid when the government acts in either its enterprise capacity (appropri-
ating to itself private resources for the common good) or its arbitral capacity
(intervening to resolve conflicts over land use). 1 52 The court, however, objected
URB. L.J. 115, 126 n.77 (1982); see generally J. Lee Rankin, Operation and Interpretation of the New
York City Landmarks Preservation Law, 36 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 366, 369-70 (1971) (discus-
sion of court's analysis in Snug Harbor).
149. 316 N.E.2d 305 (N.Y. 1974).
150. Id. at 311. The sole reason stated in Lutheran Church for adopting the charitable purpose
test is that it "is a simple enough concept and ought to apply here." Id. The opinion, however,
provided scant guidance as to the level of hardship required in order to find that landmark mainte-
nance either physically or financially prevents or seriously interferes with an institution's charitable
purpose. See Stewart, supra note 144, at 181-82 (Lutheran Church, like Snug Harbor, failed to
indicate the level of hardship necessary to satisfy test).
151. Lutheran Church, 316 N.E.2d at 307. The property in Lutheran Church, an Anglo-Ital-
ianate brownstone located at the corner of Madison Avenue and 37th Street, New York City, was
constructed in 1853. It had been the residence of J.P. Morgan, Jr. before the Lutheran Church in
America purchased it in 1942 for conversion into its national headquarters office. Id. at 307-08.
Despite the addition of a new wing in 1958, space proved inadequate. The plaintiff was planning to
demolish the brownstone and construct a larger office building on the site when the former Morgan
mansion was designated a landmark in 1965. Id. The church wanted to retain its offices at a single
location and this site was well-located. Robert B. Stiles, Note, Urban Landmarks." Preserving Our
Cities'Aesthetic and Cultural Resources, 39 ALB. L. REV. 521, 532 (1975). As in Snug Harbor, the
landmarks law provided no relief for the owner of a designated building who wished to demolish,
rather than sell or lease, its property. See supra note 147 for the relevant provisions of the landmarks
law.
152. Lutheran Church, 316 N.E.2d at 310. The court derived this arbitral enterprise dichot-
omy from an article by Professor Joseph Sax. See Joseph L. Sax, Taking and The Police Power, 74
YALE L.J. 36, 63 (1964) (arguing that when government acts to address conflicting property uses,
there is no compensable taking of property; however, when government acts in an entrepreneurial
capacity to enhance its own economic position, taking occurs and compensation must be paid to
affected property owners). The opinion cites both the Sax article and Morris County Land Improve-
ment Co. v. Township of Parsippany-Troy Hills, 193 A.2d 232 (N.J. 1963) to support the proposi-
tion that governments often hide behind the "facade of mere regulation" when they act in their
enterprise capacity to add to a "municipality's resources." Lutheran Church, 316 N.E.2d at 310-11.
The court continued:
In the instant case it could likewise be well argued that the commission has added the
Morgan house to the resources of the city by designation ... and that while such designation
might not wreak confiscatory results in all situations.. . it does have that effect here where
plaintiff is deprived of the reasonable use of its land.
Id. at 311 (emphasis added). At least two commentators have viewed the portion of the opinion
quoted above as stating a two-part test for determining when landmark designation is confiscatory;
the criteria being that (1) the property has been appropriated to public use; and (2) the property
owner has been denied the reasonable use of his land. See ROHAN, supra note 45, at 7-110 (two
requisite elements of confiscation established in Lutheran Church are that land be appropriated for
public use and that owner be denied reasonable use of land); Edgar A. Smith, Comment, Grand
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to government interference that attempted to add property to public use by "in-
vading the owner's right to own and manage" that property: "What has oc-
curred here, however, where the commission is attempting to force plaintiff to
retain its property as is, without any sort of relief or adequate compensation, is
nothing short of a naked taking."15 3 The court stated that where the owner can
make a case for alteration or demolition; the designation must give way, absent
condemnation or compromise.15 4 Lutheran Church made such a case. The
court found it "uncontested" that the building was inadequate for the organiza-
tion's current needs and that another had to be raised in order for the organiza-
tion to freely and economically use the premises.' 5 5 Thus, the court held that
the landmark designation effectively confiscated the property.'
56
Lutheran Church affirmed that the Snug Harbor charitable purpose test was
designed to fill a gap in the hardship provisions applicable to nonprofit institu-
tions, namely that no relief was available to a property owner who sought per-
mission to demolish, rather than sell or lease, its landmarked building. Stated
another way, the charitable purpose test sought to remedy the inequities of a
landmark ordinance that provided hardship relief to tax-exempt property own-
ers who could prove financial hardship (by showing there was no market for
their property as designated), but that withheld relief from owners who claimed
Central Station - Landmark at the End of the Line. or End of the Line for Landmarks? - New
York City's Landmark Law in the Courts, 37 U. Prrr. L. REV. 81, 96 (1975) (Lutheran Church
requires that property be appropriated to public use and that property owner be deprived of reason-
able use of land). But this supposed two-part test makes little sense. First, if a regulation truly had
the effect of appropriating a property to public use without payment of compensation, that effect
would itself be confiscatory, making the second part of the test superfluous. The Lutheran Church
court was self-contradictory in saying that designation appropriates property but does "not wreak
confiscatory results in all situations." 316 N.E.2d at 311. This confusion can best be explained as
the result of a too-facile reliance on the distinction that Sax draws between arbitral and en-
trepreneurial activity. While it seems plausible to argue that landmark designation implicates gov-
ernment in its enterpreneurial capacity, it can also be seen as arbitral activity: the government is
acting as a referee between the owner of landmarked property and the interests of a diffused group of
citizens who value maintaining the city's architectural and historical heritage. See Developments in
the Law - Zoning, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1427, 1475 (1978) (Sax's governmental entrepreneurial activ-
ity could be characterized as governmental action on behalf of disaggregated interests). The notion
that landmark designation is an instance in which government, acting in its enterprise capacity,
appropriates property for some strictly governmental purpose was laid to rest in Penn Central. See
Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 135 (1978) (landmark law not governmen-
tal entrepreneurial action appropriating land for public purpose). Second, where a regulation de-
prives a property owner of the reasonable use of his land, it has been clear since Pennsylvania Coal
that the enactment goes too far and is confiscatory on that basis alone, regardless of whether "a
property has been appropriated to public use." Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413-14
(1922).
153. Lutheran Church, 316 N.E.2d at 312.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. While the court's ruling permitted the Lutheran Church to demolish the Morgan
home, it sold the property instead. After a subsequent sale, the Morgan house was still standing in
1988. Joshua Silver, Legal Issues of Landmark Designation for Religious Properties 10 (Apr. 1989)
(unpublished student paper, on file with Partners for Sacred Places, Philadelphia, Pa.).
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physical hardship and who wanted to demolish their property to build a more
adequate structure.
As the Manhattan real estate market boomed in the early 1980s,157 it was
inevitable that a tax-exempt property owner would attempt to use the charitable
purpose test to validate a property development scheme. But, in Society for Eth-
ical Culture v. Spatt,i5 8 the New York Court of Appeals drew an important
distinction between the "compelling circumstances" caused by the physical
hardship in Lutheran Church and cases in which landmark designation merely
frustrates a development scheme. 159 The court noted that, in Lutheran Church,
the landmark restrictions were so debilitating and the frustration of the charita-
ble use so complete that landmark designation without compensation was noth-
157. See Stewart, supra note 144, at 166 n.17 (New York real estate values increased dramati-
cally since mid-1970s as illustrated by increased construction and rental values in mid-1980s).
158. 415 N.E.2d 922 (N.Y. 1980).
159. Id. at 926. The Society was founded in 1877 as a religious, educational, and charitable
organization whose goal was to unite interested persons to further the goal of nonsectarian moral
improvement. Id. at 924. The society owned two buildings that occupied the entire frontage of
Central Park West between 63rd and 64th Streets. Id. It brought this case when the Landmarks
Commission designated one of the buildings, known as the Meeting House, as a landmark. Id. After
the Society was unsuccessful in opposing the proposed designation at the public hearing required
under the city's Administrative Code, it sought to annul the designation in the courts. Id. The trial
court declared the designation invalid, but was reversed by the Appellate Division. Id. The Society
argued that the Meeting House was ill-adapted to its needs and could not physically accommodate
its programs, but failed to convince the court of appeals that demolition of the existing building was
the "only feasible solution." Id. at 926. The court stated: "There is no genuine complaint that
eleemosynary activities within the landmark are wrongfully disrupted, but rather the complaint is
instead that the landmark stands as an effective bar against putting the property to its most lucrative
use." Id. In analyzing the language quoted above, Stewart argues that the court created a new
hardship standard:
In the court's view, the takings clause compelled relief only if hardship interfered with
charitable activities performed within the landmark building. Thus, presumably no relief
would be granted where the hardship interfered only with the owner's activities performed
outside the landmark building or unrelated to the building. By extension, no relief would
be granted where the owner was prevented from adding new activities to those already
existing within the landmark. Strictly speaking, expanded or evolving institutional use
would not require hardship relief. The test applied not only to physical hardship but also
to alleged financial hardship.
Stewart, supra note 144, at 184.
Stewart's interpretation of Ethical Culture as creating a "new standard" is strained on a number
of accounts. First, because the impetus for the "charitable purpose" test was the failure of the
landmarks law to provide relief to tax-exempt owners for physical hardship, the focus of the inquiry
had always been on "activities performed within the building." Thus, there was nothing new here.
Second, the notion that increasing or evolving institutional use would not implicate hardship relief
directly contradicts the facts in Lutheran Church. See supra notes 149-56 for a discussion of Lu-
theran Church. What else but "expanding or evolving" use led the plaintiff there to claim a hardship
as its activities outgrew both the original mansion and the 1958 addition? Finally, the notion that
there was something "novel" about the test because it applied to physical hardship as well as to
alleged financial hardship is a mistaken reading of the court's refusal to equate a frustration of
development potential with a frustration of charitable purpose. It also ignores the availability of
relief for financial hardship under the landmarks law where the tax-exempt owner seeks to sell or to
lease the property.
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ing short of a bald taking.t60 The society, on the other hand, failed to show that
its position was so dire.161 The court acknowledged that designation would pre-
vent the Society from realizing the full economic value of its property.' 62 How-
ever, the court found that this did not constitute a taking under the charitable
purpose test noting that "there simply is no constitutional requirement that a
landowner always be allowed his property's most beneficial use."'
163
To date, the only application of the charitable purpose test to a takings
claim outside of the New York state courts is the federal district court's opinion
in St. Bartholomew's Church v. City of New York.1 64 There "St. Bart's"'165 ar-
gued that it could not carry out its religious mission in its existing facilities be-
cause the facilities were inadequate and renovation was prohibitively
expensive.166 The district court observed that while the United States Supreme
Court has never determined the constitutionality of a regulation when applied to
property owned by charitable or religious institution, Penn Central could be
160. Ethical Culture, 415 N.E.2d at 926.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 924.
163. Id. at 926. The court was also influenced by the fact that only the facade of the Meeting
House had been designated as a landmark, which left open the possibility that the Society could
modify other portions of the structure to accommodate its programs while maintaining the facade
intact. Id.
164. 728 F. Supp. 958 (S.D.N.Y. 1989), aff'd, 914 F.2d 348 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, Ill S.
Ct. 1103 (1991). Although the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling that there was no
taking, it declined to adopt the charitable purpose test, relying instead on a test derived from Penn
Central. St. Bartholomew's Church v. City of New York, 914 F.2d 348, 354-57 (2d Cir. 1990), cert.
denied, Il1 S. Ct. 1103 (1991). The charitable purpose test has been noted in other opinions, though
its adoption is far from universal. See, e.g., First Covenant Church v. City of Seattle, 787 P.2d 1352,
1364-65 (Wash. 1990) (Utter, J., concurring) (arguing for application of charitable purpose test in
free exercise claims), judgment vacated and remanded, 111 S. Ct. 1097 (1991).
165. As this dispute became a cause celebre in New York City, the name of the plaintiff regu-
larly appeared in the media as "St. Bart's." See, e.g., Dunlap, Court Backs St Bart's, supra note 15,
at B3.
166. St Bartholomew's, 728 F. Supp. at 967. St. Bartholomew's resulted from the New York
City Landmarks Commission's refusal to grant the church permission to demolish its seven-story
community house and erect a high-rise office tower in its place. In December 1983, the church
initially sought Commission approval to demolish the community house and construct a 59-story
office tower in its place. St. Bartholomew's, 914 F.2d at 351. When this application was denied in
June 1984, the church filed a second application that December seeking permission for a 47-story
tower. Id. After the denial of the second application in August 1985, the church sought relief from
the Commission under the hardship provisions of the Landmarks Law applicable to commercial
property. Id. at 352. See supra note 147 for a discussion of Landmark Law's hardship provision.
The church also sought relief through the Commission's consideration of whether the church could
satisfy the judicial charitable purpose test. St. Bartholomew's, 914 F.2d at 352. St. Bartholomew's
brought the instant action after the Commission denied it the relief it sought. The church claimed
that its community house was too small to accommodate its programs, that renovation was impracti-
cal and prohibitively expensive, and that both the community house and the church building re-
quired a complete overhaul and replacement of their mechanical systems and substantial repair and
replacement of exterior structural systems. St. Bartholomew's, 728 F. Supp. at 967-69. Given these
circumstances, the church argued that the Commission's denial of its application for a permit to
demolish the landmarked structure and develop the site with a high-rise office tower deprived the
church of its property in violation of the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 966.
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adapted to address noncommercial property.' 67 Penn Central's concept that
regulations should not substantially interfere with continued reasonable benefi-
cial use contemplated by the owner thus became the focus of the constitutional
inquiry. 168 The court, noting that the charitable purpose test embodied this
concept, adopted that test to determine whether denial of the church's hardship
application amounted to a taking. 169 After a lengthy examination of the factual
record, the court ruled that because the church had failed to prove that it could
no longer conduct its charitable activities or carry out its religious mission in its
existing facilities, it failed to satisfy the charitable purpose test. 7 '
The Second Circuit opinion in St. Bartholomew's is the only instance in
which a court has applied the Penn Central standard to property used for "char-
itable" purposes.171 The court framed the constitutional question as "whether
the land-use regulation impairs the continued operation of the property in its
originally expected use."' 172 Applying that standard, the court found that deny-
ing the church's hardship application was not a taking because the church could
continue its charitable and religious activities in its current facilities.'
7 3
167. St. Bartholomew's, 728 F. Supp. at 966. Not only has the Supreme Court not considered a
case involving land use and the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, but the first federal ap-
peals court decisions came only in the past decade. See Christian Gospel Church, Inc. v. San Fran-
cisco, 896 F.2d 1221, 1225 (9th Cir.) (finding constitutional requirement that church obtain
conditional use permit before converting dwelling in single-family residential district to church use),
cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 559 (1990); Messiah Baptist Church v. County of Jefferson, 859 F.2d 820, 825
(10th Cir. 1988) (upholding ordinance that did not conflict with religious practices of church but
that restricted location of church), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1005 (1989); Grosz v. City of Miami Beach,
721 F.2d 729 (1 1th Cir.) (zoning regulations preventing remodeling of homes in residential districts
as religious institutions not unconstitutional), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 827 (1983); Congregation of
Jehovah's Witnesses, Inc. v. City of Lakewood, 699 F.2d 303, 309 (6th Cir.) (ordinance prohibiting
churches in residential districts does not infringe upon religious freedom), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 815
(1983); cf. Islamic Center of Miss., Inc. v. City of Starkville, 840 F.2d 293, 302-03 (5th Cir. 1988)
(Equal Protection and Free Exercise Clauses violated when city applied different standards in deny-
ing special exception for a mosque than those used to review applications of churches).
168. St. Bartholomew's, 728 F. Supp. at 966. Judge Sprizzo viewed Penn Central's test for
commercial property as considering the economic impact and character of the government action in
light of the overriding principle that the Fifth Amendment contemplates continued use of a property
as it has been used in the past. Id. This interpretation thus permits no substantial interference with
the property owner's primary investment expectations or reasonable beneficial use. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 974-75.
171. 914 F.2d 348, 356 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1103 (1991). "Charitable" in this
case meaning either charitable or religious.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 356-57. The court noted that in both Penn Central and the case before it, the
application of the landmark ordinance had an identical effect: it prevented a property owner from
erecting a high-rise office tower, but did not interfere in any way with the owner's present activities
in the existing buildings. Id. at 357. The court had little difficulty in rejecting the church's three
arguments attempting to distinguish Penn Central. St. Bart's first argued that while Penn Central
stipulated that it could earn a reasonable return on the Terminal despite designation, use of the
Community House for commercial purposes would yield an estimated return of only 6%. Id. The
court found this to be irrelevant since the "reasonable return" analysis, while appropriate to deter-
mine the viability of the existing commercial use of the Terminal, had no bearing where the use was
devoted to charitable purposes. Id. The court failed to note that the church's claimed 6% rate of
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Finally, the Maher takings test 174 has been applied in several cases. In First
Presbyterian Church of York v. City Council of York, 175 the case initially came
before the trial court on appeal from the City Council's denial of a permit al-
lowing the church to demolish a landmarked building next to its sanctuary for
parking. 176 Maher had not yet been decided, and the trial court cited Snug
Harbor with approval in remanding the matter. 177 After Maher was decided,
however, a different judge rejected Snug Harbor in favor of Maher and found
that no taking had occurred. 178 The judge noted that Snug Harbor's charitable
purpose test arose in the context of landmarking individual properties, while the
instant case, like Maher, involved the application of an historic district
ordinance. 1
79
The commonwealth court later agreed that the Maher test, because it dealt
with historic districts, was preferable to the charitable purpose test.18 0 The
opinion did not discuss the fact that Maher involved a commercial property
while Snug Harbor involved a charitable institution, nor did it give any reason
why the fact that the church's property had been designated under an historic
district ordinance rather than as an individual landmark should be determina-
tive of which test to be applied.
Maher was also applied in Lafayette Park Baptist Church v. Scott.' 18 There,
the court found that the St. Louis Board of Adjustment, by considering the tech-
nological but not economical feasibility of the renovation of an historic building
by the church, had applied a standard that violated the test of constitutionality
required by Maher.'8 2 On remand, the Board again denied the demolition per-
mit and the denial was upheld by the Appeals Court.
183
2. Evaluating the Takings Tests
Both the charitable purpose test' 8 4 and the test applied by the Second Cir-
return would have been enough to bar it from relief under the New York ordinance's financial
hardship provisions for tax-exempt property. See supra note 147 for a discussion of the hardship
provisions.
The church next claimed that it had presented a second proposal for a smaller building, whereas
Penn Central had not. S Bartholomew's, 914 F.2d at 357. The court also found this claim irrele-
vant because in both cases the Landmarks Commission had indicated that it would consider addi-
tions to these buildings that were appropriate in "scale, material and character." Id. Finally, the
court rejected as unsupported the claim that Penn Central enjoyed valuable transferable develop-
ment rights, while the church did not. Id.
174. See supra notes 78-82 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Maher test.
175. 360 A.2d 257 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1976).
176. Id. at 259-60.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 261.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. 553 S.W.2d 856 (Mo. 1977).
182. Id. at 859-64.
183. Lafayette Park Baptist Church v. Board of Adjustment, 599 S.W.2d 61 (Mo. 1980).
184. See supra notes 146-73 and accompanying text for a discussion of the charitable purpose
test and its application. As stated in Snug Harbor, the charitable purpose test asks whether "mainte-
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cuit in St. Bartholomew's 18 5 state a lower burden for finding a taking than the
Maher test.' 8 6 This discrepancy exists primarily because both the Snug Harbor
and St. Bartholomew's courts explicitly addressed the question of what should be
the proper takings standard for a church or charitable institution. Each recog-
nized that a "no reasonable use" test is inappropriate for churches and charita-
ble institutions. 187 By contrast, the cases that have applied Maher's "no
reasonable use" test, a standard that arose from regulating commercial property,
made no effort to adapt that test to their church-plaintiffs.
8 8
The Maher test is unsuitable as a takings standard for religious institutions
because it fails to acknowledge the differences that flow from the charitable or
religious use of property, as opposed to a commercial use. Commercial property
owners are, economically speaking, unconcerned with the use of their property,
so long as they can find a legal use that yields a reasonable return. If landmark-
ing a commercial property has the effect of making an existing use unprofitable,
there is no taking as long as the owner is able to put the property to some other
profitable use. The owner has no inviolate right to maintain an existing use that
would compel a court to lift a landmark designation merely upon a showing that
the existing use is no longer profitable.
By contrast, religious institutions are not seeking to earn a reasonable re-
turn on their property regardless of its use. Rather, they are seeking to maintain
an existing use. The alternate uses of their property are wholly irrelevant. Thus,
for religious properties, the focus of a takings test should be on the degree of
interference with that existing use alone. This, of course, is precisely the nature
of the charitable purpose and St. Bartholomew's tests.
3. First Amendment Challenges
Churches have advanced two general claims in their First Amendment
nance of the landmark either physically or financially prevents or seriously interferes with carrying
out the charitable purpose." Trustees of Sailors' Snug Harbor v. Platt, 288 N.Y.S.2d 314, 316 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1968).
185. See supra notes 168-73 and accompanying text for a discussion of the St. Bartholomew
test. This test focuses on "whether the land-use regulation impairs the continued operation of the
property in its originally expected use." St. Bartholomew's Church v. City of New York, 914 F.2d
348, 356 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1103 (1991).
186. See supra notes 78-82 and accompanying text for a discussion of Maher. Maher required
the plaintiff to demonstrate that "the ordinance so diminished the property value as to leave Maher,
in effect, nothing." Maher v. City of New Orleans, 516 F.2d. 1051, 1066 (5th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 426 U.S. 905 (1976). The Court defined "nothing" as when sale of the property was imprac-
ticable, when the owner could not obtain a reasonable rate of return from commercial rental, or
when the alternate potential use of the property was precluded. Id.
187. See St. Bartholomew's, 914 F.2d at 356 (court developed charitable institution test as coun-
terpart to Penn Central commercial property test); Snug Harbor, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 316 (court
forumulated functional equivalent of commercial adequate return test for charitable institutions).
As the court stated in Ethical Culture, "charitable organizations are not created for financial return
in the same sense as private businesses." Society for Ethical Culture v. Spatt, 415 N.E.2d 922, 925
(N.Y. 1980).
188. See supra notes 174-83 and accompanying text for a discussion of the cases that adopted
the Maher test.
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challenges to landmark ordinances.' 8 9 The first claim is that the financial bur-
dens associated with landmark designation - such as affirmative maintenance
provisions, regulation of renovation and expansion, and the prohibition on dem-
olition and redevelopment - both divert church funds from the needs of its
religious ministry to building maintenance and deny the church the funds that
could be derived from realizing a given site's development potential. n9 0 Argua-
bly, to the extent that church funds and potential development profits are di-
verted from, or denied to the purposes of its religious ministry, a church may
claim an infringement on the free exercise of its religious rights.
The second claim is that the regulations and restrictions of landmark ordi-
nances, by intruding upon the church's management of its affairs, infringes on
rights of religious autonomy guaranteed by the First Amendment. 19 1
There have been five reported decisions involving First Amendment chal-
lenges to landmark ordinances: Ethical Culture,19 2 Church of St. Paul and St.
Andrew v. Barwick,19 3 St. Bartholomew's,'94 First Covenant Church v. City of
Seattle,195 and Society of Jesus v. Boston Landmarks.19 6 Four of these cases
involved challenges to the designation of church exteriors. 197 With the excep-
tion of First Covenant, the claim was denied in each case. In Society of Jesus, the
one case involving landmark designation of a church interior, the court found a
violation of the guarantee of religious freedom in the Massachusetts
189. But cf. Carmella, Landmark Preservation, supra note 8, at 47-53 (identifying four elements
of free exercise burden: restrictions on adaptability, limitations on transferability, fiscal burdens, and
government involvement in religious affairs); Crewdson, supra note 9, at 156-63 (arguing that three
elements of landmark designation burden First Amendment rights: architectural infringement, fi-
nancial drain on church's religious mission, and compliance with the administrative process in the
landmark ordinance). However, these three or four elements are only more specific aspects of the
two general claims that landmark ordinances divert funds from the religious ministry and intrude on
rights of religious autonomy.
190. Carmella, Landmark Preservation, supra note 8, at 47; Crewdson, supra note 9, at 159.
191. See Carmella, Landmark Preservation, supra note 8, at 52-53 (preservation costs and finan-
cial decisions made by courts involve state in religious affairs); Crewdson, supra note 9, at 161-63
(administrative process necessitates judgments involving religious needs and goals of church).
192. 415 N.E.2d 922 (N.Y. 1980). See supra notes 158-63 and accompanying text for a discus-
sion of Ethical Culture in a takings context.
193. 496 N.E.2d 183 (N.Y.), cert denied, 479 U.S. 985 (1986). See infra notes 201-12 and
accompanying text for a discussion of Barwick.
194. 728 F. Supp. 958 (S.D.N.Y. 1989), aff'd, 914 F.2d 348 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 11l S.
Ct. 1103 (1991). See supra notes 164-73 and accompanying text for a discussion of St. Bartholo-
mew's in a takings context.
195. 787 P.2d 1352 (Wash. 1990). See infra notes 227-37 and accompanying text for a discus-
sion of First Covenant.
196. 564 N.E.2d 571 (Mass. 1990). See infra notes 242-52 and accompanying text for a discus-
sion of Society of Jesus.
197. See St Bartholomew's, 728 F. Supp. at 961 (church, exterior of community house and
surrounding property designated); Barwick, 496 N.E.2d at 185 (church and parish house designated
under New York City Landmarks Law, which prohibits designation of interiors); Society for Ethical
Culture v. Spatt, 415 N.E.2d 922, 924 (N.Y. 1980) (meeting house designated under some ordi-
nance); First Covenant, 787 P.2d at 1354 (church designated pursuant to ordinance that allows for
exterior designation only).
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Constitution. 1 98
Neither of the two New York cases provides an extended discussion of the
First Amendment issue. In Ethical Culture, the Court of Appeals peremptorily
rejected the Society's claim that exterior designation interfered with its free exer-
cise of religious activities, in that it restricted the Society's ability to develop the
full commercial potential of its property. 199 While conceding that the Society
was entitled to First Amendment protection, the court ruled that such protec-
tion "does not entitle it to immunity from reasonable government regulation
when it acts in purely secular matters.
' 2 °°
198. Society of Jesus, 564 N.E.2d at 573.
199. Ethical Culture, 415 N.E.2d at 926. The Society planned to replace its Meeting House
with a new facility that would include a high-rise apartment tower to be rented at market rates.
Society for Ethical Culture v. Spatt, 416 N.Y.S.2d 246, 252 (N.Y. App. Div. 1979), aff'd, 415
N.E.2d 922 (N.Y. 1980). It would then use the income derived from the apartment tower to fund its
programs. Id.
200. Ethical Culture, 416 N.Y.S.2d at 252. In its single paragraph discussion of the First
Amendment issue, the court cited Westchester Reform Temple v. Brown, 239 N.E.2d 891 (N.Y.
1968) and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). Westchester Reform Temple held a zoning
regulation unconstitutional as applied to the temple because it had the effect of prohibiting the con-
struction of an addition to a synagagogue with no showing that the expansion would adversely affect
the community's health, welfare, or safety. Westchester Reform, 239 N.E.2d at 895-97. The court
noted that religious structures are afforded a constitutionally protected status that severely curtails
the permissible extent of governmental regulation grounded in the police powers to the point that
any conflict between the regulation and the right to construct a religious building must be resolved in
favor of construction. Id. at 896. The Ethical Culture court reasoned that the Society's reliance on
Westchester Reform Temple was misplaced because that case involved "restrictions actually impair-
ing religious activities." Ethical Culture, 415 N.E.2d at 926. The Society could claim only that the
landmarks law was frustrating its "secular" interest in maximizing the financial return it could real-
ize on its property. Id. The court thus implicitly rejected any notion that the use of funds derived
from property development for religious and charitable purposes makes a difference in characteriz-
ing activities as religious or secular. But cf Scott David Godshal, Note, Land Use Regulation and
the Free Exercise Clause, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1562, 1567 (1984) (criticizing distinction drawn be-
tween secular and religious as weak because court simply rejected church's conception of religious
activity drawing an overly facile distinction between secular and religious without stating criteria for
distinction). See generally Kenneth W. Greenawalt, Church and State: Some Constitutional Ques-
tions in Landmarking of Church-Owned Properties, in PRAcrICING LAW INSTITUTE, HIsTORIC
PRESERVATION LAW 1982, 465, 472-73 (1982) (activities undertaken by religious institution to gen-
erate income to support religious and charitable programs should not be considered secular). For a
discussion of opposite viewpoints, see infra notes 325-47 and accompanying text.
The court then cited Yoder as a case in which a general regulation was held invalid as applied
because it frustrated religious beliefs to too great an extent. Ethical Culture, 415 N.E.2d at 926. In
Yoder, the Court held that the Free Exercise Clause required the state of Wisconsin to exempt
Amish parents from compliance with the state's mandatory school-attendance law because high
school attendance conflicted directly with the Amish fundamental religious belief in maintaining
their unique separatist lifestyle. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 234-36. This reference indicates that the Ethical
Culture court believed that the Society had not shown that any religious belief or activity was bur-
dened by the landmarks law. Without such a showing, no First Amendment rights were implicated.
The Society was unable to show that its religious activities could not be accommodated physically at
the Meeting House site and offered no evidence that those activities would be burdened if it could
not acquire the funds that would be generated from development. Ethical Culture, 415 N.E.2d at
926. These claims were finally addressed in the St Bartholomew's case. See infra notes 213-25 and
accompanying text for an analysis of that decision.
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In Barwick, a landmarked church brought a declaratory judgment action
claiming that the landmarks law was unconstitutional as applied. 20 1 The court
held that because the church had not sought administrative approval to alter its
buildings, its claim was premature and the case not ripe for review. 20 2 However,
the court went on to consider whether its decision should have been different,
given that the plaintiff was a religious organization that had partially based its
claim on "prospective interference with its right of free exercise of religion"
under both the federal and New York Constitutions. 20 3 Following a rather suc-
cinct discussion, the court found the church's status to be irrelevant to the ripe-
ness issue.20 4 The court distinguished several zoning cases in which it had held
that religious institutions are protected from government restrictions that would
prohibit or directly impinge upon the religious uses of the property. 20 5 The ma-
jority determined that the landmark designation of the church did not constitute
objectionable impingement: "the ultimate effect, if any, on plaintiff's religious
201. 496 N.E.2d 183, 185 (N.Y.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 985 (1986). The church did not ques-
tion the facial validity of the landmarks law, which had been declared constitutional in Penn Cent.
Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 366 N.E.2d 1271 (N.Y. 1977), aff'd, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). Bar-
wick, 496 N.E.2d at 185.
The Church of St. Paul & St. Andrew, located on the Upper West Side of Manhattan at the
northeast corner of West End Avenue and 86th Street, was designated as a landmark in November
1981, and this decision was approved by New York City's Board of Estimate in March 1982 over the
strong opposition of the church. Id. In addition to the church building itself, the site contains an
attached parish house and a separate parsonage or rectory. Id. The Landmarks Commission desig-
nated the church and parish house, but not the rectory, as landmarks. Id.
The church claimed that its declining membership and perilous financial position made it im-
possible to maintain the church building: if the congregation was to survive, the only viable alterna-
tive was to demolish most of the church and replace it with a new smaller sanctuary and an
apartment complex. Id. at 195 (Meyer, J., dissenting). It submitted affidavits stating that its congre-
gation of 250 members, only 100 of whom were regular Sunday worshipers, was dwarfed by the
1,400 seat sanctuary. Id. at 194 (Meyer, J., dissenting). The church had not been filled to capacity
in 35 years, and its resources were being consumed financially by the need to heat and maintain the
building. Id. The church claimed that it had few assets other than the buildings, the land, and a
$35,000 endowment, and that it would need to spend $350,000 to repair the building's exterior alone.
Id. at 195 (Meyer, J., dissenting). The church had devised a plan to provide both a more suitable
facility and a source of income for the congregation. It would retain the church's exterior walls
fronting on West End Avenue and 86th Street but demolish the remainder of the building, replacing
it with the new sanctuary and apartment complex. Id. Although the church never submitted a
development plan to the Commission, it sought a declaratory judgment that the landmarks law was
unconstitutional as applied. Id. at 183. The case came to the court of appeals after the trial court
dismissed the claim as not ripe and the Appellate Division affirmed. Id. at 185.
202. Barwick, 496 N.E.2d at 185-86. The court outlined the three separate administrative pro-
cedures that were available to the plaintiff: (1) application for a "certificate of no effect on protected
architectural features"; (2) application for a "certificate of appropriateness"; and (3) application for
a certificate of appropriateness on the ground of insufficient return under the hardship provision. Id.
at 186. The dissenting opinion argued that because none of these procedures could possibly provide
relief to the church, its failure to seek administrative approval did not bar the case on ripeness
grounds. Id. at 196-98, 202 (Meyer, J., dissenting).
203. Id. at 191.
204. Id. at 191-92.
205. Id.
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activities will not be direct, but purely consequential.
' 20 6 Based on that finding,
the court held that the lower courts had properly exercised their discretion in
dismissing the declaratory judgment action, noting that the action could be re-
newed after the Commission had acted on the plaintiff's application for a certifi-
cate of appropriateness.
20 7
While the Barwick majority framed its inquiry in terms of the ripeness is-
sue, addressing the First Amendment question only at the end of its opinion,
Judge Meyer's dissent cast its inquiry in First Amendment terms from the out-
set.20 8 Judge Meyer found that none of the administrative procedures available
to the plaintiff could possibly afford it relief.
2° 9 Thus, the case was ripe for the
206. Id. at 192. The majority opinion continues:
What plaintiff must prove to establish its claim as a charity under the established standard
is neither dependent upon nor peculiar to its religious character. Plaintiff's claim -
founded on alleged interference with its building program and its inability to afford the
repair requirements of the Landmarks Law - takes on incidental First Amendment over-
tones only because it is a church. That fact is simply not germane to the ripeness issue here.
Id. (citations omitted and emphasis added). But see Crewdson, supra note 9, at 157 (religious insti-
tutions require greater First Amendment protection "because landmark regulations often impose
significant burdens on both religious belief and its exercise"). Underlying Crewdson's view, of
course, is a fundamental disagreement with the charitable purpose test as the correct standard by
which to judge the constitutionality of landmark laws as applied to religious institutions: "Given the
demonstrated impact on first amendment interests, the Barwick court's indifference to the church's
claims and its affirmation of the Spatt [charitable purpose] rationale is clearly erroneous." Id. at 163.
207. Barwick, 496 N.E.2d at 192-93.
208. Id. at 193 (Meyer, J., dissenting). Judge Meyer saw the charitable purpose test as resulting
from the "special status of religious institutions under the First Amendment." Id. at 196 (Meyer, J.,
dissenting) (citation omitted). However, it is clear that the charitable purpose test was created in
Snug Harbor merely to fill a gap in the landmark law's hardship provisions and was not based on
First Amendment considerations. See supra notes 146-48 and accompanying text for a discussion of
Snug Harbor and the charitable purpose test.
209. Barwick, 496 N.E.2d at 202. On this point, the Commission had argued that where a tax-
exempt institution presented facts showing a physical hardship, the Commission could apply the
judicially-created charitable purpose test to make a finding of insufficient return. Id. (Meyer, J.,
dissenting). The majority declined to consider this issue because the plaintiff had never sought initial
Commission approval of its building program by applying for a certificate of appropriateness. Id. at
186 n.2. The dissent argued that the only "administrative procedure" that could possibly offer the
plaintiff relief was the "judicial test" (i.e., the charitable purpose test) and that the Commission had
no authority either to read the charitable purpose test into the financial hardship provisions of the
landmarks law or to waive any of its requirements. Id. at 198-99 (Meyer, J., dissenting) (emphasis
added).
The majority and dissent in Barwick also differed on whether the church had to satisfy an
"administrative finality" requirement for its "as applied" claim to be ripe. The majority argued that
the church's takings claim was not ripe until the church had received a final administrative decision
denying its proposed building plan. Id. at 190 (citing Williamson County Regional Plan. Comm'n v.
Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172 (1985)). The dissent claimed that administrative finality should not be
required because this case dealt with "First Amendment and due process" considerations, not a
takings claim. Id. at 202 (Meyer, J., dissenting).
While the majority was correct in applying the finality requirement to judge whether the
church's takings claim was ripe, it is not Williamson that controls here, but Agins v. City of Tiburon,
447 U.S. 255 (1980), which states that an "as applied" takings claim is not ripe until the plaintiff has
submitted and been refused permission for a development proposal. Barwick, 496 N.E.2d at 202.
See PLANNING PRACTICE, supra note 87, at 103-15 (ripeness doctrine discussed); cf. Brian W.
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court's consideration. 21 0  Arguing that the majority had subordinated the
church's religious freedom to a less important secular concern, 2 11 Judge Meyer
concluded that the court should uphold the church's claim.
212
St. Bartholomew's provides a more extensive discussion of the First Amend-
ment claim than either Ethical Culture or Barwick. After the New York City
Landmarks Commission had rejected two development schemes and denied the
church relief under the ordinance's hardship provisions,2 13 St. Bartholomew's
filed suit in federal district court, claiming that the Landmarks Law, facially and
as applied, violated both the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses of the
First Amendment. 214 The federal district court found no merit in the church's
claim that the Landmarks Law was unconstitutional on its face and granted
summary judgment for defendants on these claims. 2 15 Following a bench trial,
Blaesser, Closing the Federal Courthouse Door on Property Owner" The Ripeness and Abstention
Doctrines in Section 1983 Land Use Cases, 2 HOFSTRA PRop. L.J. 73, 94 (1988) (finality requirement
troublesome in lower federal courts' application and is unreliable method of determining ripeness);
see generally Logue, supra note 97, at 742 n. 11 (listing historic preservation cases applying ripeness
concept). The dissent's confusion stems from its denial that this case posed a takings issue - it did,
of course - and its dismissal of the finality requirement on the grounds that it does not apply to due
process and First Amendment claims. Since lower federal courts have applied Williamson's finality
test to equal protection and due process claims arising out of the same facts as a takings claim, it's
not so clear that the Agins finality test wouldn't also apply when a First Amendment claim arises out
of the same facts as a takings claim. See, e.g., Sinaloa Lake Owners Ass'n v. City of Simi Valley, 864
F.2d 1475, 1481 (9th Cir. 1989) (private owners' due process claim is basis for their takings claim,
but extent of state violation impossible to determine absent final determination by "appropriate gov-
ernment body"), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1016 (1990); Herrington v. County of Sonoma, 834 F.2d
1488, 1494-96 (9th Cir. 1987) (due process and equal protection claims ripe for adjudication where
developer submitted and was rejected on multiple plan submissions to county board of supervisors),
cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1090 (1989); Kinzli v. City of Santa Cruz, 818 F.2d 1449, 1455 (private prop-
erty owner's equal protection claim not ripe until planning authorities make "final determination on
the status of the property"), modified, 830 F.2d 968 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1043
(1988). However, the dissent's final ripeness argument, that this case is distinguishable because
designation burdens the church regardless of the fate of its development proposal, is valid if you
accept the dissent's view on the extent of the burden placed on the church by mere designation.
210. Barwick, 496 N.E.2d at 202 (Meyer, J., dissenting).
211. Id. at 193 (Meyer, J., dissenting).
212. Id. at 202.
213. St. Bartholomew's Church v. City of New York, 914 F.2d 348, 351-52 (2d. Cir. 1990),
cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1103 (1991). For a discussion of the facts surrounding St. Bartholomew's, see
supra note 166.
214. 728 F. Supp. 958, 962 (S.D.N.Y. 1989), aff'd, 914 F.2d 348 (2d. Cir. 1990), cert. denied,
111 S. Ct. 1103 (1991). The church claimed that the landmark law facially violated the Free Exer-
cise Clause to the extent it affected the property of any church, and violated the Establishment
Clause by requiring an intrusive examination of the church's finances as part of the hardship review
process. Id. It argued that the law was unconstitutional as applied both because the Commission's
denial of the church's development plan violated the Free Exercise Clause and because the examina-
tion of the church's finances conducted during the hardship review violated the Establishment
Clause. Id. St. Bart's also challenged the law on Fifth Amendment takings and Fourteenth Amend-
ment due process grounds. Id. For a discussion of the takings challenge, see supra notes 164-73 and
accompanying text.
215. St. Bartholomew's, 728 F. Supp. at 963, 975. The court argued that mere designation of a
church as a landmark does not, in and of itself, violate the Free Exercise Clause. Id. at 963.
Designation creates no more than an incidental burden on religion, because it merely raises the
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the court also denied the church's "as applied" First Amendment and takings
claims. 2 16 Arguing that the church would have to meet an identical standard
under both claims - the standard being "that it can no longer carry out its
religious mission in its existing facilities" 21
7 - the court determined that the
church failed to carry its burden of proving that it met this standard.
2 18
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the lower court's
ruling on the as applied takings and free exercise claims,
2 19 but analyzed the
issues somewhat differently. As discussed earlier, rather than following the dis-
trict court in explicitly adopting the charitable purpose test, the circuit court
adapted a similar takings test for charitable or religious institutions from the
Penn Central decision.220 The appellate court's treatment of the free exercise
claim also differed from the district court's approach in that the former relied
heavily on Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v. Smith,
22 1
which was decided by the Supreme Court after the district court's judgment.
Citing Smith, the court argued that while government may not punish an
individual for his religious views or coerce him to adopt a particular belief, it
may restrict conduct associated with religious practice pursuant to its general
regulatory powers. 2 2 2 The court viewed the Landmarks Law as a "facially neu-
tral regulation of general applicability within the meaning of Supreme Court
possibility that a church may at some time want to use its landmarked property in a manner not
permitted by the ordinance. Id. The court also noted that the potential intrusion on free exercise
was made even more remote because of the hardship provisions available under the ordinance. Id.
The court found the facial attack based on the Establishment Clause equally invalid: the one-time
inquiry into the church's finances required for the limited purpose of determining whether the
church met the ordinance's hardship criteria did not result in an excessive entanglement between
church and state. Id. (citing Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 619 (1971)).
216. Id. at 974-75.
217. Id. at 967.
218. Id.
219. St. Bartholomew's Church v. City of New York, 914 F.2d 348, 350-51 (2d Cir. 1990), cert.
denied, 111 S. Ct. 1103 (1991).
220. See supra notes 167-71 and accompanying text for a discussion of the circuit court's rejec-
tion of the charitable purpose test and its adoption of a Penn Central test. The two tests are almost
indistinguishable. Compare St. Bartholomew's, 914 F.2d at 356 ("whether the land-use regulation
impairs the continued operation of the property in its originally expected use") with St. Bartholo-
mew's, 728 F. Supp. at 966. ("[whether] the landmark designation would prevent or seriously inter-
fere with the carrying out of the charitable purpose of the institution").
221. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). The Smith decision has evoked considerable discussion, much of it
critical. See, e.g., James D. Gordon, III, Free Exercise on the Mountaintop, 79 CAL. L. REv. 91, 96-
97 (1991) (arguing that Smith Court mistreated precedent, used shoddy reasoning, and deprived
Free Exercise Clause of independent significance); Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revision-
ism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. REv. 1109, 1111 (1990) (arguing that the Smith opinion
improperly uses legal sources and that its theoretical argument - a rejection of constitutionally
compelled free exercise exemptions - is wrong); but c.f. William P. Marshall, In Defense of Smith
and Free Exercise Revisionism, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 308, 308-09 (1991) (agreeing that opinion is
flawed, but defending Smith's rejection of constitutionally compelled free exercise exemptions).
222. St. Bartholomew's, 914 F.2d at 354. The court stated: "The critical distinction is thus
between a neutral, generally applicable law that happens to bear on religiously motivated action, and
a regulation that restricts certain conduct because it is religiously oriented." Id.
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decisions."'223 The court acknowledged that rejecting St. Bartholomew's devel-
opment scheme drastically reduced the funds potentially available to support the
church's religious and charitable programs. 224 Nevertheless it concluded that
the Free Exercise Clause is not implicated when neutral regulations have the
effect of diminishing the income of religious organizations. 22
5
On the same day that the United States Supreme Court denied St. Bart's
petition for review, 226 it granted certiorari in First Covenant Church v. City of
Seattle.227 The Supreme Court summarily disposed of the case by vacating the
judgment and remanding to the Washington Supreme Court for further consid-
eration in light of Smith.2 28 The vacated decision 229 - the product of a
sharply-divided Washington Court - conflicted with Barwick on the ripeness
issue and with St. Bartholomew's on the substantive First Amendment question.
The Washington Supreme Court held that the case was ripe and that the ordi-
nances violated the church's free exercise rights.230 Three members of the ma-
223. Id. The court rejected the church's assertion that, because a large percentage of New
York's landmarked buildings are religious institutions, the law was not neutral. Id.
224. Id. at 355.
225. Id. The court relied on two recent Supreme Court decisions to resolve this issue: Jimmy
Swaggart Ministries v. California Bd. of Equalization, 483 U.S. 378 (1990) (upholding state's right to
impose sales tax on religious items) and Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680 (1989) (rejecting
claim that denial of income tax deduction for expenses of religious practice violates Free Exercise
Clause). Although not mentioned by the court, the treatment of religious institutions differently in
financial matters - outside of the historic exemption from the property tax accorded to both reli-
gious and non-sectarian charitable institutions - raises significant Establishment Clause concerns.
Compare Walz v. Tax Comm'n of New York, 397 U.S. 664 (1970) (upholding property tax exemp-
tion for religious, charitable, scientific, and educational nonprofit institutions) with Texas Monthly,
Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1 (1989) (statute exempting religious periodicals from state sales tax vio-
lates Establishment Clause).
226. 111 S. Ct. 1103 (1991).
227. 111 S. Ct. 1097 (1991).
228. Id.
229. First Covenant Church v. City of Seattle, 787 P.2d 1352 (Wash. 1990),judgment vacated
and remanded, 111 S. Ct. 1097 (1991). The Landmarks Preservation Board nominated First Cove-
nant as a landmark in 1980. Id. at 1354. Although the church objected to its nomination at the
Board's public hearing, the Board both approved the designation and controls instituted to preserve
the exterior of the church and recommended to the Seattle City Council that it approve these con-
trols. Id. Four years of negotiations between the city and church failed to produce an agreement
regarding application of the controls. Id. The City Council adopted an ordinance formally designat-
ing the church as a landmark and placing controls on the building's exterior, subject to an exemption
for alterations "necessitated by changes in liturgy." Id. at 1354, 1360 (quoting Seattle, Wash., Ordi-
nance 112425 (Sept. 17, 1985)).
The church challenged its designation as a landmark by filing a declaratory judgment action in
January 1986. Id. at 1354. It sought a determination that application of the Seattle Landmarks
Preservation Ordinance to churches was unconstitutional and that the separate ordinance designat-
ing First Covenant as a landmark was void. Id. Ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the
trial court held that the landmarks ordinance properly applied to churches and that the First
Amendment challenge to the ordinance was not ripe until the city applied the ordinance in a way
that actually impinged upon First Covenant's rights. Id. The church appealed that decision to the
Washington Court of Appeals, which certified the appeal to the Washington Supreme Court. Id. at
1354.
230. Id. at 1356, 1361.
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jority, however, also subscribed to an unusual concurring opinion, written by
Justice Utter, urging the Court to adopt the charitable purpose test in evaluating
future free exercise claims in land use cases. 231 The four dissenting Justices ar-
gued that the ordinance's "liturgical exemption," which exempted any exterior
changes made for religious purposes from normal landmarks review, completely
addressed the church's "real concerns," thereby making reversal of the trial
court unnecessary.
232
The majority had little difficulty in holding that First Covenant's challenge
was ripe. Applying the ripeness doctrine the United States Supreme Court first
announced in a 1967 trilogy of cases, 23 3 the court resolved the issue in four brief
paragraphs. 234  The court concluded that the factual record regarding First
Covenant's designation was complete, that the designation constituted a final
action by the Landmarks Commission, and that the church had exhausted its
administrative remedies by appealling the designation through the procedures
provided in the ordinance.2
35
The court then analyzed the substantive First Amendment issue under the
Supreme Court's free exercise decisions before Smith. It found that the ordi-
nance infringed on the church's free exercise rights by requiring the church "to
seek secular approval of matters potentially affecting the Church's practice of
religion."'236 Holding that historic preservation was not a compelling state inter-
est, the court concluded that both the Landmarks Preservation Ordinance and
the ordinance designating First Covenant as a landmark violated the church's
free exercise rights under the federal and Washington Constitutions.
237
By simultaneously vacating the judgment in First Covenant and denying the
petition for certiorari in St. Bartholomew's, the United States Supreme Court
clearly indicated that it favors the latter over the former at least insofar as First
231. Id. at 1365 (Utter, J., concurring).
232. Id. at 1366 (Dolliver, J., dissenting). The dissent also said that: "The discussion of other
issues raised by the landmarks preservation ordinance, including the effect of a decision by plaintiff
to use or sell its property for 'nonreligious purposes,' should wait until another day." Id. (Dolliver,
J., dissenting).
233. See Gardner v. Toilet Goods Ass'n, 387 U.S. 167 (1967); Toilet Goods Ass'n v. Gardner,
387 U.S. 158 (1967); Abbott Lab. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967). These cases call for a two-part
analysis to determine whether a pre-enforcement challenge to an administrative regulation is ripe for
judicial review. The analysis operates "first to determine whether the issues tendered are appropriate
for judicial resolution, and second, to assess the hardship to the parties if judicial relief is denied."
Toilet Goods Ass'n, 387 U.S. at 162. The "appropriateness" prong of the test looks to whether the
issues raised are primarily legal, and thus do not require further factual development, and whether
the challenged action is final. Abbott, 387 U.S. at 149. The "hardship" prong requires an evaluation
of "the hardship to the parties of withholding [or granting] court consideration." Id.
234. First Covenant, 787 P.2d at 1356.
235. Abbott, 387 U.S. at 149. This ruling conflicts with that of the New York Court of Appeals
in Barwick. See supra notes 201-12 and accompanying text for a discussion of Barwick.
236. First Covenant, 787 P.2d at 1359. In reaching this conclusion, the court found that the
"liturgy exception" constituted a "vague and unworkable criterion" that would impose delays on the
church in carrying out routine activities. Id. at 1360. Further, even if the liturgy exception repre-
sented an appropriate criterion, its requirement that the church submit plans to the Board and nego-
tiate possible alternatives "creates unjustifiable interferences in religious matters." Id.
237. Id. at 1361.
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Covenant was based on the United States Constitution. In order to reaffirm its
original judgment on remand, the Washington Supreme Court must find that the
free exercise provision in its state constitution, which is significantly broader
than its counterpart in the First Amendment,2 38 requires the application of a
compelling interest test.
There is support in both commentary 239 and caselaw240 for this position.
Indeed, the Minnesota Supreme Court recently held that Minnesota's constitu-
tional protection of religious freedom required the application of the compelling
interest test.24 1 However, even if First Covenant is reaffirmed on state constitu-
tional grounds, it is unlikely to have any significant future effect. As has been
noted, in addition to the four dissenting justices, three members of the First
Covenant majority were uncomfortable enough with the compelling interest
analysis to join a concurring opinion advocating the adoption of the charitable
purpose test fir future cases. Under these circumstances the precedential value
of a reaffirmed First Covenant would be dubious.
The only other case to uphold a First Amendment challenge to landmark
preservation is Society of Jesus v. Boston Landmarks Commission,24 2 which dif-
fers from the others in two significant respects: it involved the designation of a
church interior, and it was decided solely on state constitutional grounds.
243
The Church of the Immaculate Conception, located in Boston's South End,
238. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 11 provides:
Absolute freedom of conscience in all matters of religious sentiment, belief and worship,
shall be guaranteed to every individual, and no one shall be molested or disturbed in person
or property on account of religion; but the liberty of conscience hereby secured shall not be
so construed as to excuse acts of licentiousness or justify practices inconsistent with the
peace and safety of the state.
239. See, e.g., McConnell, supra note 221, at 1118, 1142 (language in state constitutions similar
to "peace and safety" clause in Washington constitution implies existence of compelling interest test;
religious exemptions from historic preservation laws should be granted under that test). In an earlier
work, McConnell argued that the government's right to protect public "peace and safety" extends
only to cases where a claimed free exercise right would trespass on private rights or the public peace.
Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion, 103
HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1455-64 (1990). Thus, where the rights of others are not involved, free exer-
cise rights prevail, including the right of religious institutions to "define their own doctrine, member-
ship, organization, and internal requirements without state interference." Id. at 1464-65.
240. See, eg., City of Sumner v. First Baptist Church, 639 P.2d 1358, 1362-63 (Wash. 1982)
(free exercise violation where enforcement of building code's safety standards operated to close reli-
gious school); State v. Meacham, 612 P.2d 795, 797 (Wash. 1980) (validating use of compelling
interest test).
241. In State v. Hershberger, 444 N.W.2d 282 (Minn. 1989), cert. granted and judgment va-
cated, 495 U.S. 901 (1990), the state prosecuted an Amish defendant who refused to comply with a
statute requiring the use of reflective tape and lights on horse-drawn buggies. The defendant pre-
vailed on his free exercise claim in the state supreme court, but that decision was vacated and re-
manded. 495 U.S. 901. On remand, the Minnesota court applied the compelling interest test under
its state constitution and determined that highway safety was not a sufficiently compelling interest to
warrant this infringement on the religious beliefs of the Amish. 462 N.W.2d 393 (Minn. 1990).
242. 564 N.E.2d 571 (Mass. 1990).
243. Id. at 572. MASS. CONST. pt. I, art. II, § 3 states:
[N]o subject shall be hurt, molested, or restrained, in his person, liberty, or estate, for
worshipping God in the manner and season most agreeable to the dictates of his own con-
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though considered one of the "finer examples of classic mid-nineteenth century
church design," 2 " was an aging, sparsely attended, oversized building which the
Jesuits planned to renovate into office, counseling, and residential space.
245
When the renovation work began, however, the Boston Landmarks Commission
designated portions of the church's interior as a landmark. 246
The Jesuits sought court review, claiming that the designation of the inte-
rior of the church violated provisions in both the federal and state constitu-
tions.247 The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court ruled that the landmark
designation violated Article II of the state constitution because it restrained the
Jesuits from worshipping "in the manner and season most agreeable to the dic-
tates of [their] own conscience."' 248 The court argued that "[t]he configuration
of the church interior is so freighted with religious meaning that it must be
considered part and parcel of the Jesuits' religious worship." 24
9 Further, the
religious conduct burdened by the designation was not within the narrow Article
II exemption permitting regulation of conduct that disturbs the peace.
250 Fi-
nally, the court ruled that the government interest in historic preservation,
although worthwhile, was not sufficiently compelling to justify a restraint on the
free exercise of religion. 251 The court concluded that "under our hierarchy of
constitutional values we must accept the possible loss of historically significant
elements of the interior of this church as the price of safeguarding the right of
religious freedom."
252
4. Evaluating the First Amendment Challenges
The four previously discussed cases that address First Amendment chal-
lenges to landmark designation of church exteriors have produced widely diver-
gent and irreconcilable outcomes. Ethical Culture and Barwick deny that
designation implicates the First Amendment, while First Covenant, since vacated
by the United States Supreme Court,253 held both that designation significantly
science; or for his religious profession or sentiments; provided he doth not disturb the
public peace, or obstruct others in their religious worship.
Because the court held that the designation violated article two of the state constitution, it did
not reach the remaining constitutional claims. Society of Jesus, 564 N.E.2d at 572.
244. Society of Jesus, 564 N.E.2d at 572.
245. Id.
246. Id. The designation specifically restricted permanent alteration of the "nave, chancel, ves-
tibule and organ loft on the main floor - the volume, window glazing, architectural detail, finishes,
painting, the organ, and organ case" without the commission's approval. Id.
247. Id.
248. Id. at 573.
249. Id. The religious significance of the interior of a sanctuary is not limited to the Catholic
Church. See generally Carmella, Houses of Worship, supra note 8, at 449-74.
250. See supra note 243 for the text of Article II of the Massachusetts State Constitution.
251. Society of Jesus, 564 N.E.2d at 574.
252. Id. It is important to note that the court found that landmark designation of the interior
itself, not the manner in which the landmark regulations were applied to the various proposed reno-
vations, violated the religious freedom of the Jesuits. Id. (emphasis added).
253. First Covenant Church v. City of Seattle, 787 P.2d 1352 (Wash. 1990),judgment vacated
and remanded, I11 S. Ct. 1097 (1991).
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burdens First Amendment rights and that historic preservation is not a suffi-
ciently compelling state interest to justify that burden.2 54 The St. Bartholomew's
decision lies between these two extremes. The court there denied a First
Amendment claim absent a showing of discriminatory motive, coercion in reli-
gious practice, or the church's inability to carry out its religious mission in its
existing facilities.255 Society of Jesus, which upheld a free exercise challenge to
designation of a church interior, is of interest because it allows us to contrast the
respective free exercise burdens attendant on interior and exterior designation,
and because it extends the discussion to free exercise safeguards in state
constitutions.
256
This judicial debate on the First Amendment issue has not been very illumi-
nating. Ethical Culture and Barwick, both of which denied that landmark pres-
ervation implicated the First Amendment at all, reached that conclusion more
by fiat than analysis. 2 57 First Covenant, which found a First Amendment viola-
tion, is only slightly more enlightening.
25 8
Only St. Bartholemew's and Society of Jesus engage in any meaningful anal-
ysis of the First Amendment issue, and even that is limited. Society of Jesus
provides the clearest guidance; however, because it involved the designation of a
church interior, its application elsewhere is limited. In rejecting the Boston
254. See supra notes 227-41 and accompanying text for a discussion of First Covenant. First
Covenant Church argued that the church's free exercise rights were burdened simply because it
would have to comply with the procedures and rules in the landmark ordinance and because
designation lowered the market value of the church's property. First Covenant, 787 P.2d at 1355.
The dissent in Barwick also argued that designation burdened free exercise because of the need to
comply with the ordinance. Church of St. Paul & St. Andrew v. Barwick, 496 N.E.2d 183, 198
(N.Y.) (Meyer, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 985 (1986). See supra notes 201-12 and accom-
panying text for a discussion of the dissent in Barwick.
255. See supra notes 213-25 and accompanying text for a discussion of St. Bartholomew's.
256. See supra notes 242-52 and accompanying text for a discussion of Society of Jesus.
257. In Ethical Culture, the court rejected the plaintiff's claim that the landmark ordinance,
which restricted its ability to develop the full commercial potential of its property, interfered with
the free exercise of its religious activities, by characterizing development as a "purely secular" mat-
ter. Society for Ethical Culture v. Spatt, 415 N.E.2d 922, 926 (N.Y. 1980). Barwick addressed the
First Amendment issue to determine whether the court's resolution of the ripeness question would
change in light of the church's free exercise claim. 496 N.E.2d at 191. The court declined to alter its
view on the ripeness issue, offering, as its sole argument, the conclusory statement that the ultimate
effect of the landmark ordinance on the church's religious activities would be "not direct, but purely
consequential." Id. at 192.
258. See supra notes 227-41 and accompanying text for a discussion of First Covenant. The
majority argued that the landmark ordinance triggered the compelling interest test because it re-
quired the church "to seek secular approval of matters potentially affecting the . . . practice of
religion." First Covenant, 787 P.2d at 1360. It further argued that, even assuming that the "liturgy
exception" worked to exempt the church from regulation of religious expression, the ordinance
would violate the Free Exercise Clause because the church would still be required to submit its plans
to a secular body, the Landmarks Board, and negotiate possible alternatives. Id. In addition, the
majority viewed the ordinance's requirement that the church obtain a permit prior to making struc-
tural changes as an infringement of its free exercise rights. Id. For good measure, the concurring
opinion added a third reason why the ordinance violated the Free Exercise Clause: the church had
shown that application of the ordinance greatly diminished the value of its principal asset. Id. at
1363 (Utter, J., concurring).
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Landmarks Commission's claim that nothing more was at issue than "a secular
question of interior decoration," the court argued that configuration of a church
interior, because it has such great religious meaning, cannot be separated from
religious worship itself.259 Under the more stringent religious freedom safe-
guards in the Massachusetts Constitution,26° this government intrusion into reli-
gious worship clearly burdened freedom of religion. As will be seen later,
Society of Jesus is undoubtedly correct in finding a burden where religious wor-
ship itself is regulated. 261 It is unlikely, however, that worship would be impli-
cated in cases involving exterior designation.
262
In St. Bartholomew's, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit observed
that the primary effect of the Landmarks Law was to restrict drastically the
church's ability to develop its property commercially so as to raise funds for its
charitable and religious programs.263 Nonetheless, the court denied that such a
diminution in the funds potentially available for a religious institution implicates
the Free Exercise Clause. 264 The court held that a First Amendment claim
should be denied absent a showing of discriminatory motive, coercion in reli-
gious practice, or the church's inability to carry out its religious mission in its
existing facilities, 265 all factors that speak to the existence of a burden on reli-
gion, and thus a violation of the Free Exercise Clause.
III. ANALYZING THE CONFLICT: DOES LANDMARK DESIGNATION
BURDEN RELIGION?
A. The Concept of Burden Under the First Amendment
In a recent article,266 Professor Angela Carmella argues that the imposition
of "design controls" - defined as either landmark designation or architectural
review - on religious institutions constitutes an impermissible burden on reli-
gion under both the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses of the First
Amendment.267 In Carmella's view, because ecclesiastical architecture is reli-
gious expression, "the state, through design control jurisdiction and process, be-
comes impermissibly involved in assessing and dictating the content, profession
and formation of belief."' 268 This argument leads her to the inevitable conclu-
259. 564 N.E.2d 571, 573 (Mass. 1990).
260. See supra note 243 for the text of MASS. CONST. art. II.
261. See infra notes 352-57 and accompanying text for a discussion of free exercise burden
attending interior designation.
262. See infra notes 350-75 and accompanying text for a discussion of exterior designation. But
see Carmella, Houses of Worship, supra note 8 (arguing that exteriors of houses of worship have
theological significance and may not be designated).
263. 914 F.2d 348, 355 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1103 (1991).
264. Id.
265. Id. at 355-53.
266. Carmella, Houses of Worship, supra note 8.
267. Id.
268. Id. at 451-52. This occurs because:
The state becomes involved in: (1) design issues that are directly or indirectly tied to doc-
trinal and theological interpretation and conduct of worship; (2) architectural changes
that intended to promote religious renewal; (3) the actual transmission and inculcation of
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sion that there is a constitutional necessity for the exemption of religious institu-
tions from design controls.
269
There is a great deal to admire in Professor Carmella's Article, particularly
her scholarly discussion of the symbiotic relationship between theology and ar-
chitecture.270 She also correctly perceives that governmental interference in
religion may violate both the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment
Clause27' and provides a well-reasoned analysis of the legal doctrines in the
Supreme Court's decisions under each clause, 272 including a trenchant criticism
of the Court's abandonment of the compelling interest test for free exercise
claims in Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v. Smith.
273
Further, this author agrees with Professor Carmella both that commercial
development by a religious institution is undeserving of constitutional protec-
tion 274 and that the Constitution bars landmark regulation of the interiors of
houses of worship. 275 However, my differing view of what constitutes a burden
under the religion clauses leads me to refute her claim that the Constitution
requires a blanket exemption from landmark regulation for houses of
worship.
276
Normally, First Amendment challenges to government regulation do not
involve claims that government has impermissibly singled-out religious activity
for regulatory treatment, but rather, that an individual or religious institution
beliefs through the semiotic qualities of the sanctuary, facade and building plan; and
(4) internal theological debates over authentic architectural expression and stewardship of
architectural treasures. The state becomes the reviewer and arbiter of internal design deci-
sions, arrogates to itself the role of the religious community, and places itself in a position
to the religious community, and places itself in a position to direct the long term develop-
ment of ecclesiastical architecture.
Id
269. Id. at 513-15. Professor Carmella does, however, recognize certain limits to this protec-
tion. "First, it does not implicate safety, health or zoning regulations that indirectly influence the
design of a structure, but only those specifically focused on the. aesthetic control of new or existing
designs. Second, it applies only to the initial and continued use of a particular site as a house of
worship." Id. at 405 [footnotes omitted]. Finally, since "[n]on-worship use of the site or its com-
mercial development are not within the purview of this article," id. at 406, she would view the claims
of the religious institutions in St. Bartholomew's, Lutheran Church, and Ethical Culture as undeserv-
ing of constitutional protection.
270. Id. at 449-74. Professor Carmella, who was awarded the M.T.S. degree from the Harvard
Divinity School in 1984, uses her training well to provide the reader with a thoroughly documented
critique of the relationship between architecture and theology in Christianity, Islam, and Judaism.
271. Id. at 407-13 (while relationship between clauses generally understood in terms of a "divi-
sion of labor," the Free Exercise Clause offering protection from governmental interference and the
Establishment Clause prohibiting both governmental support of religion and religious usurpation of
state powers, Establishment Clause, like Free Exercise Clause, protects religion from state interfer-
ence). See infra notes 296-99 and accompanying text.
272. Id. at 413-19 (Establishment Clause) and 419-27 (Free Exercise Clause).
273. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). For a complete discussion of Smith, see infra notes 290-94 and
accompanying text.
274. See infra notes 358-75 and accompanying text.
275. See infra notes 352-57 and accompanying text.
276. See infra notes 379-95 and accompanying text.
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should be exempted from an otherwise valid, neutral regulation of general appli-
cability. 277 It is beyond the scope of this article to engage in a detailed discus-
sion of either the Supreme Court's rulings in this area or the related
commentary. However, a summary of the doctrinal development up to and in-
cluding the Court's 1990 decision in Smith, which restructured free exercise ju-
risprudence, will provide the context for our discussion of the burden issue in
First Amendment jurisprudence.
The Supreme Court's first decision on the Free Exercise Clause was Reyn-
olds v. United States,278 where the Court affirmed a Mormon bigamy convic-
tion.279 By endorsing a dichotomy between religious belief and religious
practice, the Reynolds Court essentially denied that a governmental regulatory
scheme could ever violate the Free Exercise Clause. The Court stated that while
laws "cannot interfere with mere religious belief and opinions, they may with
practices."' 280 For the next ninety years, the Court declined to recognize a claim
that a general regulatory scheme violated the Free Exercise Clause.
28 1
The modern era of free exercise jurisprudence can be traced to the Court's
1963 decision in Sherbert v. Verner,2 82 which upheld a free exercise challenge to
277. Geoffrey R. Stone, Constitutionally Compelled Exemption and the Free Exercise Clause, 27
WM. & MARY L. REV. 985, 985 (1986). Such claims also pose difficult constitutional issues because
they introduce the spectre of conflict between the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment
Clause. A claim for exemption under the Free Exercise Clause would require government to defer to
religion, yet the Establishment Clause prohibits such deference. Jesse H. Choper, The Religion
Clauses of the First Amendment: Reconciling the Conflict, 41 U. Prrr. L. REV. 673, 674 (1980). But
see Ira C. Lupu, Keeping the Faith: Religion, Equality and Speech in the U.S Constitution, 18 CONN.
L. REV. 739, 739 (1986) (arguing that conflict between two clauses can be avoided through a close
comparison of principles underlying each).
278. 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
279. Id. at 168.
280. Id. at 166. As one commentator has noted, the Reynolds dichotomy calls to mind Oliver
Cromwell's directive regarding religious liberty to Catholics in Ireland: "As to freedom of con-
science, I meddle with no man's conscience; but if you mean by that, liberty to celebrate the Mass, I
would have you understand that in no place where the power of the Parliament of England prevails
shall that be permitted." Gordon, supra note 221, at 101 n.73.
281. See Developments in the Law - Religion and the State, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1606, 1706
(1987) [hereinafter Developments in the Law]. Although the Court did invalidate a licensing system
for religious and charitable solicitations in Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940), and a flat
tax on solicitation as applied to the dissemination of religious ideas in Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319
U.S. 105 (1943) and Follett v. McCormick, 321 U.S. 573 (1944), the Smith Court distinguished these
cases because they involved "not the Free Exercise clause alone, but the Free Exercise clause in
conjunction with other constitutional protection, such as freedom of speech and of the press." Em-
ployment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881 1601 (1990) (citations omit-
ted). This is one of the aspects of the Smith opinion that has been sharply criticized. See, e.g.,
Gordon, supra note 221, at 97-99 (asserting that Court explicitly based earlier decisions on Free
Exercise Clause); McConnell, supra note 221, at 1121-22 (asserting that Smith itself could be hybrid
of free speech and free exercise claim and that Court did not intend notion of hybrid claims to be
taken seriously).
282. 374 U.S. 398 (1963). In Sherbert, South Carolina denied unemployment benefits to a Sev-
enth Day Adventist who was fired from her job in a textile mill for refusing to work on Saturdays,
her Sabbath, after the mill expanded operations to a six-day week. The Court analogized this denial
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a general regulation that effectively penalized religiously-motivated conduct.
2 83
Under Sherbert, the Free Exercise Clause requires an exemption from any gov-
ernment regulation that significantly burdens religious practice, unless the regu-
lation is justified by a compelling governmental interest and is the least
restrictive means of achieving that interest.
284
The Court reaffirmed Sherbert's principles nine years later in Wisconsin v.
Yoder.28 5 There the Court held that a Wisconsin law criminalizing the failure to
obey the state's mandatory school attendance requirement could not be enforced
against Amish families who refused to send their children to school beyond the
eighth grade.28 6 However, Yoder represents the high-water mark for free exer-
cise exemptions. Between Yoder and Smith, the Court rejected every free exer-
cise challenge to a general governmental regulation, 28 7 except for those claims
directly governed by Sherbert.
28 8
Despite the Court's near uniform failure to uphold claims for exemption
after Yoder, Sherbert's principles retained some vitality. State and lower federal
courts continued to rely on Sherbert and state and local governments often de-
veloped religious exemptions to conform to their perception of what Sherbert
required. 28 9 The Court's decision in Smith has changed this.
In Smith, a sharply divided Court rejected the free exercise claim of two
Oregon state employees seeking reinstatement of their unemployment bene-
fits.290 The employees were fired from their jobs as drug and alcohol counselors
because the state viewed their religiously-motivated peyote smoking as work-
related misconduct. 29 1 In denying their claim, the Court abandoned Sherbert's
compelling interest test, stating that "the right of free exercise does not relieve
an individual of the obligation to comply with a 'valid and neutral law of general
applicability on the ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that
his religion prescribes (or proscribes).' ",292 Stated another way, an individual's
of benefits to a fine on religious observance, id at 403-04, and upheld her free exercise claim. Id. at
406-09.
283. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 14-13, at 1255 (2d ed.
1988).
284. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403. See generally McConnell, supra note 239, at 1416-20 (describ-
ing modem free exercise jurisprudence).
285. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
286. Id. at 234.
287. See McConnell, supra note 239, at 1417 n.29 for cases in which the Court rejected free
exercise claims; see also William P. Marshall, The Case Against the Constitutionally Compelled Free
Exercise Exemption, 40 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 357, 367-70 (1989-90) (arguing that even prior to
Smith, free exercise protection existed at best in diluted form).
288. McConnell, supra note 239, at 1417. In the unemployment benefits cases prior to Smith,
the Court strongly reaffirmed Sherbert. See, e.g., Frazee v. Illinois Dep't of Employment Sec., 489
U.S. 829 (1989) (unanimous court); Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136
(1987) (only Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981) (same).
289. McConnell, supra note 221, at 1110.
290. 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (5-4 vote).
291. Id.
292. Id. at 879 (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982) (Stevens, J.,
concurring)).
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religious beliefs do not excuse him from compliance with otherwise valid laws
prohibiting conduct that the state may legitimately regulate.29 3 In the Court's
view, striking a balance between protection of religious practices and the re-
quirements imposed by laws of general application is a task for legislatures, not
courts.
2 9 4
Despite the ruling in Smith, the issue of free exercise claims for exemption
from landmark ordinances survives in both judicial and legislative decisionmak-
ing. The issue survives in the judicial context for two reasons. First, state courts
remain free to apply the equivalent of the Sherbert compelling interest analysis
under the free exercise guarantees in their state constitutions. Second, because
St. Bartholomew's interprets Smith as requiring courts to provide at least a lim-
ited degree of free exercise protection for religious institutions under landmark
preservation ordinances, the threshold issue of whether landmark designation
imposes a burden on the free exercise rights of churches is still viable in the
federal courts as well.
295
Thus, in analyzing the issue of free exercise exemptions, we begin with this
threshold consideration. For if there is no burden on the free exercise of reli-
gion, or if the burden falls on purely secular activities, the inquiry need go no
further.
Claims of a burden on religion may also arise under the Establishment
Clause. Under the tripartite test announced twenty years ago in Lemon v.
Kurtzman,296 a challenged government action must: (1) have a secular purpose;
(2) have a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion; and (3) not
foster excessive government entanglement with religion. 297 While the first two
prongs of the Lemon test are utilized to evaluate challenged governmental ac-
tions that support religion, the third prong, addressing the entanglement of gov-
ernment with religion, has been invoked to limit governmental regulatory
programs that arguably impair religion. 298 Thus, it should not be surprising
that scholars who have examined the burden concept under the Establishment
Clause's entanglement prong reach conclusions quite similar to scholars who
address the same question under the Free Exercise Clause.
299
B. Commentary on the Burden Issue
Although comparatively little First Amendment scholarship has addressed
293. Id.
294. Id. at 883-84.
295. See supra notes 222-25 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Second Circuit's
interpretation of Smith. See also Carmella, Houses of Worship, supra note 8, at 424 -26 (arguing that
landmark designation falls into several categories of cases to which Smith does not apply).
296. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
297. Id. at 612-13.
298. See generally Carl Esbeck, Establishment Clause Limits on Governmental Interference with
Religious Organizations, 41 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 347 (1984); James Serritella, Tangling with En-
tanglement: Toward a Constitutional Evaluation of Church-State Contacts, 44 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 143 (1981).
299. See infra notes 300-12 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 65
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the burden issue, in free exercise jurisprudence, 300 it has been the focus of at
least one article, 30 1 and it has been discussed in several others.302 The burden
issue has been discussed even less frequently in articles that focus on the Estab-
lishment Clause rather than on the Free Exercise Clause.
30 3
Unfortunately, the one article that specifically addresses the burden issue
promises far more than it delivers. The thrust of Professor Ira Lupu's argument
is that courts should derive a constitutional "law of burdens" from common law
norms. 304 Examining the history and general structure of free exercise jurispru-
dence, 30 5 Lupu identifies two basic approaches to the burden problem - the
coercion theory articulated in Bowen v. Roy3° 6 and Lyng v. Northwest Indian
300. See Ira C. Lupu, Where Rights Begin: The Problem of Burdens on the Free Exercise of
Religion, 102 HARv. L. REV. 933, 936 (1989) (describing area as "scholarly void"). Professor Lupu
may have overstated the matter. One reason for the relatively sparse scholarly discussion of the
burden issue may be the fact that the U.S. Supreme Court has placed relatively little emphasis on the
burden concept in deciding free exercise challenges. Professor Lupu has argued that the Court's
modem free exercise decisions on the burden issue begin with Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599
(1961), and Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). Lupu, supra, at 939-42. While Braunfeld and
Sherbert taught that there was such a thing as an "indirect" burden on free exercise, neither case
provided any express guidelines, outside its own facts, for determining when such a burden exists.
Id. at 942.
Further, while landmark designation involves regulation of religious institutions, most free exer-
cise scholarship focuses on individuals. Developments in the Law, supra note 281, at 1741. Indeed,
Professor Lupu has argued that free exercise burdens "are entirely individual in nature," concluding
that all institutional claims to free exercise exemptions should be rejected. Lupu, supra note 277, at
765-66.
301. See Lupu, supra note 300, at 933.
302. See, e.g., Bruce N. Bagni, Discrimination in the Name of the Lord: A Critical Evaluation of
Discrimination by Religious Organizations, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1514, 1540-41 (1979) (arguing gov-
ernment intrusion into church activities runs afoul of free exercise rights); Douglas Laycock, To-
wards A General Theory of the Religion Clauses" The Case of Church Labor Relations and the Right
to Church Autonomy, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1373, 1388-92 (1981) (discussing free exercise and church
autonomy); William P. Marshall & Douglas C. Blomgren, Regulating Religious Organizations Under
the Establishment Clause, 47 OHIO ST. L.J. 293, 308-10 (1986) (arguing that religion cannot be
insulated from government action); Michael McConnell & Richard Posner, An Economic Approach
to Issues of Religious Freedom, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 38-45 (1989) (addressing question of what
constitutes burden on religion); Developments in the Law, supra note 281, at 1740-81 (discussing
government regulation of church groups). For a more detailed discussion of these articles, see infra
notes 303-50 and accompanying text.
303. See Esbeck, supra note 298, at 368 (increased government regulation on churches noted);
Marshall & Blomgren, supra note 302; Serritella, supra note 298, passim (arguing that government
regulatory schemes that support or interfere with religious activities, so as to influence religion,
should be prohibited).
304. Lupu, supra note 300, at 966. Lupu's "first approximation" of his theory in "rule" form
is: "Whenever religious activity is met by intentional government action analogous to that which, if
committed by a private party, would be actionable under general principles of law, a legally cogniza-
ble burden on religion is present." Id.
305. Id. at 937-60.
306. 476 U.S. 693 (1986). The dispute in Bowen arose from a requirement in the Aid to Fami-
lies with Dependent Children ("AFDC") program that recipients' Social Security numbers be on file
with a state agency. Id. at 695. Stephen Roy, a Native American, objected to obtaining a Social
Security number for his daughter on the ground that this would rob her of her spirit. Id. at 696.
The Court found that this requirement burdened the father's exercise of his religion but held that the
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Cemetery Protective Association,30 7 and the substantial impact theory Justice
Brennan developed in his Lyng dissent. 30 8 Professor Lupu contends that neither
approach is conceptually sound,30 9 particularly in that both share the common
defect of pervasive uncertainty of scope, "with its concomitant invitation to un-
principled, result-oriented application.
'310
While Professor Lupu's argument is novel and intriguing, he ultimately
fails to show how his approach would do a better job in addressing the problems
of uncertain and result-oriented applications. 31' Further, in the development
and application of his theory, he addresses the issue of regulatory burdens on
religious institutions - the focus of the present inquiry - only tangentially and
with no real discussion.
3 12
There does exist a body of First Amendment scholarship that provides a
more appropriate framework in which to evaluate the burdens imposed on reli-
gious institutions by landmark designation. A major focus in many of these
writings is the issue of church autonomy, which relates to churches' "constitu-
tionally protected interest in managing their own institutions free of government
government was not required to conduct its own internal affairs so as to avoid conflict with these
beliefs. Id. at 699-701.
307. 485 U.S. 439 (1988). In Lyng, Native Americans challenged a decision of the U.S. Forest
Service to construct a road through a federally-owned forest in areas that are sacred to Native Amer-
icans. Id. at 442. Applying Bowen's "internal affairs" rationale to the fact of government land
ownership, the five-member majority rejected the free exercise challenge. Id. at 458.
308. Lupu, supra note 300, at 961.
309. Id. at 961-66. The author finds that the coercion concept is fraught with conceptual and
philosophical difficulty, particularly as to the distinctions between threats and offers, and may be
easily manipulated by focusing only on the less coercive aspects of the government's conduct. Id. at
961-63. The substantial impact approach is also flawed, he argues, because there would be insupera-
ble problems in attempts to trace causation and measure impacts. Id. at 964-66.
310. Id. at 965-66.
311. Lupu acknowledges that the divergency among common law rules would lead to uncer-
tainty in application. Id. at 974. After rejecting several possible approaches to this problem -
choosing either the majority rule, or the "best" rule, or the "distilled essence" of the common law -
he advocates that a sounder approach would be for the court "to engage in a comprehensive analysis
of the policies, both general and specific, advanced by the relevant common law norms." Id. at 975.
Acknowledging that this approach too would stir up uncertainty, he ultimately relies on the blunt
instrument of a presumption in favor of finding a burden in close free exercise cases. Id. at 974-75.
This seems a rather circuitous route to travel to arrive at a presumption.
312. Lupu's only mention of the regulatory context appears at the outset of his discussion of the
application of the common law principle:
Without doubt, all cases in which allegedly religious activity is met by the threat of impris-
onment or fine, whether criminal or civil, would fall within the common law principle,
because such cases involve physical restraints or seizures of property of the sort that the
common law has long made actionable between private parties.
Id. at 973. His only discussion of this statement is to note that the prohibition on polygamous
marriage in Reynolds would present a clear case of free exercise burden. Id. Since government
regulations are enforced by civil and criminal penalties, Lupu, taken at face value, would apparently
find all regulations burdensome. A more charitable assumption would suggest that he ignored the
institutional regulatory issue in part because the Court's free exercise cases and the preponderance of
scholarship deal with the claims of individuals, not institutions. See supra note 300. We might then
presume to apply his general rule. For a discussion of such an attempt, see infra notes 355-56 and
accompanying text.
HeinOnline  -- 65 Temple L. Rev. 142 1992
1992] LANDMARK DESIGNATIONS OF RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS 143
interference." 3 13 For advocates of greater religious freedom, what underlies the
autonomy issue is the recognition that churches are complex and dynamic insti-
tutions in which religious belief and practice are subject to change.3 14 Churches
therefore need to be free from government interference so as to avoid the risk
that governmental regulation will shape and influence a church's beliefs and ac-
tivities and thereby alter the direction of its future development.
3 15
Professor Bruce Bagni attempts to resolve the tension between the enforce-
ment of neutral regulatory schemes and claims for exemption from such
schemes on the ground of church autonomy by identifying the burdened activity
along a spectrum of "spirituality." 316 His classification scheme resembles a se-
ries of concentric circles, with activities constituting a church's "purely spiritual
life" at the epicenter and the church's least spiritual activities on the outermost
circle.3 17 In Professor Bagni's view, courts should require that government reg-
ulations yield to autonomy claims relating to activities at the epicenter of his
model. 318 Activities located on the outer rings, however, are increasingly sus-
ceptible to government regulation as they take on more of the characteristics of
purely secular exercises.
3 19
Rejecting Professor Bagni's model as uni-dimensional (arguing that it meas-
ures autonomy concerns only by a regulated activity's placement on a spectrum
bounded by the "purely religious" and the "purely secular"), Professor Douglas
Laycock suggests that courts use a three-part analysis in evaluating the validity
of a church's autonomy claim. 320 The first factor in the analysis is whether the
activity burdened by the regulation is within the church's internal affairs, as
opposed to its external relationships.321 The focus of this inquiry is on whether
persons engaged in the activity have voluntarily entered into a substantial rela-
tionship with the church.322 The second factor is the "religious intensity" of the
activity, that is, the activity's relation to the church's religious practices.
3 23 The
final factor is the extent and qualitative effect of the governmental interference
313. Laycock, supra note 302, at 1373.
314. Id. at 1391.
315. Id. Laycock states: "When the state interferes with the autonomy of a church, and partic-
ularly when it interferes with the allocation of authority and influence within a church, it interferes
with the very process of forming the religion as it will exist in the future." Id.
316. Bagni, supra note 302, at 1548.
317. Id. at 1539. Activities at the epicenter include selection of clergy, questions of worship
and ritual observance, and purely religious educational activities. Id. One level removed from the
epicenter are the relationships between a church and its employees who perform religious or quasi-
religious functions, and church-sponsored charitable activities such as hospitals and homes for the
elderly. Id. The outermost circle contains the church's "purely secular business activities" and its
relationships with employees in non-religious functions. Id.
318. Id.
319. Id at 1539-49; see also Developments in the Law, supra note 281, at 1771 (outlining
Bagni's continuum of spirituality).
320. Laycock, supra note 302, at 1402-14.
321. Id. at 1403.
322. Id. at 1403-06.
323. Id. at 1409.
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with the church's governance of its affairs.
324
Professor Laycock is not without his own detractors. The student editors
of the Harvard Law Review have noted that both Professors Bagni and Lay-
cock's models "suffer from severe limitations." 32 5 Because both models require
a court to assess the spirituality or intensity of a particular religious activity,
"judicial incursion into institutional religious beliefs, either directly or through
the assessment of their centrality, cannot be avoided."'326 Professor Bagni's
model is particularly deficient, they argue, in that the subject matter of most
difficult cases fall in his middle category of activities that are not readily classi-
fied as being close to either the purely secular or purely religious. 327 Thus, the
model provides courts with little guidance.
328
Professor Laycock avoids this trap by identifying factors in addition to the
degree of "spirituality" for evaluating a church's autonomy interests. 329 None-
theless, his analysis is indeterminate because it provides no single calculus by
which to integrate the results of his factorial analysis into a single conclusion.
330
In the end, both models lack the same element, "an orientation point from
which the various factors can be weighed and integrated."
331
To cure this defect, the editors propose as the point of orientation a "con-
tinuum of substance and motivation" along which the activities of religious or-
ganizations may be located. Arguing that activities that combine religious
substance and motivation cannot be separated into religious and secular compo-
nents, the editors contend that regulation of such activities is tanatamount to
regulation of belief itself. Immunity from government regulation, then, must be
close to absolute if free exercise values are to be protected. However, where
activities are not substantively religious in nature, the activity's religious motiva-
324. Id. at 1412; see also Developments in the Law, supra note 281, at 1772-73 (setting out
Laycock's three-part analysis). In explicating this last factor, Professor Laycock identifies four types
of regulations: (1) those that merely increase the church's costs of conducting the regulated activity;
(2) those that directly regulate the manner in which the activity is conducted; (3) those that affect
the selection of personnel for the activity; and (4) those that effectively prohibit the activity. Lay-
cock, supra note 302, at 1412. However, because these categories were developed as an aid in analyz-
ing cases involving state interference with church control of its employees, their relevance in other
regulatory settings may be limited. See Douglas Laycock, Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, 54 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 390, 433-34 (1977) (four catagories of state regulation discussed).
325. Developments in the Law, supra note 281, at 1773.
326. Id. This is a concern, the editors argue, because unless courts are deferential in assessing
institutional beliefs, adoption of either the Bagni or Laycock approach will indirectly weaken reli-
gious autonomy. Id. The editors further argue that courts should adopt the Supreme Court's princi-
ple of nonintervention in questions of religious doctrine or governance, as seen in the Court's
resolution of intrachurch disputes over property or ecclesiastical office. Id. at 1762-70. See, e.g.,
Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595 (1979) (state may adopt neutral principles of law that do not grant
compulsory deference to religious authority in church property disputes).
327. Developments in the Law, supra note 281, at 1773.
328. Id. at 1773-74. This is not an accurate assessment of Professor Bagni's argument, which
states: "If the [religious institution's] activity or relationship is outside the epicenter, however, the
state clearly has the power to regulate it." Bagni, supra note 302, at 1548.
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tion can be separated from its secular purposes and effects. 332 In such cases, the
activity's significant secular components are subject to government
regulation.
333
The editors conclude that the preferred approach to the autonomy issue
would require a court to use the three factors Professor Laycock suggested, but
the activity in question would be identified along a continuum bounded at one
end by activities that are substantively religious and at the other by activities
that are religiously motivated but not substantively religious. 334 Having identi-
fied the magnitude of the autonomy interest associated with a given activity, the
court would then assess the governmental interest served by regulating the activ-
ity.335 Finally, the court would weigh the church's free exercise claim to auton-
omy against the state's interest in regulating an activity that affects society.
336
Both Professors Carl Esbeck and James Serritella have approached the is-
sue of church autonomy from a different direction, focusing on the Establish-
ment, rather than the Free Exercise, Clause.33" Commentators have noted
however, that despite his focus on the Establishment Clause, Professor Esbeck's
rationales for protecting church autonomy are quite similar to those Professor
Laycock suggested. 338 Professor Serritella, whose concern is that the entangle-
ment doctrine in Establishment Clause analysis be able to "identify government
contacts with religious organizations that further or impair religion by directing
or influencing religious matters,"' 339 has proposed a reformulation of the entan-
glement test that also closely resembles Professor Laycock's multifactorial
332. Id. at 1774-75. They argue that certain activities, such as worship and proselytization, are
both religiously motivated and intrinsically religious themselves: "[t]he belief not only motivates the
act, but so infuses the act that the two become intertwined." Id. at 1795. By contrast, other church
activities, although motivated by religious belief, lack this connection. Id.
333. Id. In making the required inquiry into the substantive religious character of the activity,
the editors propose a two-step procedure. First, the court determines the relationship between the
activity and religious belief by reference to the religion itself (i.e., the subjective characterization
placed on the activity by believers). Second, the court refines this assessment by reference to third-
party perceptions of the activity's character. Id. at 1775-76.
334. Id. at 1779.
335. Id.
336. Id. The editors caution that such a test would not require churches to demonstrate that a
regulation significantly burdened a central religious belief or practice before the state must show a
compelling interest justifying the regulation. Id. Rather the court would weigh the claimed infringe-
ment on church autonomy against the competing social interest behind the regulation without re-
gard to the significance of the burden. Id.
337. See Esbeck, supra note 298, at 348 (Establishment Clause functions as structural provision
regimenting involvement between government and religious associations); Serritella, supra note 298,
at 144 (entanglement doctrine useful in distinguishing permissible church-state contacts).
338. Marshall & Blomgren, supra note 302, at 308-09; Developments in the Law, supra note 281,
at 1751 n.45. Esbeck and Laycock are both concerned about the distorting effect that government
regulation will have on the theological development of the religious institution. Compare Esbeck,
supra note 298, at 374-79 (arguing that government entanglement may subvert and redirect church
programs to meet government ends) with Laycock, supra note 302, at 1388-92 (arguing that state
interference with church autonomy frustrates doctrinal development).
339. Serritella, supra note 298, at 144.
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analysis. 340
Professors William Marshall and Douglas Blomgren take a critical view of
Laycock's free exercise analysis and the Establishment Clause approach of
Professors Esbeck and Serritella. 341 Underlying their critique is a concern that
both the Establishment Clause-based analysis and Laycock's expanded free exer-
cise analysis advocate that a greater range of activities conducted by religious
institutions should be protected from governmental regulatory programs and
that the extent of the protection provided will be more comprehensive.
342
Although Professors Marshall and Blomgren view as uncontroversial the claim
that some religious activities are protected, 34 3 they strongly disagree with the
Laycock-Esbeck thesis that the process of theological development should be
shielded from the indirect influence of government regulation.344 The authors
also question the more moderate position that government regulation need not
defer totally to religious institutions, but rather, courts should adjust the degree
of protection from regulation based on such factors as religious intensity, the
type and extent of regulatory intrusion, and the strength of the state's regulatory
interest. 34 5 They conclude that protection for religious institutions from govern-
ment regulation should remain within the ambit of the Free Exercise and Free
Speech Clause, not the Establishment Clause.346 Ultimately, they find that the
Free Exercise Clause protects religious activity only if the regulation interferes
340. Serritella's proposed reformulation focuses on three factors: "(1) the religious character
of the activity involved in the contacts, (2) the frequency and effects of the contacts, and (3) the
government interest served." Id. See supra notes 320-24 and accompanying text for a discussion of
Laycock's three factors.
341. See Marshall and Blomgren, supra note 302, at 306-15. Marshall and Blomgren conclude
that, except in limited circumstances, the Establishment Clause should not be used to measure the
constitutionality of government regulation of religious institutions' activities; rather, such regula-
tions should be judged solely by reference to other constitutional provisions, primarily the Free
Speech and Free Exercise Clauses. Id. at 326-31.
342. Id. at 295.
343. Id. at 307. The authors state: "The first amendment requires freedom for the theological
activities of churches." Id.
344. Id. at 308-10. Marshall and Blomgren do not deny that there is some merit to the conten-
tion that regulatory requirements have an indirect and subtle effect on theological development. Id.
at 308. They do note, however, that one problem with this thesis is that it singles out theological
development for special treatment, when the process of theological development is no different from
the development of political, literary, or artistic ideas that are wholly secular. Moreover, the indirect
theological effect argument becomes too broad to be meaningful, since government, simply by its
pervasive role and visibility in society, influences theological development. Id. at 310. They con-
clude that, absent coercion, the religious institution itself ultimately determines whether to be theo-
logically influenced by governmental or societal action. Id. at 310.
345. Id. at 323. Marshall and Blomgren's claim that even this more modest position is too
inhibiting of government action has been largely mooted by the Smith decision. The authors argued
that even if courts acknowledged degrees of protection for religious institutions, rather than a total
bar on regulation, the existence of any First Amendment protection would demand "exacting scru-
tiny of the challenged regulation." Id. Smith, of course, has mooted this concern by barring such
"exacting scrutiny," in the form of the compelling interest test, in claims based on the federal Consti-
tution. However, their other argument, that such a bar places religious institutions in a preferred
position vis-a-vis secular institutions, remains valid.
346. Id. at 326.
[Vol. 65
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with the "practice of religious activities or violates matters of conscience." 
34 7
Finally, the economics-based analysis of Professor Michael McConnell and
Judge Richard Posner argues that two economic effects, substitution and dispro-
portionate burden, work together to create a burden on free exercise.348 By
substitution effect, the authors refer to government actions that would induce an
individual to substitute nonreligious activities for religious activities because the
regulation places an economic burden on the religious activity. The dispropor-
tionate burden effect refers to government regulation having the effect of requir-
ing those who participate in a religious activity to bear a disproportionate share
of the overall economic burden.349 Applying this analysis to religious institu-
tions, Professor McConnell and Judge Posner argue that regulations that are
particularly disruptive to such institutions may induce them to alter their con-
duct or structure and will impose costs on religious institutions disproportionate
to those imposed on other regulated activities.
350
C. Applying the Burden Concept to the Landmark Preservation Cases
This section applies the theoretical perspectives discussed above to the
claim of Professor Carmella and others that landmark designation interferes so
substantially with "ecclesiastical architecture as theology," or with church au-
tonomy and church finances as to constitute a burden on religion.
35 1
347. Id. at 327.
348. McConnell & Posner, supra note 302, at 39.
349. Id. at 38-39. "The government practice creates an incentive for the believer to 'substitute
away' from the religious alternative toward a competing secular activity... [to] avoid some or (more
likely) all of the disproportionate burden." Id. at 39. "A burden of free exercise thus takes the form:
either renounce your religious practices or bear a burden heavier than other members are required to
bear." Id.
350. Id. at 44. Although the only examples the authors provide are regulatory interference
with hierarchical religious structure, the authors' analysis can also be applied in the landmark regu-
latory context: the "peculiarly disruptive" element, which relates directly to churches' autonomy
claims, and the "disproportionate cost" element, which can readily be applied to claimed financial
burdens, fit that context well.
The authors provide two examples of "straightforward" burdens on the free exercise rights of
institutions, both involving hierarchical institutions. Id. at 45. NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chi-
cago, 440 U.S. 490 (1979), is cited as an instance where subjecting the institution (the schools) to a
regulatory regime (the NLRB) that is inconsistent with the hierarchical structure of the church
could sever that authority and give lower-ranking church agents (the lay teachers) rights and duties
inconsistent with the religious structure. Similarly, in Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n v. Dayton Chris-
tian Sch., 477 U.S. 619 (1986), the fundamentalist school's requirement that employees agree, as a
condition of employment, to follow "the Biblical chain of command" in raising grievances, was
challenged under Ohio's civil rights law, which prohibits employers from disciplining workers for
lodging a grievance with the civil rights commission.
351. See Carmella, Landmark Preservation, supra note 8, at 52 (arguing that intrusion is partic-
ularly severe in landmark context because commissions may request "extensive information regard-
ing religious doctrine, worship, education, mission and ministry,and finances," in addition to
accounts of building use, maintenance procedures, and costs); Crewdson, supra note 9, at 162 ("com-
mission members decide intricate questions of theological purpose and religious mission" during
landmark review process). As noted earlier, commentators who favor restrictions on landmarking of
churches argue that designation raises several First Amendment concerns. First, they claim that
exterior designation infringes on church autonomy, arguing that such designation creates the poten-
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Applying the various theoretical perspectives on the burden issue to actual
or hypothetical cases involving landmark designation of houses of worship
shows that designation will undoubtedly constitute a burden on religion in some
instances. It seems clear that interior designation, and exterior designation that
would constrain the "theological aspects of building design" or have the effect of
forcing a church to cease religious worship at a given site because of physical or
financial exigency, would constitute a burden. Conversely, the denial of permis-
sion for commercial development would not appear to constitute a burden. On
these points Professor Carmella and I agree. After discussing these applications
of landmark designation, this Article now turns to murkier waters and discusses
landmark regulation of church exteriors where such regulation neither closes
down the church nor interferes with "architecture as theology."
Interior designation, as in Society of Jesus, constitutes a burden on free ex-
ercise under both the Bagni and Laycock analyses because the worship space of
a religious institution is fundamentally intertwined with the essence of religious
belief.352 The same result would occur under the "substance/motivation" test
derived from Bagni and Laycock's work.3 53 Professors Marshall and Blomgren,
no friends of free exercise exemptions, would also find cause for exemption here,
because interior designation readily meets their criterion for protection of reli-
gious activity: the regulation interferes with the practice of religious activities or
violates matters of conscience. 354 Professor Lupu, if taken at face value, would
find a burden here simply because a violation of the landmark ordinance imposes
tial for impermissible government entanglement in church affairs and may conflict with internal
decision-making processes, particularly in hierarchical churches. See Carmella, Landmark Preserva-
tion, supra note 8, at 53 (in the Catholic Church, landmark process may be most effective route for
members of parish to dispute decisions regarding ultimate disposition of property and thus may
disrupt church's internal decision-making process). Exterior designation also limits the church's
ability to adapt, or transfer, its property to meet current needs, id. at 48-50, and infringes on the
church's "architectural" freedom. Crewdson, supra note 9, at 157-58 (arguing that religious values,
symbols, and forms of expression are intimately bound up in any religious structure). Second, oppo-
nents claim that designation burdens the free exercise of religion because it places a financial strain
on churches by diverting funds from other pursuits to building repair and renovation and, by deny-
ing churches the most profitable uses of their property, prevents them from obtaining funds for their
religious mission. Id. at 158-60; see also Carmella, Landmark Preservation, supra note 8, at 50-52
(landmark regulations divert funds for aesthetic, not safety, purposes, may require considerable ex-
penditures for required repairs and maintenance, and subject church administrators to criminal
sanctions for noncompliance).
352. See supra note 268 for a discussion of the nexus between interior space and religious be-
liefs. Interior designation of a worship space would be at the epicenter of Bagni's model. See supra
note 317. For Laycock, interior designation would involve the church's internal affairs and would be
thus religiously "intense," and the extent and qualitative effect of the governmental interference
would be significant. See supra notes 320-24 and accompanying text for a discussion of Laycock's
analysis.
353. See supra notes 332-36 and accompanying text for a discussion of the substance/motiva-
tion test.
354. See Marshall & Blomgren, supra note 302, at 327 (protection for religious activity exists if
regulation interferes with "practice of religious activites or violates matters of conscience").
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a penalty.355 Applying his general rule, it would be easy to find a violation of
common law property rights in the case of interior designation. 35 6 Finally, Pro-
fessor McConnell and Judge Posner's economic analysis suggests that interior
designation is a violation of free exercise because the designation forces the
church to alter its conduct from its preferred course.
357
Turning to exterior designation, the cases present several different factual
settings. When such First Amendment claims are based on denying permission
to engage in commercial development, as in St. Bartholomew's and Ethical Cul-
ture, it appears that not even Professors Bagni or Laycock would acknowledge
the claimed burden. Professor Laycock argues that "[a]ny activity engaged in
by a church as a body is an exercise of religion." 35 8 Thus he views church par-
ticipation in commercial enterprises, presumably including property develop-
ment, as religious activity because the funds are being raised for the church.
359
Nevertheless, he acknowledges that the church's primary interest in commercial
enterprise is profit, "the same interest a secular owner would have.''36° Accod-
ing to Professor Laycock, such secular enterprises should not command free
exercise protection.
36 1
Similarly, Professor Bagni excludes "business activities" from his model's
epicenter of purely religious activity, subjecting property development to gov-
ernment regulation. 362 Further, in discussing church claims to tax-exemption, a
concept closely-related to the issue of fiscal burden, Bagni argues that religious
organizations are not constitutionally entitled to exemption from taxation.
363
Rather, "such exemptions are constitutionally permissible only if they are
granted to charitable, nonprofit organizations without reference to the organiza-
tion's religious character, because then such aid can be justified as based on
purely secular criteria.
' '364
A similar conclusion would be reached under the "substance/motivation"
test, because commercial development, as a religiously motivated but not sub-
stantively religious activity, would be subject to government regulation.36 5
Professors Marshall and Blomgren would certainly not find a burden in these
355. See Lupu, supra note 300, at 973 (all instances in which religious activity is met by threat
of government sanction are protected under Free Exercise Clause).
356. See supra notes 300-10 and accompanying text for discussion of Lupu's "common law"
theory of free exercise burdens. As opposed to exterior designation, interior designation could not
readily be justified by looking to the policies underlying the common law concept of nuisance.
357. McConnell & Posner, supra note 302, at 44.
358. Laycock, supra note 302, at 1390.
359. Id. at 1410.
360. Id. Laycock contrasts church participation in commercial business for profit alone with
commercial businesses that are church-owned for intrinsically religious reasons or run in intrinsi-
cally religious ways. Id.
361. See id. ("[E]xcept for claims of conscientious objection, a claim that it is religiously impor-
tant, that the [enterprise] be conducted in some particular way is not very compelling.").
362. Bagni, supra note 302, at 1548.
363. Id. at 1546-47.
364. Id. at 1547.
365. See Developments in the Law, supra note 281, at 1775 n. 159 (commercial activity under-
taken by church remains secular in character).
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cases, given their general belief that Establishment Clause concerns should not
shield religious institutions from neutral government regulations. 366 Professor
Lupu's common law analysis could provide support for regulating commercial
development by looking to the principles that underlie both private and public
nuisance. 367 Professor McConnell and Judge Posner would characterize a bar
on development as having an income effect, but not a substitution effect. 368 Be-
cause there would be no disproportionate effect here either,369 they would not
find a burden on religion. Given this concensus on the prohibition of develop-
ment issue, cases like First Covenant, in which the only burden is a claimed
reduction in property value resulting from designation itself,370 would not pres-
ent a valid free exercise claim.
This suggested unanimity among scholars would likely be the view taken by
the Supreme Court, which has never found that the mere fact that a governmen-
tal regulatory program imposes costs on religious institutions burdens the free
exercise of religion.
371
Professor Carmella has argued that the financial costs associated with
landmark preservation are particularly objectionable because funds spent to
meet landmark requirements serve aesthetic purposes, as opposed to the costs of
meeting building and safety codes that guarantee the public's health and
safety. 37 2 But this argument fails to acknowledge either the modern trend rec-
ognizing the validity of regulation to achieve aesthetic goals, 373 or the historic,
cultural, and communal goals served by landmark preservation.3 74 Further,
366. Marshall & Blomgren, supra note 302, at 308-10; see id. at 324-26 (raising specific con-
cerns about the favoritism that would be shown religious institutions if they were exempted from
regulation).
367. The church's argument that any interference with its development rights would be an
impermissible restraint on alienation under common law, could be countered with the claim that
development which threatens to destroy a landmark could be enjoined by adapting the concepts and
policies underlying both public and private nuisance to this situation.
368. McConnell & Posner, supra note 302, at 38-39. While all landmarked buildings are under
the same income-reducing disability, there is no incentive to substitute membership in a landmarked
secular institution over a landmarked religious institution. The bar to development operates identi-
cally as regards both St. Bartholomew's Church and, for example, the Municipal Art Society.
369. Id. at 39. Members of a landmarked religious institution bear no greater burden than
members of a landmarked secular institution.
370. First Covenant Church v. City of Seattle, 787 P.2d 1352, 1355 (Wash. 1990), cert. denied,
111 S. Ct. 1097 (1991).
371. See, e.g., Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 603-04 (1983) (government's
denial of tax-exempt status to church-operated educational institution which violated federal ban on
racial discrimination did not abridge Free Exercise Clause; "Denial of tax benefits will inevitably
have a substantial impact on the operation of private religious schools, but these will not prevent
those schools from observing their religious tenets."); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 606-08
(1961) (Orthodox Jewish merchants not exempted from complying with Pennsylvania's Sunday-
closing law, despite the fact that compliance potentially imposed significant economic hardship since
these merchants also remain closed on Saturday, the Jewish sabbath).
372. Carmella, Landmark Preservation, supra note 8, at 50-51.
373. See Costonis, supra note 85, at 371-77 (discussing trends in aesthetic jurisprudence); Karp,
supra note 85, at 310-20 (tracing judicial history of aesthetics-based regulation).
374. See Costonis, supra note 85, at 359-60, 386-91 (historic preservation is important to cul-
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while judgments about the relative importance of valid governmental programs
are crucial to the compelling interest test in free exercise cases, their premature
use in making judgments on the threshold issue of whether there is a burden on
religion improperly skews the analysis towards finding a burden. So long as the
regulations serve a valid governmental purpose, judgments about the values
served by that purpose should have no place in determining the burden issue.
375
A more compelling case is presented when, as in Barwick, a church claims
that landmark designation is not merely denying the church the most profitable
use of its property but is forcing it to close its doors due to financial exigency.
376
Where a church can prove that unyielding enforcement of a landmark ordinance
will result in a forced cessation of religious worship and practice in the
landmarked building, a burden would be found under any of the models we've
discussed for the reasons stated in the earlier discussion of interior
designation.
377
tural stability, with multiple groups playing roles in preservation); Rose, supra note 25, at 488-91,
533-34 (discussing relationship between landmark preservation and community).
375. But see Developments in the Law, supra note 281, at 1779-80 (arguing that courts should
weigh claimed infringement on free exercise, without regard to significance of burden, against com-
peting social interest in regulation). Even under this "substance/motivation" test, however, the sub-
stance of property development is so clearly secular that no free exercise violation would be found.
376. Church of St. Paul & St. Andrew v. Barwick, 496 N.E.2d 183, 185 (N.Y.), cert. denied,
479 U.S. 985 (1986). In that case, the church could escape its financial woes by utilizing the hard-
ship provision in the New York City Landmarks Law, which provides for lifting the landmark
designation based on a showing that the property, if sold or leased, could not earn a reasonable
return in a commercial use. See supra note 147 for a discussion of the hardship provision. But,
because that course would also result in destruction of the landmarked building, it is not a real
option in a discussion of the tensions between religion and landmark preservation, where, as is the
case here, the church declines to take such action. It is anomalous to suggest that permitting a third-
party to buy and destroy the landmark is the solution to a claimed burden on free exercise caused by
landmark designation.
377. See supra notes 352-57 and accompanying text for a discussion of the free exercise burden
attending interior designation. The result under two of the models needs some explanation. Lupu
would find a burden because an approach based on an amalgam of public and private nuisance
concepts would presumably require some balancing, and here, since all reasonable use of the
landmarked property would be destroyed if the landmark law were enforced unyieldingly, that bal-
ance would favor lifting the restriction. Lupu, supra note 300, at 966-72. McConnell & Posner
would find a violation because this application of landmark preservation would violate one of the
general rules underlying their economic model: "religious institutions or activities can be subjected
to different treatment only when necessary to minimize the effect of government action on religious
practice .... McConnell & Posner, supra note 302, at 33-34.
Also, the closure of a church already in operation should be distinguished from the enforcement
of zoning regulations that prohibit churches from constructing new buildings at certain locations or
from continuing to operate in contravention of a zoning code, so long as reasonable alternative sites
are available. See, e.g., Grosz v. City of Miami Beach, 721 F.2d 729 (1 1th Cir.) (ordering cessation
of religious services in converted garage where churches not permitted in that zoning district), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 827 (1983); Congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses, Inc. v. City of Lakewood, 699
F.2d 303 (6th Cir.) (prohibiting churches from residential neighborhoods), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 815
(1983). Commentary has been divided on these and similar cases. Compare Laurie Reynolds, Zon-
ing the Church: The Police Power Versus the First Amendment, 64 B.U. L. REV. 767, 819 (1985)
(concluding that exclusion of churches from residential areas can survive free exercise challenge,
although cautioning against danger of arbitrariness and religious discrimination where special-use
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Further, we would reach an identical result in cases like Lutheran Church,
where a church can prove that its landmarked building is no longer physically
adequate for its religious or charitable purposes. Indeed, in both of these situa-
tions, such proof would also show that applying the landmark ordinance violates
the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause under either of the theories previously
discussed.
378
The most difficult aspect of landmark preservation we must address in our
burden inquiry is the general effects of exterior designation on a church - that
is, whether such designation constitutes a burden on religion because it intrudes
on "architecture as theology," exacting a fiscal toll through maintenance re-
quirements and review procedures, or violates church autonomy by requiring
churches to submit to "secular approval.1
379
Given the outcome of our analysis of the fiscal burden issue in the context
of property development, there is no reason to find a different outcome regarding
maintenance costs that may be imposed by landmark regulations.3 8 0 Regarding
the autonomy issue, it is important to recognize that churches normally are
treated no differently from any other property owner subject to government reg-
ulation. Churches must conform to building, safety, fire, electrical, and plumb-
ing codes, which, of course, means that churches must routinely seek secular
approval before they undertake exterior (or interior) repairs and renovations
that are regulated under such codes. Presumably, secular approval in these cir-
cumstances is uncontroversial because there is no religious significance to up-
grading electrical wiring or replacing a broken sewer connection. 38 1 Thus, what
must lie at the heart of the autonomy and "architecture as theology" claim re-
garding landmark ordinances is the idea that ordinances require secular ap-
proval of matters that should remain in the sole discretion of religious
permits are used) and Mark W. Cordes, Where to Pray? Religious Zoning and the First Amendment,
35 KAN. L. REV. 697, 701 (1987) (arguing that traditional position in majority of states that zoning
ordinances cannot exclude churches from residential areas is unwarranted, but that "mere rational-
ity" approach of Lakewood fails to provide sufficient scrutiny) with Godshal, supra note 200, at 1577-
83, and Comment, Zoning Ordinances Affecting Churches" A Proposal for Expanded Free Exercise
Protection, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1131, 1132 (1984) (both arguing for expanded free exercise analyses
in cases involving zoning regulation of churches).
378. See discussion supra at notes 144-83 and accompanying text.
379. See Carmella, Landmark Preservation, supra note 8, at 52-53 (landmark designation im-
poses fiscal burden and creates potential for government entanglement in church affairs); Crewdson,
supra note 9, at 161-63 (administrative review process involves local landmark commissions in judg-
ments concerning architectural expressions of religious beliefs symbolism).
380. See, e.g., Bagni, supra 302, at 1548 ("[T]he custodial maintenance of its buildings are far
removed from the spiritual epicenter of the church. They more properly belong in the second con-
centric circle").
381. See, e.g., Carmella, Landmark Preservation, supra note 8, at 50-51 (diocese will allocate
funds to meet building code requirements because those regulations based on concern for health and
safety). Despite this, the Washington Supreme Court is unique in having found a constitutional
violation when enforcement of building and fire codes led to the closure of a religious school on
safety grounds. City of Sumner v. First Baptist Church, 639 P.2d 1358, 1362 (Wash. 1982) (uncom-
promising enforcement of building codes which would close church operated school would deny
church members right to guide children's education).
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authorities.
38 2
Obviously, the theories discussed earlier provide no guidance in determin-
ing whether landmark designation, by definition, burdens religion in violation of
the First Amendment. The polar categories implicit in each model - sacred
and secular are handy tags we might apply - clearly suggest that the models
contemplate some degree of harmony (if only at the secular level) between gov-
ernment regulation and religious autonomy. The present inquiry proceeds on a
more fundamental level than the models allow. In order to determine if
landmark designation is irreconcilable with the First Amendment we must ex-
amine the underlying philosophical position of the respective authors.
At this point, a clear distinction emerges between Professor Carmella's ad-
vocacy of a blanket exemption from landmark designation for houses of worship
and this Article's claim that such an exemption is unwarranted. 383 The avail-
able data on the administration of landmark preservation ordinances seems to
refute Professor Carmella's insistence that all landmark regulation of houses of
worship involves impermissible government intrusion on religion and thus sup-
ports the notion that there are both sacred and secular elements in this context.
While the reported cases we've previously discussed provide little insight, the
treatment of religious properties under the Philadelphia landmarks ordinance is
instructive.
In the vast majority of the 127 permit applications reported in the Philadel-
phia study, 384 the Historical Commission was asked to, and did, approve routine
repairs, reconstructions, and demolitions of houses of worship or their auxiliary
buildings. The only permit request that could be unequivocally identified as "sa-
cred" rather than secular involved the Commission's 1964 denial of a request to
attach a cross to the top of the Church of St. Luke and the Epiphany, based on
the Commission's view that St. Luke and the Epiphany, an excellent example of
a Greek Revival church, was, architecturally speaking, complete without a cross
at the apex of the pediment.
38 5
Professor Carmella's claim also contrasts sharply with a basic notion in the
scholarship on the burden issue: the activities of religious institutions include
382. See, eg., Carmella, Landmark Preservation, supra note 8, at 53 (arguing that requiring
secular approval of ultimate disposal of church property creates potential for disruptive parishioner
participation in hierarchical decision processes). But see Laycock, supra note 302, at 1412-14 (argu-
ing that right to church autonomy should not depend on way in which church is organized).
383. Carmella, Houses of Worship, supra note 8, at 405. Given her view that ecclesiastical
architecture is theology, the permissible scope of governmental regulation for houses of worship is
limited to "safety, health or zoning regulations that indirectly influence the design of a structure."
Under the "architecture as theology" theory, however, even this limitation becomes questionable.
Although Professor Carmella would tolerate the imposition of zoning regulations on houses of wor-
ship, these have at least as great a potential as landmark regulations to intrude upon religious free-
dom. For example, zoning restrictions on the height of a house of worship could conceivably bar the
construction of a Gothic cathedral or the minaret of a mosque. Presumably, Professor Carmella
finds this less objectionable than design control because government is only indirectly involved in
"dictating the content, profession and formation of belief." Id. at 451-52.
384. See PHILADELPHIA STUDY, supro note 103.
385. Id. at 7.
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both sacred and secular components. Thus, it is necessary to inquire into the
nature of a particular activity in order to determine if government regulation of
that activity would constitute a burden on religion. 38 6 Further, the scholarship
on the burden issue stands for the proposition that such an inquiry is itself not
constitutionally suspect.
The model for such an inquiry suggested by the student editors of the
Harvard Law Review could serve this purpose quite well.38 7 Its distinction be-
tween activities that may be burdened - those activities that are motivated by
religious belief but which are not substantively religious - and activities that
must not be burdened - those that are not merely religiously motivated, but are
themselves substantively religious - seems well-suited to evaluating the burden
issue when religious institutions claim that landmark regulation of the exterior
of a house of worship is interfering with "architecture as theology."
This approach, however, does not address the claim that landmark designa-
tion per se burdens religion by intruding too deeply on the right of religious
institutions to autonomy. In answering this claim, it is instructive to examine
the underlying philosphical positions on the issue of First Amendment exemp-
tions of the authors who have addressed the burden issue.
Professor McConnell, a leading advocate for free exercise exemptions, ar-
gues that the text and history of the Free Exercise Clause "guarantees that be-
lievers of every faith, and not just the majority, are able to practice their religion
without unnecessary interference from the government. ' 38 8 Further, Professor
McConnell notes that this is "a protection that is most often needed by practi-
tioners of non-mainstream faiths who lack the ability to protect themselves in
the political sphere, but may, on occasion, be needed by any person of religious
convictions caught in conflict with our secular political culture."
38 9
Justifications for free exercise exemptions based on a concern for "non-
mainstream faiths" appears to lack any validity in the landmark context. In-
deed, it is normally only the most established of faiths that "suffer" designation
because only they have produced structures significant enough to be selected.
As for the second element, the conflict between religious and secular values
is, of course, the very core of the disagreement. On this point, Professor Mc-
Connell and Judge Posner have stated that "[e]ffects on religious practice must
be minimized, and can be justified only on the basis of a demonstrable and una-
voidable relation to public purposes unrelated to the effects on religion. ' ' 39° In
another attempt to define a rule for judging conflicts between religious and secu-
lar values, Professor McConnell suggested that a law with the purpose or likely
effect of increasing religious uniformity by inhibiting the religious practice of the
person or group challenging the law "will be permitted only if it is the least
restrictive means for (a) protecting the private rights of others, or (b) ensuring
386. See supra text accompanying notes 304-36.
387. See Developments in the Law, supra note 281, at 1775-80.
388. McConnell, supra note 221, at 1192.
389. Id.
390. McConnell & Posner, supra note 302.
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that the benefits and burdens of public life are equitably shared."
' 39 1
Landmark preservation, concerned with historical, architectural, cultural
and communal values, 392 satisfies Professor McConnell and Judge Posner's cri-
terion that government regulation be justified by public purposes unrelated to
the effects of religion. Moreover, landmark designation has been validated by
the United States Supreme Court as meeting the constitutional test for ensuring
that the benefits and burdens of public life are distributed in a fair manner.
39 3
A consideration of the fundamental arguments presented by Professor Mar-
shall, a leading critic of free exercise exemptions, reinforces this judgment. Mar-
shall identifies favoritism towards religious belief systems as one of the most
serious potential problems associated with free exercise exemptions: "a constitu-
tional preference for religious belief cuts at the heart of the central principle of
the Free Speech Clause - that every idea is of equal dignity and status in the
marketplace of ideas." 394 Recognizing that religion is not insular, but a power-
ful social and political force that competes with other forms of belief in the shap-
ing of the mores and values of society, 39 5 Marshall argues that exempting
religious organizations from regulatory requirements will endow them with
more resources to carry on their religious enterprise and dissemination of
ideas. 396 Marshall's favoritism argument is, of course, directly applicable to the
landmark context. Granting exemptions to landmarked religious institutions,
while retaining restrictions on secular landmarks, would have the precise effect
Marshall suggests. Even if St. Bartholomew's or the Society for Ethical Culture
is barred from reaping millions from commercial property development at their
landmarked sites, their exemptions from the other financial burdens associated
with landmark designation, such as permitting and affirmative maintenance re-
quirements while "competing" secular charitable institutions are denied such
exemption, serves to free funds to promote their religious message and mission.
D. Legislative Protections for Religious Institutions and the Establishment
Clause
As has been noted previously, legislative efforts to grant religious institu-
tions some measure of protection from landmark ordinances have recently be-
come a viable alternative for opponents of landmark designation. Given that
Smith itself suggests that churches should look to the political process rather
than the courts for free exercise protections, 397 we should expect even more such
efforts in the future. Smith is not unique in recognizing the role of political
bodies in accommodating free exercise values, where the Free Exercise Clause
itself does not compel the courts to require an exemption from a neutral law of
391. Michael W. McConnell, Taking Religion Seriously, FIRST THINGS, May 1990, at 30, 34.
392. See generally authorities cited supra note 82.
393. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 133-35 (1978).
394. Marshall, supra note 221, at 320.
395. See Marshall & Blomgren, supra note 302, at 316-20 (cataloguing the extent and value of
church-owned property and commercial holdings, and political influence of religious organizations).
396. Marshall, supra note 221, at 322.
397. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 883-84 (1990).
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general application. 39 8 The justification for allowing such legislative accommo-
dations "is that the government is in a better position than the courts to evaluate
the strength of its own interest in governing without religious exceptions."
399
But in considering laws that exempt churches from landmark ordinances, how
careful must legislators be that they do not violate the Establishment Clause of
the First Amendment?
The test for the constitutionality of government action that allegedly vio-
lates the Establishment Clause was set forth in Lemon v. Kurtzman: "First, the
statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary
effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion . . .; finally, the
statute must not foster an excessive government entanglement with religion."
4 °
In these cases, however, because the legislatures are avowedly seeking to pro-
mote the free exercise of religion by exempting churches, 4° 1 there is an inherent
tension between the Lemon analysis and any legislation intended to advance free
exercise values.4 2 As Justice O'Connor wrote in her concurring opinion in
Wallace v. Jaffree :43
On the one hand, a rigid application of the Lemon test would invali-
date legislation exempting religious observers from generally applica-
ble government obligations. By definition, such legislation has a
religious purpose and effect in promoting the free exercise of religion.
On the other hand, judicial deference to all legislation that purports to
facilitate the free exercise of religion would completely vitiate the Es-
tablishment Clause. Any statute pertaining to religion can be viewed
as an "accommodation" of free exercise rights.
4 4
This tension between legislative free exercise exemptions and the Establish-
ment Clause can be resolved in the context of landmark regulation by reference
to the analysis of the burden question in the preceding section. That analysis
398. See TRIBE, supra note 283, § 14-7, at 1194 (Court has extended principle of free exercise
neutrality to allow Congress, and state legislatures to create necessary exemptions). Of course, after
Smith, there will be few cases, if any, that will find a constitutionally-compelled free exercise
exemption.
399. Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion, 1985 SuP. CT. REV. 1, 31.
400. 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
401. With the sole exception of New York City Council Introduction No. 633, which would
have applied to all tax-exempt landmarked properties, each of the legislative proposals described
previously that sought to protect churches from landmark designation did so by singling-out reli-
gious institutions, either by exempting them from designation or requiring that they consent to
designation.
402. There has been extensive, and conflicting commentary on this tension and how it should
be resolved. Compare Steven D. Smith, Separation and the "Secular" Reconstructing the Disestab-
lishment Decision, 67 TEX. L. REV. 955, 990-93, 1025-31 (1989) (noting conflict between the Free
Exercise and Establishment Clauses and arguing that much of conflict could be resolved by discard-
ing "secularism" in favor of "institutional separation" as the most basic value underlying the Estab-
lishment Clause; this would permit government accommodation of religion so long as it does not
involve government directly in internal affairs of churches or confer actual governmental power on
churches) with Developments in the Law, supra note 281, at 1737-40 (arguing for closer scrutiny of
legislative accommodations).
403. 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
404. Id. at 82 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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concluded that landmark regulation only burdens religion when core religious
values are affected by the designation of church interiors or when exterior
designation is found to intrude upon architectural decisions that are substan-
tially theological or has the effect of rendering a building physically or finan-
cially unsuitable for the existing activities of a religious institution.
Applying this analysis to legislative exemptions, enactments that attempt
wholly to exempt churches from landmark regulations - such as owner consent
provisions, barring designation of churches, or hardship appeals provisions that
effectively gut landmark controls - would fail an Establishment Clause chal-
lenge because they are not permissible accommodations of free exercise, but
rather unconstitutional attempts to benefit religious institutions over secular in-
stitutions that are similarly situated. 40 5 By contrast, legislative enactments that
accommodate core religious values, such as exemption from interior designation
and hardship provisions for nonprofit institutions generally, would pass consti-
tutional muster.
Further, the recognition that churches have both religious and secular in-
terests in their properties, which is explicit in the burden analysis, would allow
for significant government financial support of the secular components of reli-
gious buildings. For example, the burden analysis strongly indicates that the
Establishment Clause would not be violated if a state or municipality established
a low-interest loan program for all owners of landmarked properties, using ap-
propriate controls to insure that funds loaned to religious institutions were ex-
pended for the sole purpose of meeting the requirements of landmark
ordinances.406 In fact, New York State has made significant grants to
landmarked religious institutions to permit exterior maintenance and repairs.40 7
CONCLUSION
This Article has shown that much of the alleged conflict between religious
405. Exempting religious institutions from landmark designation creates the potential for sig-
nificantly advancing religious ideas over competing secular ideas. If St. Bart's is free to reap millions
of dollars from the commercial development of its property and then apply those funds to support its
religious and charitable programs, but secular charitable institutions must comply with the
landmark ordinance and so are denied access to funds derived from property development, then
religious institutions and their ideas are given a significant advantage by government action. Deny-
ing government the right to prefer religion over secularism lies at the core of the Lemon test, and this
may well have been the reason why New York City Council Introduction No. 633 made all tax-
exempt institutions eligible for its proposed hardship appeals process, rather than limiting participa-
tion to churches. For a discussion of Introduction No. 633, see supra notes 138-40 and accompany-
ing text.
406. The "controls" under such a program would be similar to the regulatory inspection provi-
sions used to monitor building permits and would not create any need for a continuing government
oversight of religious activities likely to violate Lemon's entanglement prong. See, e.g., Roemer v.
Maryland Bd. of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736 (1976) (upholding grants for university construction at
religious institutions); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734 (1973) (same); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S.
672 (1971) (same).
407. 1986 Bond Act, 1986 N.Y. LAWS, ch. 512 (codified as amended at N.Y. ENVTL. CON-
SERv. LAW §§ 52-0901 to 52-0911 (McKinney Supp. 1992)). See Oversight Hearing, supra note 16,
at 73-76.
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institutions and landmark preservation is mythical and there is neither a need
nor a constitutional necessity for the outright exemption of churches from
landmark designation. Rather than creating a blanket exemption from
landmark designation for houses of worship, courts may limit the protection
afforded to religious institutions, and thereby achieve an appropriate constitu-
tional accommodation between governmental interests and religion, by focusing
more closely on whether designation truly burdens core religious values.
Whether a court's analysis proceeds under New York's charitable purpose
test, or the Second Circuit's application of Smith to Free Exercise Clause chal-
lenges, or a consideration of the entanglement prong in an Establishment Clause
challenge under Lemon, the outlines of such an accommodation are clear.
Designation of church interiors, and exterior designation that leaves a building
physically or financially unsuitable for the existing activities of a religious insti-
tution, would be barred as intruding too deeply into the essence of religious
belief. At the same time, neither the financial costs associated with meeting the
requirements of preservation ordinances - including denial of permission for
commercial development - nor the fact that religious institutions must seek
secular approval in accordance with the ordinance's provisions is sufficient to
uphold a First Amendment claim. Claims that exterior designation has intruded
upon architectural decisions that implicate theology are not so readily catego-
rized; however, they may be analyzed by examining the religious substance and
motivation involved in each instance.
Legislatures can also play a role in reaching a more appropriate accommo-
dation between government and religious institutions by amending their
landmark ordinances to include hardship provisions specifically tailored to the
needs of religious and charitable institutions, exempting the interiors of houses
of worship from designation, and negotiating with religious institutions to find
alternatives to full compliance with landmark ordinance requirements. State
and local governments should also explore financial aid programs, available to
all landmarked properties, that could aid religious institutions which find the
financial burdens of designation difficult to bear.
By striving to find an appropriate accommodation between government and
religion, rather than crafting a blanket exemption from landmark designation
for religious institutions, courts and legislatures will hew more closely to the
values that underlie the First Amendment.
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